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TRUE BELIEVERS AT LAW: NATIONAL SECURITY AGENDAS,
THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS, AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
PETER MARGULIES*
ABSTRACT
Ideological agendas distort the deliberation required for sound
legal advice about national security.  Elite government lawyers after
September 11 advanced a theory at the expense of context, labeling
legal constraints as “lawfare” against American interests.  The
lawfare critics failed to recognize that legal constraints can empower
decisionmakers by reinforcing reputational and other long-term val-
ues.  They also failed their history test, ignoring the lessons of presi-
dents from Jefferson to Kennedy who rejected a rigid adherence to
ideology in the national security realm.  By discounting context, the
construction of the lawfare paradigm produced dire results, includ-
ing the torture memos drafted by the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel (“OLC”) and the destruction of CIA interrogation
tapes.
Unfortunately, this elevation of ideology over context has failed
to yield adequate remedies.  Tort litigation, exemplified by Jose Pa-
dilla’s recent lawsuit against former OLC attorney John Yoo, risks
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personalizing the problem and neglecting systemic issues.  The infor-
mal norms approach suggested by a number of OLC alumni, while
offering a number of excellent proposals such as citing and distin-
guishing adverse authority, has not attracted stakeholders across the
political spectrum.  A structural reform approach that replaces OLC
with an adjudicative entity may produce an inquisitorial tribunal
that lacks sharp adversarial inputs and loses influence to more plia-
ble players such as White House counsel.
To transcend these difficulties, lawyers should turn to a model
of dialogic equipoise relying on two values: transparency and tailor-
ing.  Dialogic equipoise allows the President to take action that is
consistent with the most accurate reading of sources of authority.  Ac-
tion, however, must be both interstitial—with a clear exit strategy—
and publicly disclosed.  To implement the dialogic equipoise model,
this Article recommends an integrated approach, including a safe
harbor for publicly disclosed legal opinions, consideration of institu-
tional consequences, assertion of the least drastic rationale for execu-
tive power, and an ex ante role for Inspectors General and the OLC
in document preservation.  This blended regime can counter ideol-
ogy’s corrosive influence on legal deliberation about war, peace, and
national security.
Some clients love drama.  Take the client who informs you that
the fates of thousands of people hinge on your advice.1  For the con-
scientious lawyer, a dilemma arises.  In the ever-shifting context of na-
tional security decisions, inflexible adherence to the letter of the law
can spell disaster.2  Invidious or ill-advised responses to exigency, how-
ever, can undermine the integrity of legal institutions.  A lawyer with
an ideological agenda to promote may not see the complexity of the
situation.  Indeed, the ideologically driven lawyer may have helped
construct the client’s stark vision.  Unfortunately, failing to see the
dilemma does not make it go away.
1. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 71 (2007) (noting the displeasure of Vice President Cheney’s Counsel,
David Addington, who often spoke for the Vice President, at then Office of Legal Counsel
attorney Jack Goldsmith’s refusal to sign off on “an important counterterrorism initiative;”
Addington told Goldsmith that “the blood of the hundred thousand people who die in the
next attack will be on your hands”).
2. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (recommending pragmatism and cautioning against “rigidity dictated by a
doctrinaire textualism” in analyzing scope of executive power); cf. David J. Barron & Mar-
tin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121
HARV. L. REV. 941, 948–49 (2008) (arguing that presidents have varied in their interpreta-
tion of their own authority and have often elected to work with Congress, rather than rely
on stark claims of executive power).
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Commentators have long argued that the lawyer is best served by
a balance or equipoise between solidarity with a client and commit-
ment to the abiding values of the legal system.  This equipoise allows
lawyers to fulfill the role identified by students of the social scene
from Tocqueville3 to the present as mediators between private and
public interests.4  When lawyers become issue entrepreneurs, pushing
a perspective on an issue that ignores or discounts opposing views,
they threaten this ideal of equipoise.  For government lawyers in na-
tional security matters, the stance of the issue entrepreneur is particu-
larly perilous.5  National security lawyers opine about inherently
dangerous or intrusive measures, including coerced interrogation,
surveillance, weapons sales, and military strikes.  The temptations for
any lawyer to go along with the perceived wishes of a senior official are
substantial.  When a lawyer is an issue entrepreneur predisposed to
approve violent or intrusive means, the lawyer’s ability to say “No” to
the client is even more gravely compromised.6  Moreover, the lawyer’s
issue entrepreneurship can create a tipping point that privileges short-
term interests and legitimizes unduly risky behavior by the executive.
These perils have emerged in a number of recent developments, in-
3. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, On That Which Tempers the Tyranny of the Majority in the
United States, in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 301, 306 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Library of
Am. 2004) (stating that the “legal profession is the only aristocratic element that can mix
readily with the natural elements of democracy” and that a republic could not survive today
“unless the influence of lawyers on its affairs increases as the power of the people grows”).
4. See Peter Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence and Collective Illegality in Government and
Corporate Misconduct, Terrorism, and Organized Crime, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 939, 982 (2006)
[hereinafter Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence] (explaining that the concept of equipoise
requires lawyers to balance work in a manner that both serves the interests of private cli-
ents and safeguards the public’s interest and democratic values).
5. On the ethics of executive branch lawyers, see generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully
Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559
(2007); John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative,
Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L REV. 375, 407–19 (1993); Randolph
D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective From the Office of Legal Counsel, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 1303 (2000); Neil M. Peretz, The Limits of Outsourcing: Ethical Responsibilities
of Federal Government Attorneys Advising Executive Branch Officials, 6 CONN. PUB. INT’L L.J. 23
(2006); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands,
103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005); Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Govern-
ment Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (2006); A. John Radsan, Sed Quis
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel?, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 201
(2008); cf. Nelson Lund, The President as Client and the Ethics of the President’s Lawyers, 61 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 65–67 (1998) (arguing that government lawyers lack authority to sec-
ond-guess their clients’ choices on grounds of morality or policy); Geoffrey P. Miller, Gov-
ernment Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1295–97
(1987) (same).
6. Issue entrepreneurs can also be unduly predisposed toward caution. See infra notes
72–73 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate balance between caution and taking R
risks).
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cluding the torture memos drafted by the Justice Department’s Office
of Legal Counsel (“OLC”)7 and the Central Intelligence Agency
(“CIA”) tape destruction affair.
Issue entrepreneurship in post-September 11 legal advice arose
because academic lawyers pushed the overarching idea that America
was unfairly and dangerously bound by law.  According to these law-
yers, who included OLC attorneys John Yoo and Jack Goldsmith,8 in-
ternational law was often illegitimate because it did not require
adequate consent or reflect national interests.9  Yoo also had a dis-
torted view of executive power.10  Goldsmith has struggled to recon-
cile his critique of international law with an emerging prudential
concern about the Bush Administration’s unilateralism.  In his starkly
7. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 176–80, 200–02 (2007) (criti-
quing Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee and OLC lawyer Daniel Levin’s memos ad-
dressing torture and abuse of Al Qaeda detainees); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z.
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 187–99
(2007) (providing a historical background on the role of OLC lawyers in drafting legal
opinions and addressing the torture memos specifically); Stephen Gillers, Legal Ethics: A
Debate, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 236, 236–40 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006)
(arguing that the torture memos failed to adequately addressed the legal questions at is-
sue); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 67, 80–85 (2005) [hereinafter Wendel, Legal Ethics] (critiquing the torture memos);
W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167, 1224–32 (2005)
[hereinafter Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation] (same).
8. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 20–21 (noting that John Yoo and Jack Goldsmith R
were part of a group of conservative intellectuals skeptical about the increasing influence
of international law on American law).
9. Goldsmith has also argued that customary international law is nothing but a stalk-
ing horse for national interest and is thus entitled to no independent respect. See JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13 (2005) (arguing that
customary international law does not reflect “universal” interests, rather that it is a product
of state self-interest); cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 275 (2007) (arguing that legal constraints on national
security decisionmaking are usually counterproductive and institutionally flawed); JOHN
YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 106–08 (2006)
[hereinafter YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS] (arguing that restrictions on wiretapping and
data collection endanger national security).
The lawyers mentioned are often part, very loosely speaking, of a network of lawyers
with conservative goals and values. See generally Patrick J. Bumatay, Causes, Commitments, and
Counsels: A Study of Political and Professional Obligations Among Bush Administration Lawyers, 31
J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 22–36 (2007) (discussing the views of government lawyers’ roles among
Bush Administration attorneys); Anthony Paik et al., Lawyers of the Right: Networks and Or-
ganization, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 883, 891–99 (2007) (providing statistical data about the
structure of lawyer networks).  Of course, there are substantial variations within the cohort
of conservative lawyers, as they are among lawyers who consider themselves liberal or pro-
gressive. See Paik et al., supra, at 891–99 (discussing differences among social, pro-business,
and libertarian conservatives).
10. See YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS, supra note 9, at 10–14 (arguing that the President R
has prerogative power that neither Congress nor the courts can restrain under the
Constitution).
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critical mode, Goldsmith argues that enemies of the United States ex-
ploit international law by conducting “lawfare” against American
interests.11
The lawfare critics at the OLC failed to recognize that legal con-
straints can empower, as well as impede, decisionmakers.  Reasonable
constraints check the executive’s tendency in crises to discount
reputational and other long-term values.  Preserving reputation allows
the United States to project “soft power,” which is often more effective
than brute force.  That ability to project soft power has suffered with
the revelations about American personnel engaging in torture and co-
ercion, often acting with at least partial authorization from the OLC.
This Article will discuss the construction of lawfare in the political
economy of theory.  Theorists and those who publicize their work
have often extolled parsimony as a virtue—advancing one idea to ex-
plain as many complex events as possible.12  In theory, parsimony is a
good idea, paring away extraneous or irrelevant factors and—particu-
larly in the physical sciences—allowing other members of an interpre-
tive community to try to falsify the thesis.  Think of gravity.  In
practice, however, particularly in the area of social sciences, parsi-
mony poses risks.  It can become reductive, missing the history and
context that form the backdrop for human events.13  In addition, par-
simony can become a branding strategy for issue entrepreneurs seek-
ing a vivid story to vanquish their opponents’ fuzzy equivocations.  In
the social sciences, issue entrepreneurs have reduced theories of self-
interest to simplistic levels that would earn the ire of thinkers like
Adam Smith, who regarded parsimony as theory’s distinctive vice.14
The critique of international law as lawfare advanced by Gold-
smith, Yoo, and others is a model of parsimony.  It attacks interna-
tional law on two grounds—as being illegitimate and impairing the
efficacy of American policy.  Each argument founders, however, when
context and history disturb parsimony’s domain.  International law
has featured prominently in American law since the Founding era,
with Chief Justice John Marshall relying on the international law of
11. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 58–59. R
12. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some
Categories of Economic Discourse, in RIVAL VIEWS OF MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ES-
SAYS 142, 142–43 (1986) (outlining skeptical view of parsimony’s virtues in the context of
economic theory).
13. Cf. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION 224–64 (1993) (discussing problems with parsimony and the neglect of prudential
considerations on both the Right and Left in the legal academy).
14. See PIERRE FORCE, SELF-INTEREST BEFORE ADAM SMITH: A GENEALOGY OF ECONOMIC
SCIENCE 10–11 (2003) (analyzing Adam Smith’s negative view of parsimony).
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neutrality in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.15  American presidents
have typically regarded the body of international law as a useful con-
straint, not a hindrance.  From Lincoln to Roosevelt to Kennedy, pres-
idents have considered international law in making national security
decisions, without any noticeable deficit in their decisiveness.16  Un-
fortunately, the lawfare critics’ parsimonious perspective has obscured
this productive role.
The parsimonious turn has also affected the lawfare critics’ work
product, with dire consequences for United States interests.17  John
Yoo wrote a memo that narrowed the definition of torture by ignoring
the lawyerly virtues of tailoring and fit.18  While Jack Goldsmith
showed great courage in withdrawing Yoo’s memo, Goldsmith today
faults the Administration on form, not substance.  He acknowledges
that the Bush Administration’s unilateral predilections have often
proved unwise, but asserts that the interrogations authorized by Yoo,
including those that used waterboarding, were legal.19  For Goldsmith,
the chief problem with the Administration’s stance is that it precluded
early cooperation with Congress on measures that would have been
even more draconian than the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”).
Given that the MCA appears to permit evidence obtained through co-
ercion, as long as that evidence is “reliable,” Goldsmith’s vision of pro-
cedural safeguards seems minimalist at best.20  Moreover, Goldsmith
authored a draft opinion on removing undocumented aliens from
Iraq that is more open about opposing authority, but fails to consider
how removing and interrogating people in this group leads straight
into the murky world of disappearances, “black sites,” and secret
prisons.
15. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). Marshall stated that an act of Congress can never be
construed to violate “neutral rights” or to affect “neutral commerce” under international
law. Id. at 118.
16. See infra notes 132–146 and accompanying text.
17. Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC.
L. & POL’Y 455, 469–71 (2005) (stating that despite the torture memo’s “glaring legal inac-
curacies” and flawed legal analysis, it became the basis for the Defense Department’s inter-
rogation policy); George C. Harris, The Rule of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional
Responsibilities of Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409,
451–52 (2005) (arguing that the attorneys that prepared the OLC torture memos failed to
carry out their professional obligations).
18. Yoo also opined that the President was not bound to any law Congress passed on
this issue. See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1229–35 (2006) (critiquing Yoo’s view).
19. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 143–51, 164–65. R
20. See 10 U.S.C. § 948r(d) (2006) (providing that statements obtained under circum-
stances “in which the degree of coercion is disputed” may be admitted if a military judge
finds that the statement is “reliable”).
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The damage caused by issue entrepreneurs extends not just to
compliance with international law, but to compliance with the Consti-
tution.  Examples of the latter include the MCA’s evisceration of
habeas corpus and the warrantless surveillance wrought by the Admin-
istration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program.  Some of these develop-
ments would surely have occurred without the issue entrepreneurship
of the lawfare critics.21  The lawfare critics, however, legitimized policy
and, at least in Yoo’s case, provided what even Goldsmith now ac-
knowledges as the virtual equivalent of a “get out of jail free” card.22
Moreover, as the ongoing investigation into the CIA’s destruction of
interrogation tapes reveals, the transitions between levels of coercive
questioning increased the risk of satellite misconduct such as obstruc-
tion and perjury.
This Article will argue that the issue entrepreneurship of lawfare
critics should give way to a model of dialogic equipoise.  The dialogic
equipoise model stresses two core values: transparency and tailoring.
On this view, the attorney serves the executive branch best by keeping
in mind the structural scheme of the Constitution23 and limiting the
executive’s claims to inherent authority.  The model recognizes, how-
ever, that a “workable government”24 is fluid, not static.  The attorney
may advise the executive to act against the most accurate reading of a
statute or constitutional provision, but should approve only interstitial
actions with clear exit strategies.  Moreover, such interstitial measures
should be subject to dialog with other stakeholders.  Lincoln’s initial
suspension of habeas corpus in the spring of 1861 to protect Union
transportation and communications lines from insurrection in Mary-
land, President Roosevelt’s destroyer deal with Britain during World
War II, and President Kennedy’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis
meet this test.
To enforce a model of dialogic equipoise, this Article will suggest
a comprehensive regime that blends criminal and tort law, informal
norms developed by former OLC officials, and structural reforms.
21. See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOS-
ING THE WAR ON TERROR 264 (2007) (noting that “temptation to adopt harshly coercive
preventive measures in response to terrorist attacks” is not exclusive to one particular presi-
dential administration or to any particular party).
22. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 149–50 (stating that the OLC’s conclusions about R
presidential power “could be interpreted as if they were designed to confer immunity for
bad acts”).
23. For another approach exploring this theme, see Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Com-
mander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169, 1169 (2006).
24. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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Each of these approaches is inadequate in isolation.  Tort remedies,
for example, exemplified by Jose Padilla’s recent lawsuit against John
Yoo, risk personalizing the problem and neglecting the systemic issues
that any new administration will face in a world that still presents dan-
gers.  By playing “gotcha,” both criminal and tort law approaches also
risk alienating politicians and lawyers linked to the present Adminis-
tration and its supporters in Congress, leading to a reprise of the vola-
tile mixture of law and politics that plagued implementation of the
Independent Counsel statute in the 1980s and 1990s.25  The informal
norms approach, while offering a number of excellent proposals for
best practices by OLC attorneys like citing and distinguishing contrary
authority, similarly lacks stakeholders affiliated with the Bush Admin-
istration and also appears to unduly limit the President’s own lawmak-
ing power under the Constitution.  A structural reform approach that
replaces the OLC with an adjudicatory entity raises questions about
the tribunal’s legitimacy, the quality and sharpness of its adversarial
inputs, and the role of politics in selecting the entity’s personnel.
In contrast, a pragmatic or blended approach would take the best
of each of these approaches.  It would provide presumptive safe har-
bor protection from criminal and tort liability to attorney opinions
that have been published, thus encouraging dialog.  It would develop
specialized ethics rules for national security attorneys that require
practices consistent with the informal norms approach, including cita-
tion and distinguishing of adverse authority, consideration of the non-
legal and institutional consequences of executive action, and
adoption of the least expansive rationale for such action by the Presi-
dent.  Finally, to deal with the problem of satellite misconduct, the
blended approach suggests a greater role for Inspectors General in
handling questions of document preservation, and seeking guidance
from the OLC.
These proposals will not end issue entrepreneurship in national
security matters.  Nor will they end the perennial appeal of parsimony
to scholars who find themselves in government positions.  Seeking dia-
logic equipoise will, however, temper the excesses of issue entrepre-
neurship and promote the deliberative virtues that have distinguished
the most effective national security advice.
This Article is presented in six Parts.  Part I outlines the problem
of parsimony and provides a brief history of issue entrepreneurship
25. Cf. Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Politi-
cal Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 590–92 (2005) (discussing
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation of Bill Clinton).
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among government lawyers.  Part II focuses on Goldsmith and Yoo’s
lawfare critique, highlighting the flaws in that critique.  Part III exam-
ines the legal memos produced by Yoo, Goldsmith, and their succes-
sors, and the costs of those memos.  Part IV analyzes options for
regulating the advice of OLC attorneys, including the criminal, tort,
informal norm, structural reform, and professional discipline options.
Part V outlines the dialogic equipoise model as an alternative to issue
entrepreneurship for elite government lawyers.  Part VI provides a
blended enforcement model for encouraging dialogic equipoise.
I. ISSUE ENTREPRENEURS, CAUSE LAWYERING, AND GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS
A. Parsimony in Theory
Government is not just about ends and means, it is about ideas.
Ideas distinguish contending groups, marking some as friends and
others as enemies.  Issue entrepreneurs assert their own identity
through their ideas, seeking to establish the primacy of their analysis
over perspectives from the past or competing perspectives from the
present.26  Scholars in law and economics, for example, have devel-
oped rational actor theories, either reductive or nuanced in nature, to
explain human behavior and lay down a marker to measure other the-
ories’ effectiveness.27
For issue entrepreneurs, parsimony confers advantages.  To be
successful, issue entrepreneurs must attract attention and discredit
old orthodoxies.28  Parsimony aids this mobilization process.29  A
26. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 29–33 (2000) (discussing the process
that “norm entrepreneurs” use to  establish social and political norms).
27. See FORCE, supra note 14, at 9–14 (discussing the use of the self-interest principle to R
explain human behavior and economics); see also Ralph G. Carter et al., Setting a Course:
Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs in Post-World War II U.S. Foreign Policy, 5 INT’L STUD.
PERSP. 278, 284–86 (2004) (discussing foreign policy issue entrepreneurs).  Issue or policy
entrepreneurs in this context are practitioners or scholars who wish to take the initiative in
a particular area, often with a parsimonious narrative that explains and justifies through a
simple set of criteria.  Entrepreneurs in the political realm may focus on issues that distin-
guish them from the current occupant of the White House—for example, Senator Edward
Kennedy’s interest in human rights and refugee affairs—or that respond to a niche de-
mand—such as Senator Chris Dodd’s commitment to peace in Latin America, originating
from his experience in the Peace Corps.
28. The suffragettes, for example, pressing their overarching idea of gender equality,
“chained themselves to fences, went on hunger strikes, broke windows of government
buildings, and refused to pay taxes as ways of protesting their exclusion from political
participation.”  Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Po-
litical Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 897 (1998).  Similarly, the modern civil rights movement
strove for equality by seeking to overturn established precedent and moving beyond the
judicial arena, engaging in sit-ins and other forms of direct action. See generally MARTIN
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good theory accords with the familiar rule of Occam’s razor—it relies
on as few moving parts as possible.  Economists, for example, turn to
the concept of rational self-interest, in various guises, to do both nor-
mative and descriptive work.30  Prospective adherents remember facts
and theories distinguished by salient features that are readily ex-
plained and tell a simple story.31  The audience for the issue entrepre-
neur does not have to remember a long list of factors, or dig deep into
the detail of each case.  Such theories have a rhetorical advantage over
theories that are thicker, taking in more facts about institutional struc-
ture and routine that complicate the narrative.32
In fights for interpretive dominance, therefore, parsimonious
theories frequently drive out thicker theories, at least for a time.  A
discourse that enjoys these advantages soon approaches a tipping
point.  Those who have initiated the discourse expect loyalty, while
acolytes strain to declare their allegiance to the theory and disparage
the competition.  The thrill of the new, or the urge to find renewed
LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 77 (1964) (writing
about his nonviolent protest against segregation in Birmingham, Alabama).  For a trans-
formative vision of race and class that seeks to update and extend King’s ideas, see john a.
powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW & INEQ. 355, 355–60
(2007).
29. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 28, at 897 (explaining that issue entrepre- R
neurs must challenge existing social conditions to create new norms).
30. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 159 (noting the concept of self-interest in the R
context of economic analysis); see also FORCE, supra note 14, at 9–10 (discussing debate R
between Hirschman and market theorists such as Gary Becker).  Other scholars may take a
different view of substance that is equally absolute in method, advancing a theory of law as
integrity that holds law to be consistent with our best practices and values.  For scholars
who follow this view, fairness and equality are often touchstones. See generally Finnemore &
Sikkink, supra note 28, at 895 (explaining the “life cycle” of norms and the role of norm R
entrepreneurs).  For a lucid argument that the concept of norm entrepreneurs has be-
come too fuzzy to possess any descriptive utility, see David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs
Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 283, 309–10 (2008).
31. See Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of
Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103, 117–19 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (ex-
plaining that individuals make decisions based on information sources deriving from ex-
periences that are easy to recall).
32. Cf. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43–51(3d ed.
1996) (discussing transitions between paradigms in scientific explanation).  Theories with
fewer moving parts are also more readily falsifiable, encouraging further research. See gen-
erally KARL R. POPPER, Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge, in CONJECTURES AND REFUTA-
TIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 129–32 (2d ed. Basic Books 1965) (1963)
(discussing relationship between structure of theory and growth of scientific knowledge);
cf. Paul K. MacDonald, Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Founda-
tions of Rational Choice Theory, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 551, 553–56 (2003) (arguing that even
in scientific explanation, parsimonious theories work better in engendering debate than
they do in accounting for observed phenomena).
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relevance in a return to origins, helps to constitute the discourse.33
Issue entrepreneurs also fashion signals that cue their followers and
establish the bona fides of a group member.  In the group that criti-
qued government regulation and exalted the unfettered market in the
1980s, for example, Adam Smith neckties were a prominent signaling
device.34 Smith himself would have viewed such displays as puzzling,
but they illustrate the power of parsimonious ideas.
Parsimonious ideas often have disproportionate power in times of
contradiction and crisis.35  In a crisis environment, another cognitive
dynamic joins the salience heuristic: representativeness.36  People see
a grave crisis looming on the horizon, immersing them in uncertainty,
and they seek a story, image, or theory that is equally stark.  A thicker
theory seems equivocal in a climate that rewards decisiveness.37  In-
deed, thick theories seem like dangerous distractions at best, and em-
blems of disloyalty at worst.
Frequently, the problems that theories purport to resolve are
themselves framed to encourage parsimonious answers.  Consider the
problem of torture and the “ticking bomb scenario.”  Faced with de-
struction of a city because a single terrorist refuses to disclose the loca-
tion of the bomb, a parsimonious utilitarian theory would suggest that
33. The appeal of parsimony can be just as potent on the Left as the Right. See BRIAN
Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 75 (2006) (discuss-
ing  the influence of Marxist philosopher Friedrich Engels’ reductive notion that morality
was product of “contemporary economic conditions of society”).
34. See Washington Talk: Briefing; Salute to Reaganism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1988, at A28
(discussing a reception and buffet attended by Robert Bork, Alan Greenspan, and others;
noting that some attendees wore the “emblem of hard-core Reaganomics—the necktie em-
broidered with a bust of Adam Smith”).
35. See Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices,
and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
232, 256–59 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (discussing competition and
contradiction among political ideologies and discourses).
36. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substi-
tution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 31, at 49, 49–50, 65–81 R
(discussing the controversy over the representativeness heuristic).
37. See Ronald Rogowski, Review Article, Rationalist Theories of Politics: A Midterm Report,
30 WORLD POL. 296, 304 (1978) (noting that American academics beginning in the 1960s
came to believe that “largely inductive and intuitive style that had characterized even beha-
viorist explanation became unacceptable; instead, serious practitioners demanded hypoth-
eses that were both deductively derived from a few basic axioms and falsifiable”).  This
dynamic then drives the entire interpretive community framed by the discourse. Cf. BRIAN
Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW
148 (1997) (elaborating on prominent legal scholar Stanley Fish’s notion of a legal inter-
pretive community, consisting of “groups of people bound together by shared knowledge,
language or terminology, and often a basic corpus of ideas, beliefs, and attitudes.  One
becomes a member of an interpretive community by undergoing indoctrination—by learn-
ing and internalizing the shared ‘meaning system’ of the interpretive community”).
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the salvation of the many justifies the suffering of one individual who
is culpable.  Driven by the hypothetical’s premises, society moves to-
ward a tipping point where actions such as torture are acceptable or
even required.38  As discourse percolates through institutions, the new
theory “expand[s] itself to the limit[s] of its logic.”39  Having the tool
of torture available creates further institutional pressure for the tool’s
use.40  It also provides an opening for new acolytes to demonstrate
their toughness.41
As the theories generated by the ticking bomb scenario demon-
strate, issue entrepreneurs do not only attract attention, they also con-
fer legitimacy.42  Interest-based theories that tied the apparent
excesses of markets to Adam Smith’s invisible hand may well have
missed the richness of Smith’s thought.43  These theories also justified
inequality in two senses.  First, they intimated that inequality was inevi-
table, and extended that notion to the premise that attempts to re-
duce inequality would invariably produce perverse consequences.44
Second, reductive interest-based theories embodied the appeal of
both novelty and origin myth, casting justifications of government reg-
ulation as camouflage for rent-seeking bureaucrats45 and interest-
based theories as a return to the virtues of innovation and risk-tak-
ing.46  Through each of these arguments, interest-based theories legit-
imized inequalities of wealth and power.
38. See David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1427
(2005) (criticizing the “ticking-bomb hypotheticals” used to justify torture).
39. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921)).
40. Cf. JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANI-
ZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 13 (1989) (noting that a “solution [in public policy terms] . . .
is an answer actively looking for a question”).
41. Cf. Richard H. Weisberg, Loose Professionalism, or Why Lawyers Take the Lead on Tor-
ture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 299, 304 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (arguing that law-
yers constructing legal arguments for torture do not wish to seem naı¨ve in confronting the
ticking bomb scenario).
42. See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 28, at 903 (noting the importance of legiti- R
macy in establishing social norms).  In international law, legal scholars have long served
this purpose by laying claim to expertise in identifying and describing binding customary
norms.
43. See FORCE, supra note 14, at 9–14 (discussing interest-based theories). R
44. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOP-
ARDY 27–42 (1991) (discussing rhetoric of perverse consequences in the context of welfare
provisions that some conservatives argue interfere with market incentives).
45. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 915, 932–34 (2005) (critiquing William Niskanen’s well-known ideas regarding bu-
reaucratic behavior); Rogowski, supra note 37, at 311 (same). R
46. Many rational actor theorists have developed richer theories. See, e.g., POSNER,
supra note 26, at 29–32 (discussing the motivations of “norm entrepreneurs” and the use of R
symbolism and signals to accomplish self-interest goals).
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Unfortunately, life is too unruly to be reduced to theory.  Life’s
rough edges get in the way, fragmenting theories as people try to cre-
ate things that work in the world.47  For example, interest-based expla-
nations—unless they are so heavily qualified that they are no longer
parsimonious—fail to account for a wide swath of cooperative human
behavior.48  Ultimately, interest-based explanations, while they can
serve to enlighten and provoke debate, also embody academia’s
privileging of parsimonious theories.  As social scientist, Jon Elster ob-
serves, “[t]he assumption that all behavior is selfish is the most parsi-
monious we can make, and scientists always like to explain much with
little.  But . . . [s]ometimes the world is messy, and the most parsimo-
nious explanation is wrong.”49  Indeed, Adam Smith, sometimes
hailed as the father of interest-based theories, criticized parsimony as
a vice that scholars “are apt to cultivate with a peculiar fondness, as
the great means of displaying their ingenuity[ ]—the propensity to
account for all appearances from as few principles as possible.”50  Brit-
ish philosopher David Hume assailed parsimonious explanations as
neglecting the richness of the human condition, deriding as “fruitless”
47. British philosopher and political theorist Edmund Burke distrusted the theories
that drove the French Revolution, believing that the certainty of the theorists translated
into corpses draped over guillotines. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION
IN FRANCE 7 (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1790) (criticizing the intellec-
tual tendency to view ideas “stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of
metaphysical abstraction;” arguing that “[c]ircumstances . . . give . . . to every political
principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect . . . [and] circumstances are
what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind”); cf.
KRONMAN, supra note 13, at 25 (noting that Burke and American legal scholar Alexander R
Bickel “emphasized the importance of judgment in politics and insisted that the prudence
which political life demands cannot be reduced to or replaced by an abstract science of
government”); Carl T. Bogus, Rescuing Burke, 72 MO. L. REV. 387, 411 (2007) (“Burke be-
lieved that the wisdom of law came not from logic or abstract theory but from experi-
ence . . . .”).  Similarly, political theorist Hannah Arendt argued that the French
revolutionaries sought a purity that does not exist in the world, while American revolution-
aries improvised in response to necessity—they insisted on the interaction of theory and
facts on the ground and never lost sight of either. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION
111–12, 173–74 (Penguin Books 2006) (1963).  For Arendt, any theory that sought a com-
prehensive explanation of human conduct aimed to end history and failed to take into
account the unpredictability of human affairs, the multiplicity of perspectives, and the in-
evitability of change.
48. See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 137, 137–38 (2000) (setting up a discussion of the gap between self-interested indi-
viduals and cooperative human behavior).
49. JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 54 (1989).
50. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 474 (Liberty Classics 1976)
(1759).
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interest-based theories proceeding from “that love of simplicity which
has been the source of much false reasoning in philosophy.”51
One central error is that entrepreneurs promoting parsimonious
theories in law or social science often neglect the role of time.  Reduc-
tive interest-based theories, for example, often admit only grudgingly
that human beings cling to a short-term perspective.  This narrowing
of perspective camouflages long-term benefits and costs.52  For institu-
tions that function over time, temporal discontinuity can be disas-
trous.  Constitutionalism is useful because it commits the polity to
taking a long-term perspective, even when measures that injure equal-
ity or fairness promise short-term gain.53  Interest-based theories, how-
ever, often marginalize constitutional safeguards like judicial review,
arguing that deference to the political branches will typically lead to
sound outcomes.54  Interest-based theories also have a difficult time
dealing with agency costs, caused by agents whose own agendas cause
them to neglect the interests of the organizations or institutions they
represent.  Here, too, short-term gains tempt agents to make decisions
with long-term costs.  When economists study agency costs, they often
51. DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 116 (Liberal Arts
Press 1957) (1777). The tradeoffs between over- and under-theorizing data have continued
to consume scholars. See, e.g., Robert C. North & Matthew Willard, Review Essay, The Con-
vergence Effect: Challenge to Parsimony, 37 INT’L ORG. 339, 340 (1983) (“[W]hereas a lack of
parsimony often yields amorphous theory, an excess of parsimony may produce tautology,
explain the obvious, or, in the case of some approaches to international politics, reduce
complex human interactions to rigid, almost mechanical abstractions.”); Rogowski, supra
note 37, at 303–07 (rooting ascendancy of rationalist models in trends within the political R
academy, including new-found preference for models that were parsimonious and falsifi-
able); Lisa Wedeen, Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science, 96 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 713, 719 (2002) (arguing that political scientists would enrich their research by re-
laxing their preference for “conceptual parsimony over the complicated, messy narratives
of anthropological inquiry,” such as the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz).
52. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL
LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 46 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (discussing individuals’ tendency
to heavily discount future costs); cf. David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,
112 Q. J. ECON. 443, 444–45 (1997) (analyzing how individuals use “commitment mecha-
nisms” such as insurance policies or savings plans to remedy the tendency to discount
unduly the future); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM.
ECON. REV. 103, 105–07 (1999) (analyzing “present-biased preferences”).
53. Indeed, the careful design of constitutional structures can also assure that markets
play an appropriate role, encouraging efficiency and serving as a counterweight to politi-
cians who seek rents for special interests or a monopoly on power. See, e.g., John O. McGin-
nis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 542–46
(2000) (arguing that the World Trade Organization can serve a constitutional purpose by
checking protectionist forces and opening markets to more efficient products, including
products from the Third World).
54. For a contrasting view, see POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 4–6 (arguing that R
objective analysis must also consider that courts might unduly discount the importance of
acting quickly in emergencies).
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come up with interest-based remedies such as stock options to align
the interests of salaried managers more thoroughly with the interests
of the corporation.55  Interest-based theories do less well, however, in
dealing with the volatility that risk-prone managers inject into mar-
kets.  In sum, parsimony has costs, as well as virtues, which theorists
tend to finesse.
B. Cause Lawyers in Practice
Parsimony has shaped the strategies of some of America’s greatest
lawyers.  Consider Justice Brandeis’s work on behalf of maximum
hours legislation.  For Brandeis the public interest lawyer, justifying
government regulation on a market failure theory was a central quest.
Brandeis believed that untrammeled markets undermined human re-
lationships, but that government regulation would help in restoring
the balance.  The problem, however, was that persuading hostile
courts to uphold such regulation was a tall order.  To increase the
chances, Brandeis filed the famous amicus brief in Muller v. Oregon.56
His brief sought to leverage images of women’s frailty and child-rear-
ing role.57  This imagery led to a victory in Muller v. Oregon, but also
exploited stereotypes that have shaped American social practices for
decades afterward.
Similarly, commentators have critiqued public interest lawyers as
pursuing a single idea, thereby risking arrogance and disregarding the
needs of their clients.  Derrick Bell has argued that the NAACP law-
yers did not pay attention to the needs and wishes of their clients, who
may have wished to secure more resources for their own communities,
rather than secure a formal legal equality that too often cloaked con-
tinued resource disparities.58  In the area of structural reform of gov-
ernment institutions, I and others have argued that public interest
lawyers seeking to improve conditions at state psychiatric hospitals
and prisons failed to pay sufficient attention to the consequences of
court-ordered reform.  In particular, advocates did not reckon ade-
55. Cf. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 913, 919–21 (discussing incentives for plaintiffs’ securities lawyers, who suppos-
edly act as agents for aggrieved shareholders).
56. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
57. Id. at 421–23; see also Peter Margulies, Public Interest Lawyering and the Pragmatist
Dilemma, in RENASCENT PRAGMATISM: STUDIES IN LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 220, 226–27 (Al-
fonso Morales ed., 2003) (explaining Brandeis’s brief in Muller v. Oregon and its conclusion
that long work hours harmed women physiologically).
58. Cf. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UN-
FULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 7–9 (2004) (arguing that desegregation litigation
failed to bring quality education to African-American communities).
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quately with the exit strategy available to states of dumping patients
on the streets.59  While institutional reform enhanced treatment, in-
creasing costs led to homelessness and to “transinstitutionalization,”
in which people who earlier were served in psychiatric facilities in-
stead ended up in prisons and jails.60
When lawyers pursue parsimony and ignore context,61 they can
also harm third parties or the public.  Entrepreneurship can blind a
lawyer to wrongdoing that a client is committing, and pave the way for
the lawyer becoming an accomplice instead of an advocate and an
advisor—something I have argued happened with the radical defense
lawyer Lynne Stewart,62 and may have happened with John Yoo, as
well, in his drafting of the torture memos.63  Here, indulgence in en-
trepreneurship injures the lawyer’s role as gatekeeper.64
59. Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudence and Public Interest Law, 25 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 487, 514–15 (1999); cf. Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, “Johnny’s
in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine”: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 346–48 (2000) (arguing that institutional reform often obtained
meaningful benefits for patients and that cases helped give people with mental disabilities
a voice); Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental Disability
Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333, 335–37 (2007) (describing
appalling conditions in facilities for people with mental disabilities worldwide and calling
for effective reform).
60. For a vision of a more pragmatic public interest law, see William H. Simon, Solving
Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 127, 170–81 (2004) (arguing for more flexible approaches to defining community
interests) and compare Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times:
Can New Models of Institutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective Structural Change?, 30 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 323, 325–30 (2007) (analyzing more collaborative models of advocacy).
61. For an argument that legal education breeds these vices, see Neal Kumar Katyal,
Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65,
116–20 (2006).
62. Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the Roles of Lawyers for
Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173, 174 (2003) [hereinafter Margulies,
The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity].  To ensure government accountability that is necessary in
a constitutional republic, defense lawyers should mount a vigorous defense of their client,
even when the client’s acquittal could pose dangers to the state. See generally Lonnie T.
Brown, Jr., Representing Saddam Hussein: The Importance of Being Ramsey Clark, 42 GA. L. REV.
47 (2007) (discussing career of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark); Michael E. Tigar,
Voices Heard in Jury Argument: Litigation and the Law School Curriculum, 9 REV. LITIG. 177,
179–82 (1990) (discussing the function of a criminal defense attorney in conveying his
client’s humanity).
63. See Harris, supra note 17, at 452 (stating that personal views of OLC lawyers and R
pressure from the client “hindered OLC lawyers from fulfilling their professional responsi-
bilities”); Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence, supra note 4, at 976–78 (explaining that Yoo was R
more concerned with “cementing his professional identity as a champion of executive
power” than giving an accurate legal opinion).
64. For insight on how these issues also figure into the development of new forms for
rendering professional services, see Mary C. Daly, Monopolist, Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur? A
Comparative Perspective on the Future of Multidisciplinary Partnerships in the United States, France,
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When the lawyer represents an organization, including the gov-
ernment or a corporation,65 untempered entrepreneurship can also
injure the interests of the entity itself.66  The lawyers for Enron, for
example, bought into the rhetoric of managers who maintained that
old metrics of value such as price-earnings ratios were obsolete—mere
accounting conventions that stifled innovation.67  The result was a dis-
aster for shareholders and third parties who suffered through the
bursting of the Enron bubble.68  As we will see, the United States suf-
fered severe losses in credibility because of the issue entrepreneurship
practiced by the Bush Administration’s lawyers.69  Better lawyers
would have recognized that over time, the interests of a large organi-
Germany, and the United Kingdom After the Disintegration of Andersen Legal, 80 WASH. U. L.Q.
589, 589–92 (2002) and George C. Nnona, Situating Multidisciplinary Practice Within Social
History: A Systemic Analysis of Inter-Professional Competition, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 849, 850–53
(2006).
65. See Andrew M. Perlman, A Career Choice Critique of Legal Ethics Theory, 31 SETON HALL
L. REV. 829, 834–38 (2001) (arguing that as practical matter corporate lawyers often have
little discretion in handling particular matters because of economic ties to significant cli-
ents). But see W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The
Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987, 991 (2006) (arguing that systemic good
achieved by access to legal representation should generally trump scruples about repre-
senting certain clients). See generally KRONMAN, supra note 13, at 128–34 (discussing the R
blend of sympathy and detachment a lawyer should bring to client representation); Russell
G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and
Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1351–55 (2006) (arguing that the pluralist concep-
tion of morality, rather than the unitary conception of a “good” client or lawyer, best suits
the modern legal profession); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1317, 1320–25 (2006) (discussing the importance of counseling on morality, justice, and
prudence).
66. See generally Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95
CAL. L. REV. 1879 (2007) (discussing tensions in representation of resistance movements);
Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobiliza-
tion in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992) (same).
67. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, in
LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 371, 372–73 (Susan D. Carle ed.,
2005) (noting Enron lawyers’ claim that they relied on managers and accountants to han-
dle accounting matters); Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Exec-
utives’ Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 55, 68 (2006) (stating that
subordinate employees and outside attorneys for Enron “may have neglected to disclose
wrongdoing or discuss potential problems as doing so would have branded them as follow-
ers of old discourses and ancient metrics that Enron culture had supposedly tran-
scended”); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1147 (2005)
(explaining that Enron’s accounting methods placed more importance on creating a “mer-
itocratic” system to promote competition among employees rather than adhere to conven-
tional accounting rules).
68. For a different account of lawyers’ problems that emphasizes the influence of for-
malistic routine rather than issue entrepreneurship, see JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DEL-
GADO, HOW LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY 34 (2005).
69. See Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence, supra note 4, at 977 (stating that the torture R
memos “created sizable negative externalities for United States antiterrorism efforts by in-
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zation often align with those of the public because any large organiza-
tion requires credibility and good will to flourish.70  Privileging
parsimony and short-term gains conceals this common ground.
C. Issue Entrepreneurs and Attorney General Opinions
The history of Attorney General opinions entails two very rough
groupings—those who argue that the government lawyer’s advice
should reflect the best view of the law, and those who argue that the
lawyer’s advice should reflect the wishes of the President.71  Issue en-
trepreneurs can be found on both sides of this divide, although the
recent trend in issue entrepreneurship has been toward the latter cat-
egory.  On either side, issue entrepreneurs can be harmful, not least
because they articulate a stylized view of both the “best” view of the law
flaming populations and communities whose cooperation the United States desperately
needs”).
70. See W. Bradley Wendel, Informal Methods of Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers, 54
S.C. L. REV. 967, 972–73 (2003) (noting that values of reputation and credibility encourage
responsibility among lawyers).  Issue entrepreneurs do not adequately address the role of
long-term values like reputation and credibility because such values are too fuzzy for parsi-
monious theories.  Theorists wedded to parsimony will sometimes dismiss reputation as
cutting in too many directions to be a useful concept.  For example, Goldsmith and Posner
argue that a country may wish to cultivate a reputation as being law-abiding, or a reputa-
tion as being tough. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 202–03 (stating that states R
comply with international law out of self-interest, not because citizens and leaders think a
state has an underlying moral obligation to obey international law).  For them, this uncer-
tainty of application makes the concept of reputation problematic.  One could argue, how-
ever, that the wisest leader should strive to uphold both of these values, exhibiting both
toughness and fidelity to law.
Even if parsimonious theorists concede that reputation can be important, see GOLD-
SMITH, supra note 1, at 158, they fail to recognize that times of crisis distort officials’ assess- R
ment of reputational interests.  In times of crisis, officials tend to discount the long-term
good of a reputation for law-abiding conduct and overweigh the virtue of appearing tough.
Cf. Laibson, supra note 52, at 443–46 (discussing excessive discounting of long-term costs R
and benefits).  The ticking time-bomb scenario virtually forces this discounting, asking the
captor to choose between short-term disaster and the more diffuse and amorphous bene-
fits of reputation. See Luban, supra note 38, at 1444 (stating that the ticking-time bomb R
scenario forces citizens to accept the morality of torture based on the “certainty of anguish
and the mere possibility of learning something vital and saving lives”).  This discounting
also emerges at the micro level, when theorists seek government jobs.  When crisis looms,
theorists who debunk constraint but also concede the value of reputation tend to empha-
size the former in their job interviews.  Their official interlocutors do not redress the im-
balance. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 29 (discussing candidly his interviews with Bush R
Administration officials for the top OLC job).
71. See McGinnis, supra note 5, at 380–81 (outlining the two views concerning the At- R
torney General’s role as a legal opinion writer).  McGinnis offers a third view, centered on
upholding the institutional interests of the executive. Id. Later in this piece, I offer an
alternative view that seeks to fulfill this role, while also encompassing respect for the sepa-
ration of powers and the need for cooperation among the three branches of government.
See infra notes 304–306 and accompanying text. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 19 25-NOV-08 13:14
2008] TRUE BELIEVERS AT LAW 19
and the President’s interests that can do violence to stability and prac-
ticality in government.
The first issue entrepreneur in the Attorney General’s office actu-
ally argued for a risk-averse course when a more aggressive posture
was most consistent with national interests.  Levi Lincoln, Jefferson’s
Attorney General, argued that Jefferson needed a constitutional
amendment to authorize completion of the Louisiana Purchase.72
Lincoln was an aggressive advocate—an issue entrepreneur, in the
parlance of this Article—of a strict constructionist view adopted by the
Jeffersonian Party (the ancestor of today’s Democrats) that rejected
the expansive view of implied governmental powers espoused by the
Federalists.  For the Jeffersonian Party, implied powers were danger-
ous, leading to government overreaching at home and abroad, with
the Alien and Sedition Acts passed in the Adams Administration form-
ing the clearest example.  Rejecting implied powers and insisting on
clear textual authority for actions by the federal government, was for
Lincoln the best—indeed, the only—way to keep the federal govern-
ment honest.  Jefferson agreed with this position in principle.  In prac-
tice, however, as he noted, there were times when the welfare of the
nation depended on the President’s swift action, even without express
textual authority.  Jefferson believed that the need to take advantage
of the favorable terms offered for the Louisiana Purchase was one of
those occasions.  Jefferson also asked Congress’s consent and publi-
cized his decision immediately, inviting public dialog.  While the Loui-
siana Purchase on one level continued the decimation of native
populations that had already begun through European settlement, in
other respects it was clearly advantageous for the young Republic.
Failing to temper an unduly risk-averse opinion with a fuller sense of
the national interest can be as much a failing as unconstrained risk-
seeking.73
After America entered World War I, Attorney General Thomas
W. Gregory assumed an entrepreneurial role in the suppressing of dis-
sent.74  Gregory campaigned actively for the arrest and deportation of
dissidents.  Shortly after the war, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer
continued this trend with the Palmer Raids that first brought to prom-
72. McGinnis, supra note 5, at 414, 417. R
73. Edmund Randolph, who served as George Washington’s Attorney General, was a
pragmatist, mediating between those two great norm entrepreneurs, Jefferson and Alexan-
der Hamilton.  Randolph sought to find the happy mean between the extremes posed by
his great Cabinet colleagues.  McGinnis, supra note 5, at 407 n.109. R
74. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the “Bad Tendency” Test: Free Speech in Wartime,
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 413–14 (noting aggressive tactics under President Wilson to sup-
press dissent).
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inence one of the great issue empire builders in national security and
law enforcement—J. Edgar Hoover.
In 1940, Franklin Roosevelt and Attorney General Robert Jackson
aggressively wielded executive power to complete the destroyer deal
that aided Britain and presaged the Lend-Lease Program.75  Jackson
approved the transaction, despite doubts about its legality.  Jackson
was candid in his opinion, however, acknowledging that one of his
main arguments was hairsplitting.76  Roosevelt and Jackson also solic-
ited input from inside and outside the government.  In this sense, they
combined activism and prudence in a manner unknown to issue
entrepreneurs.77
Ideological and issue entrepreneurs have occupied the OLC posi-
tion in previous administrations.  During the Johnson Administration,
State Department lawyers issued aggressive opinions supporting presi-
dential authority to intervene in Vietnam.  Republican administra-
tions have tended more to be issue entrepreneurs, although the
products of the 2001–2003 OLC are striking for their aggressive ideo-
logical focus.  William Rehnquist, as OLC chief, took a strong line on
certain issues, arguing that Nixon had authority as Commander in
Chief to invade Cambodia.78  Rehnquist’s argument on assuring the
safety of American troops was colorable.  Rehnquist’s analysis, how-
ever, lacked sufficient consideration of the negative consequences
that could arise if the President was wrong, including consequences
for America’s reputation and credibility.79
75. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 93–103 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003) (explaining the destroyer exchange deal
with Britain).
76. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 484, 495 (1940).
77. In a more troubling episode during World War II, famed law professor Herbert
Wechsler—author of the Model Penal Code—arguably misrepresented facts before the
Supreme Court of the United States when he served as an Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Japanese internment litigation. See Peter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope:
Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, and National Security Strategy, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 652–54
(2007) [hereinafter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope] (discussing Wechsler’s partial
reliance, driven by pressure from the then Department of War, on a government report
containing inaccurate charges about the loyalty of Japanese-Americans).
78. William H. Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues—Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 628, 638–39 (1970); see also STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 229 (4th
ed. 2007) (providing an excerpt on Rehnquist’s legal rationale for the introduction of U.S.
troops into Cambodia).
79. Rehnquist also practiced constraint in his OLC role, most importantly by finding
that the President lacked power to impound congressionally appropriated funds. See gener-
ally Moss, supra note 5 (explaining the role of executive branch lawyers as legal R
interpreters).
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Later, during the heyday of Iran-Contra, the Reagan Administra-
tion asked for and received an opinion from OLC’s head, Theodore
Olson, who subsequently argued Bush v. Gore80 on George W. Bush’s
behalf and became Bush’s Solicitor General.  Olson wrote an opinion
on whether United States aid to the Contras violated the Neutrality
Act.81  Olson cited Robert Jackson’s opinion approving the destroyer
deal with Britain during World War II,82 but wholly missed the sub-
stance and spirit—whatever good aiding the Contras accomplished, it
would seem a stretch to compare it to aiding Churchill in the epochal
global struggle against Hitler.
Olson also made a questionable analogy to a very early opinion by
Attorney General William Bradford that argued American nationals
who attacked a friendly government could only be prosecuted if their
attack was initiated on U.S. soil.83  Olson, however, alluded only in
passing to the question of tort liability for wrongs committed by the
Contras or their American sponsors, and the international backlash
that such harms might create.  Olson also narrowly interpreted the
“within the United States” language in the Neutrality Act84 to argue
that U.S. nationals located in the United States who cause others to
engage in hostilities against a foreign friendly state are immune from
prosecution.  This move would result in targeting foot-soldiers, while
immunizing their suppliers and enablers—surely not the result that
Congress intended.  Olson ended the opinion with a reference to
Robert Kennedy’s post-hoc justification for the Bay of Pigs fiasco.85
This reference seems curious at best—in the patterns of precedent
that develop around executive decisions, success would seem to be a
better guide than failure.
In another episode, Olson claimed executive privilege regarding
decisions made by the head of the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”).86  This claim was highly entrepreneurial in support of the
President’s power, particularly given the EPA’s agency status.  Such
agencies are not part of the President’s staff and are often statutorily
protected from presidential influence.  Claiming executive privilege
80. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
81. 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 209 (1984).
82. 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 484, 488 (1940).
83. 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 209, 213–14 (1984).
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 959, 963–67 (2000).
85. 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 209, 218 (1984).
86. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRST-
HAND ACCOUNT 135 (1991) (explaining that Olson advised EPA Administrator Anne Bur-
ford to claim executive privilege in response to a congressional investigation into the
enforcement of environmental regulations).
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was an attempt to expand the President’s power at Congress’s ex-
pense, changing the separation of powers scheme.
This being said, Congress’s action was extreme.  Angry congres-
sional Democrats pressured for a special prosecutor to investigate Ol-
son, asserting that he had misled Congress about documents he had
turned over in the EPA investigation.87  No charges were ever filed in
the case.  In retrospect, the role of the Independent Counsel in inves-
tigating Olson stemmed from an equal and opposite issue en-
trepreneurial posture in Congress and contributed to partisan
bitterness that continues to plague the federal government.  The crim-
inal referral did nothing to curb entrepreneurial tendencies at the
OLC; if anything, Olson’s successor Douglas Kmiec was far more ea-
ger to take up the cudgels on behalf of presidential power, in the
Independent Counsel case as elsewhere.  Moreover, the Olson experi-
ence may have radicalized Republicans, forming the lode of resent-
ment mined by Dick Cheney, David Addington, and John Yoo during
the Bush Administration.88
II. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE ENTREPRENEURS DURING THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY
A. The Construction of “Lawfare”
The OLC during the Bush Administration has been even more of
a haven for issue entrepreneurship.  The ideological climate in the
office embodies a simple, parsimonious story pushed by John Yoo and
best captured by Jack Goldsmith, the Harvard professor who in an act
of great courage and character withdrew Yoo’s torture memo.  Gold-
smith’s perspective, despite his courageous act, still overlaps with
Yoo’s.  Goldsmith advances the idea of “lawfare.”  In the lawfare para-
digm, Goldsmith and Yoo depict enemies of the United States as frus-
trating American interests not only through violence—“warfare”—but
also through a web of international and domestic law, rules, and regu-
lations limiting American officials’ flexibility.89
87. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 666 (1988) (stating that majority members of
the House Judiciary Committee published a report suggesting that Olson gave false testi-
mony at a hearing addressing the EPA investigation).
88. A better approach by Congress might have been to push back through assertion of
its own power, either threatening to withhold funds from the OLC pending full disclosure,
or threatening to hold Olson in contempt.  Arguably, the departure connoted by the initial
claim of executive privilege justifies such strong measures.
89. Goldsmith identifies Air Force General Charles Dunlap as being responsible for the
term “lawfare” gaining currency within the military. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 58. R
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The lawfare idea weds the aesthetic virtues of parsimony with an
entrepreneurial appeal to an eager market.  The term “lawfare” lever-
ages distrust of law among those who believe that bureaucratic con-
straints impede innovation and stifle democratic accountability.90  On
a rhetorical level, it contrasts the cumbersome technicalities of law
with the no-nonsense approach required by incoming fire.  A nation
distracted by legal niceties, on this view, is ill-equipped to deal with
the exigencies of national security and foreign affairs.  More subtly,
the logic of the lawfare paradigm suggests that making policy through
consultation and collaboration is potentially perilous, with one sure-
fire remedy: greater discretion residing with the President.91
Goldsmith and Yoo’s lawfare construct has both normative and
descriptive dimensions.92  Normatively, Goldsmith and Yoo argue that
international law poses a challenge to democratic legitimacy.  They
also argue that international law norms pose a challenge to the effi-
cacy of executive decisions.  In contrast, they suggest, clear-eyed con-
sideration of American interests would enhance both legitimacy and
efficacy.  As I will show in a subsequent section, they make some com-
pelling arguments about particularly exigent situations where rigid ad-
herence to the letter of the law is counter-productive.93  Their
analysis, however, like that of so many parsimonious theories, is frus-
tratingly incomplete, aiming to stake a claim to a position and attract
90. See Levinson, supra note 45, at 926–34 (discussing this view). R
91. Concern about illegitimate congressional meddling with executive policy in foreign
affairs also spurred drafting of the founding document for today’s executive unilateral-
ists—the “Minority Report” signed by Dick Cheney, with contributions from a young staff
lawyer, David Addington, dissenting from the House Iran-Contra Committee Report. See
H.R. REP. NO. 100-433, at 457 (1987); see also SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 7, at 158–60 R
(discussing the Minority Report).  A similar argument that legal constraints impair the
efficacy of responses to national security threats appears in POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note
9, at 275.  While Posner and Vermeule make important points about the costs of unduly R
rigid legal constraints, their preference for broad conceptual arguments over sustained
attention to empirical examples limits the force of their analysis.  Actually, Goldsmith’s
position is more complex than his lawfare construct suggests.  He favors wide discretion for
the President, but sees some role for Congress.  Moreover, Goldsmith believes that the
President, as a prudential matter, should often consult with others, although he fails to
recognize that constraint can supplement prudence in a crisis. Compare GOLDSMITH, supra
note 1, at 136 (arguing that the Supreme Court should have upheld the President’s unilat- R
eral establishment of military commissions), with id. at 197–98 (praising Franklin
Roosevelt’s consultation with others regarding aid to Britain during World War II).
92. Criticism of Goldsmith’s earlier work has been plentiful. See, e.g., Paul Schiff
Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1270–75 (2006)
(raising empirical and normative concerns about the assumptions made in GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 9). R
93. See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 80–81 (discussing Jefferson’s view that “a R
leader’s first duty was to protect the country, not follow the law”).
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adherents, rather than to offer a nuanced descriptive or normative
account.  The lawfare critics unduly discount the complementary rela-
tionship between constraint and American power.  They also fail to
understand how constraint reinforces the teachings of prudence.94
1. Lawfare and Legitimacy
On the question of the democratic legitimacy of international
law, Goldsmith with his sometime co-author Eric Posner asserts that
international law has “no democratic pedigree or epistemic author-
ity.”95  One reason is that states do not always have the opportunity,
present within a democracy, to specifically consent to provisions of
international law, particularly customary international law, which de-
velops through an accretional process based on state acknowledgment
and practice, rather than express agreement.96  Yoo takes this critique
even further, asserting that treaties are not legitimate or binding un-
less they are not only ratified by the Senate, as the Constitution pro-
vides, but in all cases are also implemented by legislation passed by
both houses of Congress and signed by the President.97
Goldsmith and Posner then warn of the danger that the agendas
of nongovernmental organizations, such as Oxfam International, pose
to democratic ideals.98  According to Goldsmith and Posner, these
groups press ideals of “cosmopolitan charity,”99 which do not reflect
the heterogeneous preferences of the American electorate.  Gold-
smith also warns in The Terror Presidency that the foreign activists in the
“human rights industry”100 may seek to use principles of universal ju-
risdiction to hold to account democratically elected American officials
or their congressionally confirmed agents, such as former Secretary of
94. Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that prudence is vital and that reputation is an
important value. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 202.  They fail to adequately R
address, however, the argument that an emphasis on self-interest, untempered by con-
straint, can cause distortions in institutions and adversely affect national interests over
time.
95. Id. at 199.
96. Id. at 189–91.
97. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Origi-
nal Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1958–62 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Globalism and
the Constitution].
98. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 211. R
99. Id.  But see Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155,
1164–68 (2007) (arguing for polycentric conception of international law with a role for
nongovernmental organizations).
100. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 59.  In fairness to Goldsmith, this stilted description, R
although not in quotes in the original text, may be an effort to convey the perspective of
Donald Rumsfeld, whose point of view Goldsmith is depicting in the passage.
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State Henry Kissinger.101  Yoo argues that critics of the Bush Adminis-
tration’s interrogation policies invoked international law to impose
their own policy preferences on the political branches.102  In appeal-
ing to the courts, those making arguments based on international law
compound this problem of legitimacy.103  Yoo asserts that lawyers for
the President must not surrender to these intrusions—if they do so,
they undermine their role as legal advisers to the executive.104
2. Lawfare and Executive Efficacy
Similarly, Goldsmith and Yoo argue that international law
reduces the efficacy of the political branches in dealing with foreign
affairs and national security threats.  Goldsmith argues that domestic
statutes based on international law, such as the War Crimes Act, can
tie the hands of a president seeking to deal with the pressing chal-
lenges of terrorism.  Goldsmith warns that the “hornet’s nest” of such
restrictions will prevent the executive from taking appropriate ac-
tion.105  In a widely quoted passage, Goldsmith ventures a revisionist
view of the Bush Administration’s motivation that embodies this chil-
ling effect, portraying the Bush Administration as “strangled by
law.”106  Indeed, says Goldsmith, since September 11, “this war [on
terror] has been lawyered to death.”107  For Goldsmith, the solution is
simple: basing national foreign relations decisions not on interna-
tional law, but on “the logic of state self-interest and state power.”108
Unfortunately, Goldsmith argues, lawfare today interferes with
this attention to interests in a fashion that prior presidents have not
had to face.  He asserts, for example, that the law then in effect did
not present Franklin D. Roosevelt with a “real threat to aggressive
presidential action.”109  According to Goldsmith, Roosevelt took “ex-
101. Id. at 55–58.  Goldsmith does acknowledge the virtues of human rights law. Id. at
54–55.
102. YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS, supra note 9, at 180–81. R
103. Id. at 180 (“[C]ritics sought to use litigation to move wartime policy in their pre-
ferred directions rather than working through our elected representatives.”).
104. Id. (characterizing critics of interrogation policies as arguing that lawyers “should
have refused to answer the White House’s question, out of moral outrage”).
105. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 69 (stating that various restrictions on the Presi- R
dent’s discretionary wartime powers limit his ability to fulfill his obligation of protecting
the nation).
106. Id.
107. Id.; cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 44 (criticizing law professors for signing R
a letter in December 2001, opposing President Bush’s order establishing military commis-
sions). But see Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, with Apologies, 86 TEX. L. REV. 569, 595–96
(2008) (criticizing Posner and Vermeule’s arguments).
108. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 203. R
109. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 65. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 26 25-NOV-08 13:14
26 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:1
tralegal” action that was not possible in the “post-Watergate hyper-le-
galization of warfare”110 confronting the Bush Administration.
B. Problems with the Lawfare Paradigm
1. International Law and the Founding Period
The lawfare critics’ legitimacy argument glosses over American
courts’ long-time use of international law, which has roots in the Con-
stitution itself.  Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases
affecting foreign diplomatic officials.111  According to the Supreme
Court of the United States, this textual grant stemmed from the Fram-
ers’ recognition that international law required them to provide some
redress for violations of diplomatic immunity.112  In the early Charm-
ing Betsy case, Chief Justice Marshall announced the principle that
courts would construe statutes to avoid conflict with international
law.113  Marshall saw what Goldsmith denies—that customary interna-
tional law has a pedigree entailing the considered judgment and prac-
tice of nations over time.114  Recently, the Supreme Court has
interpreted international law broadly in the course of construing the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), holding that Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, incorporated by reference into
the UCMJ, was intended to fill gaps in coverage and ensure a floor of
110. Id. at 81.
111. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
112. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–16 (2004).
113. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
114. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 493–95 (1998) (explaining that
U.S. courts viewed customary international law as general common law due in part to inter-
national law’s foundations in state practice); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use
of Force, International Law, and the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 299 (2005)
(noting that customary international law arises out of “consistent practices that states fol-
low out of a sense of legal obligation”); cf. Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of
Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383,
442 (2004) [hereinafter Margulies, Judging Terror] (arguing that courts should interpret
statutes authorizing force as being consistent with international humanitarian law). But see
Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien
Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 155–56 (arguing for judicial deference to executive
interpretation of statute providing remedies to aliens for violation of law of nations, based
on the executive’s superior institutional competence); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin,
Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1226–27 (2007) (argu-
ing that the Charming Betsy canon skews democracy by importing norms with less legitimacy
and guarantees of “quality” than decisions by the President).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 27 25-NOV-08 13:14
2008] TRUE BELIEVERS AT LAW 27
protection for virtually all persons detained in hostilities, including
alleged members of Al Qaeda.115
2. International Law Constraints and the Upholding of
Constitutional Norms
The lawfare critics also fail to recognize that international law’s
constraints reinforce constitutional norms.  Like a canary in a coal
mine, violations of international law have often signaled the emer-
gence of grave constitutional difficulties.  Consider, for example, the
limited naval war with France in the late 1790s and early 1800s.  In the
Charming Betsy case, the Court read a statute to preserve the rights of
neutrals under the law of nations, holding that a statute limiting
American trade with France did not authorize the seizure of a Danish
vessel.116  In the same year, the Court held that the executive had ex-
ceeded its constitutional power by disregarding a statute that permit-
ted capture of a vessel heading to France, but not one departing from
a French port.117  By violating the statute, the President sought to in-
terpose his judgment about the scope of allowable captures for that of
Congress, which has express constitutional authority in this area.118
The Court’s decision (in another Marshall opinion) redressed the
constitutional balance.  Further, the Alien and Sedition Acts, which
scholars and historians widely agree violated First Amendment protec-
tions, were enacted during the quasi-war with France.119  Habits of
constraint in observing international law could have tempered ex-
cesses in the constitutional arena.120
115. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 562 (2006).  For background on the principles
and development of international humanitarian law, see generally THE LAWS OF WAR: CON-
STRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994).
116. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 120–21.
117. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 176–78 (1804).
118. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (providing that Congress has the power to “make
rules concerning captures on land and water”).
119. Deborah Pearlstein, The Constitution and Executive Competence in the Post-Cold War
World, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 547, 566 (2007).
120. But see POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 140–41 (arguing that government’s R
tendency to stretch the limits of law in emergencies recedes as exigencies fade).  This Arti-
cle does not address the use of international law to interpret constitutional provisions such
as the Eighth Amendment or the Due Process Clause. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
577–78 (2005) (holding that Eighth Amendment bar on “cruel and unusual” punishment
prohibited imposing death penalty on juveniles). Compare Timothy K. Kuhner, The Foreign
Source Doctrine: Explaining the Role of Foreign and International Law in Interpreting the Constitu-
tion, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1389, 1390–95 (2007) (arguing for giving weight to international
law when interpreting certain open-ended provisions of the Constitution), with McGinnis
& Somin, supra note 114, at 1186–88, 1224–26 (arguing that international law suffers from R
“democracy deficit” which makes its use in interpreting the Constitution unwise).
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The danger to constitutional legitimacy posed by disregarding in-
ternational law is also evident in post-September 11 developments.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld121 was a case not just about the interpretation of
Common Article 3, but about the permissible scope of executive au-
thority, and whether the executive could disregard language in the
UCMJ requiring that military commissions and courts-martial have
comparable procedural protections wherever practicable.122  More-
over, to reach this question, the Hamdan Court also had to reaffirm
the importance of habeas corpus rights and the need for a clear state-
ment from Congress manifesting its wish to limit habeas protections.
Similarly, the Military Commissions Act (“MCA”) passed to address
the impact of the Hamdan decision also has significant constitutional
gaps in the area of procedural safeguards.123  Goldsmith, in contrast,
views the MCA as a “victory” for the Administration.124  He also as-
sumes the constitutionality of the Act, without addressing its procedu-
ral flaws.125
To his credit, Goldsmith addresses the problem of executive uni-
lateralism in an important prudential argument, asserting that open-
ness from the executive is often the most efficacious course in
dealings with Congress, the courts, the public, and the international
community.126  For Goldsmith, however, this prudential argument
does not and should not lead to greater substantive limits on the au-
thority of the political branches.  Indeed, he insists that a statute with
even more truncated procedural protections than the MCA would
have passed constitutional muster.127  The recent tenor of the Su-
121. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
122. See Stephen Ellmann, The “Rule of Law” and the Military Commission, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 761, 765–70 (2006–2007) (discussing role of courts in reviewing military commission
procedures and rulings); David A. Martin, Judicial Review and the Military Commissions Act:
On Striking the Right Balance, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 344, 354–62 (2007) (arguing for prudential
approach that where possible interprets MCA in light of principles of constitutional and
international law).
123. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c) (2006) (authorizing the admittance of statements ob-
tained by torture under certain circumstances); see also Peter Margulies & Laura Corbin,
Reliability and the Interests of Justice: Interpreting the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to Deter
Coercive Interrogations, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750, 768–70 (2007) (analyzing provi-
sions of the MCA); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (striking down
MCA provisions that sought to limit federal courts’ jurisdiction over writs of habeas
corpus).
124. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 139. R
125. See id. at 138–39 (discussing the MCA’s passage).
126. See id. at 205–09 (discussing Bush Administration’s unilateralism).
127. Id. at 139–40.  Goldsmith’s most recent work reflects a more finely grained analysis
of procedural safeguards in the detention of suspected terrorists. See generally Robert M.
Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention
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preme Court on the MCA in Boumediene v. Bush,128 however, suggests
something different.  At the argument, even the Solicitor General
conceded readily that the Court could read procedural protections
into the MCA’s gaps and seemed to share the concern of five Justices
that any other interpretation would render the statute constitutionally
infirm.129
Goldsmith’s legitimacy argument also does not adequately ac-
knowledge the premises of American foreign relations law that guard
against international domination.  Goldsmith rightfully criticizes the
most sweeping internationalist claim, which holds that Congress lacks
the power to modify certain international obligations, including those
in customary international law.  The Court, however, has repeatedly
held that Congress is free to modify those obligations, in the same way
that it can amend or repeal statutes.130
3. International Law and United States Power
Similar concerns rebut the lawfare critics’ claim that interna-
tional law limits the political branches’ effectiveness.  Often, as Gold-
smith acknowledges, the United States uses international law and
institutions to both vindicate norms and serve American interests.131
In many cases, such as the Declaration of Paris of 1856 on maritime
rights, the establishment of the United Nations, the enactment of the
Geneva Conventions, and the United Nations’ promulgation of rules
Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008) (discussing the evolving procedural criteria for
detention).
128. 128 S. Ct. 2229.
129. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Ready to Answer Detainee Rights Question, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2007, at A32 (noting that as the Justices expressed skepticism about government’s
initial argument that procedural safeguards were not required, Solicitor General Clement
“began throwing pieces of [that argument] over the side. He even suggested for the first
time that under the available procedures, the appeals court would be able to reach the
ultimate judgment of ordering a detainee’s release”). This argument was unavailing as the
Court determined that a clear holding that the statute was unconstitutional was necessary
to provide guidance for the future. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275–77; see generally Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2008)
(discussing factors for deciding between prompt resolution of a constitutional dispute and
statutory interpretation that avoids resolution of the constitutional issue).
130. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“Congress may modify [treaty]
provisions, so far as they bind the United States . . . .”); see also William S. Dodge, Customary
International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 26–27 (2007),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/120/feb07/dodge.pdf (stating that cus-
tomary international law may be “limited or overridden democratically”).
131. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 63 (discussing State Department objections to R
memo, written by Goldsmith for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, that argued for a stronger
line against international legal institutions).
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after September 11 requiring member states to enact anti-terrorist leg-
islation, the United States has been a prime catalyst for change.132
In other cases, the constraints imposed by international and do-
mestic law have focused American efforts in a salutary fashion.  As an
example, consider the course of discussions between the United States
and Britain during the Civil War regarding the Union blockade of the
Confederacy.  In Goldsmith and Posner’s facile account, the United
States enforced the blockade by attacking neutral ships, permitting its
own interests to overwhelm the position on international law that it
had advanced for decades.133  As usual, however, parsimony promotes
incomplete facts.  One detailed study suggests that the United States
and Britain negotiated against a backdrop of broad agreement about
international law.134  International law influenced the approaches of
both President Lincoln and Secretary of State William H. Seward,135
who, with the exception of one minor incident inflated by Goldsmith
and Posner, respected neutral rights.136  Despite the imperative to de-
feat the Confederacy and enforce the blockade, concerns about inter-
national law led the Administration to discipline both the American
ambassador to London137 and naval officers who had interfered with
trade.138  The discipline of the naval officers occurred even though
132. See S.C. RES. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling on states to
implement relevant anti-terrorist legislation); OLIVE ANDERSON, A LIBERAL STATE AT WAR:
ENGLISH POLITICS AND ECONOMICS DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR 253, 272 (1967) (discussing
the importance of United States influence on treaty establishing maritime rights); Jack M.
Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S. Counterterror Oper-
ations, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 56, 64 (2007) (“[T]he United States has had strong incentives to
participate in formulating, supporting, and strengthening the Geneva Conventions and
the law of war.”); cf. Asli U. Bali, International Law and the Challenge of Terrorism, 9 J. ISLAMIC
L. & CULTURE 1, 22–24 (2004) (discussing Security Council resolutions); Kim Lane Schep-
pele, Other People’s PATRIOT Acts: Europe’s Response to September 11, 50 LOY. L. REV. 89, 91–95
(2004) (discussing passage of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1373 and the European
Union’s antiterrorism laws in the wake of 9/11).
133. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 46–48. R
134. See David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: Goldsmith and
Posner’s The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333, 365–70 (2006).
135. Id. at 367.
136. Id. at 359–61; see also MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 141 (1991) (noting that “[t]hroughout the Civil War, most blockade-
runners, even after capture by the Union blockading squadrons, went scot-free, as interna-
tional law prescribed;” also noting Secretary of State Seward’s rebuke of Navy Secretary
Gideon Welles for requiring that captured British blockade-runners agree not to engage in
blockade-running in the future as a condition of their release; Seward believed that such a
requirement “is not warranted by public law”).
137. See Golove, supra note 134, at 370. R
138. Id. at 361 n.64.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 31 25-NOV-08 13:14
2008] TRUE BELIEVERS AT LAW 31
prize courts in the United States would almost certainly have upheld
the officers’ decisions.139
Indeed, constraints on executive decisions have been a mainstay
of American law and politics since the dawn of the Republic, with pre-
cious little net impact on the effectiveness of policymakers.  In the
Charming Betsy case, for example, a navy commander was ordered to
pay damages for improperly seizing a vessel owned by a national of a
neutral state.140  In Little v. Barreme,141 Chief Justice Marshall, in an
opinion for the Court, ordered a navy captain to pay damages for seiz-
ing a vessel in violation of a statute, holding that instructions from the
executive could not “legalize an act which without those instructions
would have been a plain trespass.”142  Ten years later, a court fined
General Andrew Jackson for contempt of court after Jackson declared
martial law, detained judges, and abridged press freedoms in the wake
of his victory in the Battle of New Orleans.143  After the Spanish-Amer-
ican War, the Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana144 ordered the
government to pay damages to the owner of a Cuban coastal fishing
vessel seized by the navy.145  To consummate the destroyer deal with
Britain during World War II, President Roosevelt and Attorney Gen-
eral Jackson stretched the constraints of statutory and international
law of neutrality beyond the breaking point to keep Nazi Germany at
bay.146  They did so, however, not merely for the sake of expedience,
but to promote goals that have become pillars of the post-war global
legal order: increased international cooperation, regard for human
rights, and protection against aggression.147
139. Id.
140. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 72–73, 125 (1804).  As
the Charming Betsy case demonstrates, courts have also been more than capable of cali-
brating the exposure of officials to avoid harshness and chilling effects on initiative. See id.
at 123–24, 125 (ordering remand so that lower court could reduce damages in keeping
with captain’s good faith).
141. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
142. Id. at 176–77, 179.
143. See Caleb Crain, Bad Precedent: Andrew Jackson’s Assault on Habeas Corpus, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 29, 2007, at 78.  Over twenty-five years later, the aged Jackson persuaded Con-
gress to reimburse him. Id. at 84.
144. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
145. Id. at 713–14.
146. See Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at 666–67 (discussing gaps in R
Jackson’s analysis of statutory and international law).
147. See JACKSON, supra note 75, at 93–103 (discussing back story of destroyer deal); see R
also GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 48–49, 192–205 (praising Roosevelt and Jackson while R
understating the constraints that they faced); cf. Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime”
and its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2324, 2365–66 (2002) (noting Jackson’s view of aggressors as “outlaws from the interna-
tional community”).  For a concise account of the trajectory of international law from the
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As a final demonstration of the defects of parsimony and the pro-
ductive role of constraint, consider another more recent blockade—
the American response to the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Participants in the
American strategy sessions have noted that concerns about interna-
tional law and the global reputation of the United States played a
profound role, starting with Robert Kennedy’s view that an all-out at-
tack on Cuba would be “Pearl Harbor in reverse.”148  Drawing back
from the precipice, the United States fashioned a more tailored re-
sponse—the limited blockade of Cuba—which led to a peaceful reso-
lution.  Ignoring this history, Goldsmith and Posner dismiss the
American response as a series of concessions to Communist
regimes.149
If the lawfare critics minimize the productive role of constraint,
they also commit a complementary error by exaggerating the benefits
of an interest-based strategy in foreign affairs.  While no strategist
should continually disregard her country’s interests, deploying a rhet-
oric of interests invites substantial agency costs.150  An interests-based
strategy is not always an impeccably calm and measured process.
Sometimes, an interest-based analysis camouflages a “garbage can” of
clashing institutional agendas and overreaching by government offi-
cials.151  Great world powers often fall prey to this phenomenon.  Con-
sider the case of Britain’s strategy and tactics during the Crimean War,
which Goldsmith and Posner cite to rebut the Supreme Court’s claims
in The Paquete Habana that customary international law protects
coastal fishing vessels.152  The Crimean War, a conflict fought by Brit-
ain, not out of self-defense, but because of a perceived geo-political
interest in containing Russia, cost the lives of thousands of British
soldiers, prompted the discredit and eventual collapse of a British gov-
Treaty of Westphalia to the post-war era, see Christopher J. Borgen, Triptych: Sectarian Dis-
putes, International Law, and Transnational Tribunals in Drinan’s Can God and Caesar Coex-
ist?, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 11, 20–24 (2006).
148. Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at 670; see ROBERT F. KENNEDY, R
THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 9 (1971).
149. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 178. R
150. Goldsmith and Posner recognize these costs, but leave them at the margins of their
analysis. Id. at 104–06.
151. See generally Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 (1972) (discussing the garbage can model in the context of organized
anarchies).
152. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900). The Paquete Habana Court also
recognized that legislative or executive rulings could displace customary international law,
thereby preserving democratic legitimacy. See id. at 700 (indicating that a “controlling ex-
ecutive or legislative act” or comparably controlling “judicial decision” could trump cus-
tomary international law).
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ernment,153 spurred international disdain,154 and ended inconclu-
sively.155  One treatise writer cited by the Court asserted that the
British attacked coastal fishing vessels, despite the prevalent view
echoed in the decision that such vessels were engaged in “hon-
est[ ] . . . peaceful industry,” not aid to belligerents.156  Goldsmith and
Posner argue that the practices of Royal Navy commanders vitiated
the international consensus that the Paquete Habana Court purported
to discern.157  The Court, however, cited naval reports that the fishing
vessels supplied the Russian military.158  If these reports accurately
stated the Royal Navy’s views, seizing the ships served a military pur-
pose and therefore did not violate the rule announced in the case.
Careful examination of the history of the Crimean conflict reveals
a third possibility—contemporary naval accounts may have touted a
strategic objective to cover up wanton destruction that was not ex-
pressly authorized, but was instead a product of insufficient discipline
among English forces.  Military operations included the sacking of
towns, accompanied by the pillaging of museums and looting of
relics.159  As the Paquete Habana Court noted, the campaign had a
“limited” impact on Russian supplies because the Russians had ample
re-supply routes over land.160  In fact, the episode illustrates not a fail-
153. See ANDERSON, supra note 132, at 33–35 (discussing failure of Lord Aberdeen as R
British Prime Minister at the start of the Crimean conflict and accession to power of Lord
Palmerston).
154. See PAUL W. SCHROEDER, AUSTRIA, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE CRIMEAN WAR: THE DE-
STRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONCERT 294–95 (1972) (discussing disillusionment with Brit-
ain’s role domestically and internationally).
155. See ANDERSON, supra note 132, at 275 (describing end of the war as an “anti-cli- R
max”).  Some might find parallels here to a continuing conflict closer to home.
156. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 699–700 (citing 4 M. CHARLES CALVO, LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL § 2372, at 326–27 (Arthur Rousseau ed., 5th ed. 1896)).
157. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 71–72. R
158. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 699–700.
159. See CLIVE PONTING, THE CRIMEAN WAR: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE MYTH 267–68
(2004) (stating that an eyewitness to the destruction of a museum saw British and French
troops destroy every artifact—“[n]ot a single bit of anything that could be broken or
burnt . . . had been exempt from reduction by hammer or fire”); see also J.B. CONACHER,
BRITAIN AND THE CRIMEA, 1855–56, at 100 (1987) (describing “looting and disorder” on the
part of British forces during this episode); cf. D.S. RICHARDS, CONFLICT IN THE CRIMEA:
BRITISH REDCOATS ON THE SOIL OF RUSSIA 123–25 (2006) (recounting that British com-
manders had sent in cavalry to curb excesses of their own troops and to suppress news of
“atrocities,” including rape; reports of abuses triggered adverse reaction in the United
States, although British leaders believed that campaign was a strategic success).
160. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 699; PONTING, supra note 159, at 268.  In other R
venues of the conflict, the British navy was similarly ineffectual. See id. at 49 (noting that
the naval campaign in the Baltic resulted in “attacking a few undefended towns . . . and
destroying mainly British property” with no strategically important victories, leading to dis-
grace for British naval commander).
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ure to crystallize international custom—the evidence is a wash—but
the irrationality with which “interests” are often constituted through
flawed institutions.
Contemporary examples echo this problem of interest and irra-
tionality.  In the war in Iraq, for example, Secretary Rumsfeld pushed
his agenda of military reform, championing a “lean, mean” American
force and silencing those who believed that a larger cohort of troops
would be necessary.161  Additionally, consider coercive interrogation.
Here, tactics reveal a different dynamic—if organizations have a tool
or toy in their arsenal, they often seek to use it.  As Mark Twain said,
“To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”162  The ac-
cumulation of institutional momentum toward greater use of force oc-
curs even when force is not useful or tactically sound.  Most analysts
agree that, at least over the broad run of cases, coercion, including
torture, is ineffective because of imperfect knowledge.163  Torture sub-
jects typically know less than what we think they know, and often tell
us what we want to hear.  The natural standpoint of the torturer is to
assume that the silent captive is concealing something, while the
voluble captive is imparting useful information—but in fact the oppo-
site may be the case.  However, the mission creep phenomenon, in
which organizations expand their job description to seek greater visi-
bility and higher budgets, suggests that institutional actors will often
use the new tool, even in the absence of verifiable results.164
161. See Edward N. Luttwak, Op-Ed., So Few Soldiers, So Much to Do, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2003, at A25 (arguing that the Bush Administration sent too few combat-trained soldiers to
Iraq).
162. See Alan Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 41, R
at 257, 271 (quoting Twain); see also HIRSCHMAN, supra note 12, at 152 (discussing force of R
habits); Annette C. Baier, Trusting People, [6 ETHICS] PSYCHOL. PERSP 137, 147 (1992) (not-
ing the self-reinforcing nature of habits, including habits of trust and mistrust); cf. Paul J.
DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZA-
TIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 19 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (“[H]abit must not
be seen as a purely passive element in behavior, but rather as a means by which attention is
directed to selected aspects of a situation, to the exclusion of competing aspects that might
turn choice in another direction.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, Behavioral Decision The-
ory in the Court of Public Law, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 671, 675 (2002) (observing that experts
exhibit “group think” behavior that obscure options and perspectives); Sally S. Simpson &
Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control, Organizational Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 509, 535 (2002) (analyzing incentives within bureaucracies).
163. See Henry Shue, Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 41, at 47, 55 (not- R
ing the possibility of torturing persons who genuinely do not have the sought after
knowledge).
164. See SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 7, at 46 (discussing mission creep during Franklin R
Roosevelt’s Administration). But see POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 9, at 155–56 (re- R
jecting slippery slope arguments based on institutional pathologies).
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In sum, Goldsmith and Yoo cultivate parsimony to the detriment
of both accurate description and sound prescription.  Goldsmith’s
view that the legal constraints faced by officials today are new does not
explain the history of constraint going back to the founding of the
Republic.  Similarly, although Goldsmith and Yoo recognize that rep-
utation is an important value, their work fails to acknowledge the util-
ity of constraint under international law as a device for preserving and
enhancing reputation.  Without constraint, excess overwhelms a
purely prudential regard for reputation, as the OLC’s work product
after September 11 demonstrates.
III. THE WAGES OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE CONTENT AND
CONSEQUENCES OF OLC LEGAL MEMORANDA AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11
The dubious theoretical analyses of the lawfare critics were just
the beginning of the story.  After September 11, Goldsmith and Yoo
were called upon to issue concrete guidance to the Administration on
tactics in the war on terror.  In this trying period, both men believed
that national security hinged on recognition of the risks to legitimacy
and efficacy they perceived in international law.  Legal advice reflect-
ing this recognition was a necessary element in the Bush Administra-
tion’s strategy, providing both legitimacy and risk management.165
For the critics of lawfare, the opportunity to provide guidance was
thus part of a mission.  The mission was strategic, but also profes-
sional.  Vanquishing internationalist premises in legal policy would be
a test run for an intellectual journey—a return to what the critics of
lawfare viewed as the authentic beginnings of American foreign affairs
law.
It did not turn out that way.  Yoo’s guidance failed basic tests of
sound lawyering, and may have run afoul of a range of legal norms.
Goldsmith showed deep character and a dedication to legal craft in
withdrawing Yoo’s guidance, but continued to champion a reductive
view of legal constraints.  As we shall see, the result was a grave injury
to America’s reputation, and through statutes like the Military Com-
missions Act, the entrenchment of a legal regime that unduly dis-
counted both international obligations and constitutional duties.166
In addition, the far-flung system of detention and coercive interroga-
165. Cf. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1909, 1910–11 (2006) (arguing that lawyers who engage in risk management run the
risk of shirking their ethical responsibilities).
166. See generally Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165  (argu-
ing that habeas relief does not require the possession of rights).
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tion authorized in the lawfare critics’ guidance yielded satellite mis-
conduct, including possible obstruction of justice, as in the
destruction of the CIA tapes of the questioning of suspected Al Qaeda
operatives.  To analyze these wages of entrepreneurship, I turn first to
the contents of the memos themselves.
A. Strained Constructions: Analyzing the Content of the OLC Memos
To grapple with the content of the OLC memos, I break them up
into three categories.  The first category includes the so-called “Bybee
Memo” on permissible techniques in coercive interrogation, which
was actually authored by John Yoo,167 and eventually withdrawn by
Jack Goldsmith.  The second category includes the successor to the
Bybee Memo, written by Daniel Levin, the acting head of the OLC
following Goldsmith’s departure, and the reported-on, but still secret,
memo by Stephen Bradbury, who followed Levin as acting Assistant
Attorney General.  The third category includes the opinion written by
Goldsmith regarding Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, which pro-
hibits an occupying power from deporting or transferring illegal
aliens from occupied territory.
1. Misplaced Analogies
In the months after September 11, John Yoo, who had left Berke-
ley to take a position with the OLC, drafted a remarkable memo.  Yoo
examined the provisions of the War Crimes Act and the Torture Act
(the “Acts”), which made torture by United States personnel critical
and sought to narrow interpretation of the Acts to make prosecution
of United States personnel impossible.168  Unfortunately, Yoo’s inter-
pretations were so strained that, as one commentator observed, they
amounted to “torturing the law.”169
167. For clarity, I refer to this memo as the Yoo memo.
168. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Asst. Att’y Gen., to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel
to President (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo Memo], in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD
TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005); cf. LUBAN, supra
note 7, at 177–80, 200–02 (critiquing the torture memos); see also Military Commissions Act R
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(b) 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (defining war crimes under 18
U.S.C. § 2441 without including conduct that violates Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, such as “outrages upon personal dignity” and “humiliating and degrading
treatment”); Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 347,
349–50 (2007) (asserting that lawyers authorizing conduct that violates Geneva Conven-
tions can be prosecuted in foreign or international fora, and possibly in the United States).
169. See Jose´ E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 215–21 (2006)
(discussing how the torture memos violated rules of professional responsibility); cf. PHI-
LIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES
72–77 (2008) (describing Yoo’s work on interrogation); Norman W. Spaulding, Professional
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 37 25-NOV-08 13:14
2008] TRUE BELIEVERS AT LAW 37
For example, Yoo pointed to language in the torture statute re-
quiring that a perpetrator of torture cause severe pain with specific
intent.170  Yoo opined that a captor who imposed severe pain on a
subject to elicit a confession or information lacked the requisite spe-
cific intent because his ultimate goal was not to cause severe pain.171
The statute, however, nowhere carves out this exception.  Indeed, an
exception for seeking information would eviscerate the statute, be-
cause captors often use paradigmatic torture techniques—such as ex-
tinguishing a lighted cigarette on the skin of a subject—for the
purpose of securing information.  This is common knowledge for any-
one who has seen a World War II movie with a grinning Gestapo offi-
cial advising a prisoner that, “We have ways of making you talk.”
Indeed, the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) specifically men-
tions the “interrogational torture” situation as an example of a prohib-
ited practice.172  Congress omitted this language from the text of the
torture statute, giving Yoo his opening.  However, unless one believes
(with no support in the text or the legislative history) that Congress
wished to exempt the Gestapo situation from the torture statute’s cov-
erage, this argument does not pass the laugh test.173
Yoo’s construction of the phrase “severe pain” is even more
strained.  Yoo looked to other laws that mentioned severe pain in un-
related contexts, having nothing to do with the war on terror.  For
example, Yoo cited a statute that required the federal government to
reimburse medical care for undocumented aliens facing health care
emergencies.174  The statute made clear that coverage was unavailable
for routine health care needs.175  Undocumented aliens are a peren-
nial political football, and Congress apparently decided to ignore the
risk that routine illness on the part of undocumented people, left un-
treated, would soon spread to the documented population.  In cases
Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1975–76 (2008) (dis-
cussing Yoo’s motivation and suggesting remedies for the future).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2000).
171. Yoo Memo, supra note 168, at 175. R
172. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1(1), U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/Res/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Convention against Torture].
173. The only plausible reading of this language is that the harm (“severe pain”) that
the victim suffered could not be merely accidental or fortuitous, but instead had to be the
product of a conscious design by the captor. See id.  Indeed, courts have interpreted the
other implementing legislation of the CAT in this way and there is no reason to think that
the meaning of the criminal statute implementing the CAT is any different. See Lavira v.
Att’y Gen., 478 F.3d 158, 166–67 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing CAT standard in the context of
an alien advancing a defense to deportation).
174. Yoo Memo, supra note 168, at 176 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2000)). R
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1369.
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of clear emergencies, however, where a patient is experiencing severe
pain equivalent to organ failure—is near death—coverage is permit-
ted.176  Yoo’s analogy, however, is flawed. A refusal to reimburse med-
ical treatment of nonemergency conditions does not authorize the
government to engage in conduct that may create such conditions.177
Yoo also argued that a necessity defense should be available when
a captor uses coercion to elicit information that is beneficial in avoid-
ing future harm to innocents.178  Here, Yoo ignores two concerns.
First, a high frequency of successful necessity defenses is substantially
equivalent to an ex ante authorization.179  If one can count on the
defense, the effect is the same.  Moreover, while the torture statute
does not mention defenses, the CAT allows no exceptions whatso-
ever.180  Precluding the defense is certainly more consistent with the
prophylactic purpose of the statute.  The legislative history of the
MCA similarly does not suggest that Congress wished to allow the de-
fense.  So here again, Yoo’s analysis hangs on contestable interpretive
conventions, without express support in text, purpose, or legislative
history.
In addition, Yoo says nothing about the Charming Betsy canon,
which would require a construction of a statute that avoids conflict
with international law.181  Yoo’s reading of the torture statute conflicts
with both the CAT and the status of torture as a violation of jus
cogens—fundamental customary international law.  However, Yoo does
176. Id.
177. See Luban, supra note 38, at 1452–60 (criticizing Yoo memo and premises underly- R
ing it); Wendel, Legal Ethics, supra note 7, at 80–85 (same); Wendel, Professionalism as Inter- R
pretation, supra note 7, at 1224–32 (same).  Assuming that Yoo knew that waterboarding was R
one of the tools the Bush Administration wished to use, it is also odd that Yoo ignored the
recent history of water torture, including investigation of abuses by United States person-
nel combating rebels in the Philippines during the early 1900s, convictions of Japanese
military personnel for performing water torture on United States prisoners during World
War II, and a conviction on federal charges of a Texas sheriff accused of using water tor-
ture to secure a confession. See United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting Texas sheriff’s appeal that was based on trial court’s refusal to sever cases); see
also 154 CONG. REC. S948–49 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2008) (remarks of Sen. Whitehouse) (dis-
cussing history of waterboarding); Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water
Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468, 478–88, 502–04 (2007) (discussing
case law).
178. Yoo Memo, supra note 168, at 207–09. R
179. See Peter Margulies, Beyond Absolutism: Legal Institutions in the War on Terror, 60 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 309, 318 (2006) [hereinafter Margulies, Beyond Absolutism] (noting that ac-
quittals of torturers may “normalize the incidence of torture-lite or torture”).
180. Convention against Torture, supra note 172, art. 2. R
181. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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not acknowledge the relevance of the Charming Betsy canon, let alone
endeavor to explain why it does not apply.182
Finally, in his boldest move, Yoo argues that the statutes do not
really matter, in any event.  The President, he claims, has the power to
order coercion of any kind, by virtue of being Commander in
Chief.183  Armed with this premise, Yoo invokes the doctrine of consti-
tutional avoidance, asserting that one must read the torture statute to
give the President a blank check.184  Any other reading, Yoo insists,
would represent an unconstitutional power grab by the legislature.185
Yoo’s position here is against the great weight of precedent.  His
response is to trot out a long-time favorite of executive unilateralists,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright.186  The facts in Curtiss-Wright, however,
do not support this broad proposition because Congress had expressly
delegated to the President the authority upheld in that case.187  More-
over, Yoo fails to mention the Supreme Court’s decision in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,188 which holds that the power of the Presi-
dent is at its lowest ebb when the President acts against the wishes of
Congress on a matter committed to rule by both branches.189  The
182. Yoo does mention the Charming Betsy rule in another memo, but in a fashion that
renders it virtually toothless as a check on executive action.  According to Yoo, the rule is
merely a clear statement rule, which Congress can overcome by making its intention plain.
See Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Asst. Att’y Gen. & Robert J. Delabunty
[sic], Spec. Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Defense (Jan. 9, 2002)
[hereinafter Yoo & Delahunty Draft Memo], in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 168, at 38, R
74 n.122.  While this interpretation is literally correct, it fails to capture the depth of com-
mitment to international norms as default rules that is evident in Marshall’s opinion. See
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and conse-
quently can never be construed to violate neutral rights . . . further than is warranted by the
law of nations.”) (emphasis added).  Moreover, elsewhere in the memo Yoo proceeds to
have his cake and eat it, too.  Having observed that Congress can violate international law if
it does so plainly, Yoo argues that any attempt by Congress to broadly construe international
law protection of Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees would be an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on the powers of the President. See Yoo & Delahunty Draft Memo, supra note 182, at R
47, 74 & n.122.
183. Yoo Memo, supra note 168, at 200. R
184. Id. at 203.
185. Id. at 207.
186. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).  The Curtiss-Wright Court discusses the importance of the Pres-
ident’s powers in foreign affairs and states that “‘[w]e should hesitate long before limiting or
embarrassing such powers.’” Id. at 322 (quoting MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311
(1915)).
187. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 n.2 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
188. 343 U.S. 579.
189. Id. at 637–38; see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief
at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV.
689, 720–21 (2008) (proposing framework for analyzing Youngstown “Box 3” problems).
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Youngstown Court applied this analysis to strike down President Tru-
man’s seizure of the steel mills when a labor dispute allegedly imper-
iled the supply of equipment to our troops in Korea.190  Surely, a
dispute about torture would prompt similar solicitude for Congress,
which has the power to declare war, regulate the army and navy, and
pass legislation implementing treaties.
Yoo’s memo is problematic for a number of reasons.  First, it en-
ables the regime of detention and coercive interrogation that
emerged after September 11.  Goldsmith, who ultimately withdrew the
memo after he became head of OLC, acknowledges that the memo
“could be interpreted as if [it] were designed to confer immunity for
bad acts.”191  Viewed in this light, it arguably violated the lawyer’s duty
to avoid assisting a client in a crime or fraud.192  In addition, Yoo’s
memo arguably violates the lawyer’s duty of competence193 because of
its failure to identify and distinguish relevant legal authority.
Goldsmith’s withdrawal of the Yoo memo demonstrated both
courage and character, but left intact the mantle of issue entrepre-
neur.  Goldsmith seems genuinely troubled by the “blank check” that
Yoo provided to interrogators194 and chagrined by the damage it
caused to the reputations of the OLC and the whole Justice Depart-
ment.195  Nevertheless, Goldsmith returns too readily to his lawfare
critique, blaming the “criminalization of warfare” for contributing to
Yoo’s excesses.196  In addition, Goldsmith divorces the craft of lawyer-
ing from the substance of the detention and coercion regime.  He
implies that there was nothing improper about the practices them-
selves, asserting that the chief flaw with Yoo’s memo was that it was
“wildly broader than was necessary to support what was actually being
done.”197  He applauds the memo written by his successor at the OLC
that supplanted Yoo’s work, describing it as a “careful and nuanced
analysis.”198  The chief virtue of the successor memo for Goldsmith
was that this attention to craft made for a more credible argument
that the detainees had not been abused.199
190. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583, 585.
191. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 150. R
192. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008).
193. Id. R. 1.1.
194. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 151. R
195. Id. at 158.
196. Id. at 164.
197. Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 165.
199. See id. at 164–65.
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2. From True Believers to Technocrats
The next memo sent out by the Administration on the torture
front represents a significant improvement in tone, but a more equiv-
ocal gain in substance.  Daniel Levin, a veteran of legal national secur-
ity positions who had never espoused a grand theory, wrote the
memo—having become acting head of OLC after Goldsmith re-
signed.  Levin’s memo, issued in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, starts
with the observation that “[t]orture is abhorrent.”200  Levin deserves
substantial credit for clear and resonant language that accurately rep-
resented the consensus on this issue.  If one reads the memo more
carefully, however, loopholes appear, justifying what the Administra-
tion had already done.201
First, as noted above, the memo says that everything approved
under the old memo would be legal under the Levin memo, too.202
This dovetails conveniently with the Administration’s standard line on
Abu Ghraib—that none of the egregious abuse was authorized and
that it all resulted from a kind of Animal House or “night-shift” syn-
drome among the military personnel at the prison.  However, we
know that a broad repertoire of coercive techniques was used first at
Guantanamo and then brought to Iraq by the former Guantanamo
commander, General Geoffrey Miller.  In other settings, CIA opera-
tives used waterboarding, at least for three high-level Al Qaeda detain-
ees.  The Levin footnote signals that all of this activity comported with
the law.
The Levin memo backs up this signal of impunity with a parsing
of the test for torture that ignores the text and purpose of the CAT
and federal law.  Consider the most notorious interrogation prac-
200. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen., to James B. Comey,
Deputy Att’y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memo], in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN
AMERICA, supra note 7, at 361. R
201. See LUBAN, supra note 7, at 180–82 (stating that Levin’s memo “provide[d] ample R
cover for interrogators”).
202. Levin Memo, supra note 200, at 362 n.8.  In June 2008, Levin testified to Congress R
that this footnote meant simply that if Yoo had used Levin’s analysis, Yoo would still have
approved a wide range of interrogation techniques. See From the Department of Justice to
Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration Interrogation Rules (Part Two)
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter House Hearing] (testimony of Daniel Levin),
available in Fed. News Serv. (June 18, 2008).  Levin’s explanation of the footnote as merely
a description of Yoo’s subjective state of mind seems at odds with both the objective lan-
guage of the footnote and Goldsmith’s understanding of it. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1,
at 164–65.  Levin acknowledged that his drafting of the footnote was imprecise. See House
Hearing, supra (statement of Daniel Levin).  Levin also asserted that an interrogator who
had relied on Yoo’s memo and “went up to the limits of what it allowed . . . would be
violating the law.” Id.
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tice—waterboarding.  To waterboard a subject, interrogators place the
subject on a board, place a towel over his face, and pour running
water over the towel.  As long as the water is running, it is virtually
impossible for the subject to breathe without ingesting water in
through the lungs.  As survivors note, waterboarding is not “simu-
lated” drowning—it is drowning.203  Because the torture statute bars
the imposition of severe pain or suffering, waterboarding would seem
to fit within the definition.
The Levin memo addresses this issue by opining that torture has
a durational component—it must occur in a fashion that is not transi-
tory.204  This convenient qualification is less far-fetched on the surface
than the arguments made by Yoo, but potentially leaves loopholes just
as large.  After all, as was said above, putting out a lighted cigarette on
someone’s arm does not take a long time.  Few would argue, however,
that this procedure does not constitute torture.  Similarly, waterboard-
ing is often brief, as the subject begins to ingest more and more water
in a vain attempt to breathe, and panic takes over.  Under the circum-
stances, the brevity of the experience does not remove it from tor-
ture’s realm.  Because the text, purpose, and legislative history of the
statute support this broader interpretation of what constitutes torture,
the duration requirement resembles the towel interrogators use in
waterboarding—it is “made up . . . out of whole cloth.”205
The irony here is that despite the Levin memo’s preservation of
impunity, the Administration resented Levin’s vivid anti-torture lan-
guage and his going off the reservation in one striking episode.  Levin,
a methodical attorney who did not like loose ends,206 wanted to de-
203. See Wallach, supra note 177, at 469, 482–90 (describing water-torture survivors’ ex- R
periences); Dana Milbank, Logic Tortured, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2007, at A2 (same).  Fearing
death, most subjects start talking within a minute or so, although whether they actually
reveal useful information is a subject of debate.  In training exercises for United States
military personnel, where no one is supposed to die, trainers will briefly move the hose
away from the subject’s face to allow the subject to catch a quick breath.  A skilled interro-
gator would also do this in the field, because otherwise the subject might pass out and
actually drown before imparting any information.  In the field, however, when an interro-
gator feels pressure to get results from a recalcitrant subject, mistakes can happen.
204. Levin Memo, supra note 200, at 373–74. R
205. See LUBAN, supra note 7, at 182. R
206. I should disclose here that I knew Levin in the 1980s when we worked together on
litigation supporting the rights of people with mental disabilities. See Klostermann v.
Cuomo, 463 N.E.2d 588, 591, 594 (N.Y. 1984) (holding claims of people with mental disa-
bilities for community services and housing were justiciable).  Levin was then, and I assume
continues to be, a nonideological person guided by ideals of professional craft and an
innate sense of decency.  My criticism of his work on the memo requires an acknowledge-
ment that I and most other critics of the Bush Administration have not faced the difficult
calls that Levin and Goldsmith confronted—calls which presidents of both parties encoun-
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cide for himself whether waterboarding was torture.  News reports in-
dicate that Levin underwent waterboarding so that he could gain
better insight into the real world consequences of the Justice Depart-
ment’s legal opinions.207  The experience apparently led Levin to call
for far more stringent regulation of the practice.208  On the one hand,
this episode suggests the folly of both seasoned technocrats and parsi-
monious theorists alike.  “Stringent regulation” of abusive techniques
will not launder conduct that is inherently abusive.  Moreover, even if
regulation could have this effect in theory, in practice the lack of
transparency surrounding the technique and the exigencies of the sit-
uation will create overwhelming incentives for abuse.  On the other
hand, the denouement of Levin’s foray into the mindset of the inter-
rogation subject demonstrated the Administration’s view that only
true believers need apply: incoming Attorney General Gonzales told
Levin that he would not be nominated as permanent head of OLC.209
Because one technocrat proved to have too many scruples, the
Administration shopped around for another who was free of these en-
cumbrances.  It settled on Steven Bradbury, an acolyte of Kenneth
Starr.210  Bradbury proved to be more ideologically driven than Levin,
carrying the Administration’s water on the MCA, where he argued to
Congress that eviscerating detainees’ access to courts and allowing evi-
dence obtained by coercion met constitutional muster.211  Bradbury
also wrote secret opinions which allowed for coercive interrogation
using a combination of techniques, including deafening music for a
prolonged period, sleep deprivation, and extremes of hot and cold.212
While the torture statute does not mention combinations, their use
seems to defy the MCA’s purpose.  Moreover, permitting the practice
is imprudent as an institutional matter.  As with waterboarding, strin-
gent regulation of combinations will only go so far.  Authorizing the
ter. See House Hearing, supra note 202 (testimony of Daniel Levin) (testifying that “the legal R
issues . . . are . . . extremely difficult,” guidance from the framers is “murky, at best,” and
“[t]he stakes are high.  You’re often told that lives, and perhaps many, many lives are at
stake, and classification concerns often limit whom you can consult”).  In suggesting later
in this Article ways of more effectively regulating OLC’s work product, I try to keep in
mind the complexity of that context and acknowledge that risk aversion also has costs.
207. Scott Shane, A Firsthand Experience Before Decision on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2007, at A22.
208. Cf. House Hearing, supra note 202 (statement of Daniel Levin) (stating that “there R
were certain changes in practices as a result of the change in legal analysis” embodied in
his memo).
209. Id.
210. See Scott Shane et al., Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2007, at A1.
211. See id. (discussing Bradbury’s congressional testimony).
212. See id.
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practice will inevitably transform interrogators and senior officials
alike into Twain’s man with a hammer looking for a nail.  In addition,
the turn to coercion will shift attention away from developing effica-
cious noncoercive techniques, like those that proved successful in de-
briefing Nazi captives during World War II.213
3. Lawyerly Craft Enabling Dubious Practices: Goldsmith’s Draft
Article 49 Memo
Legal issues about interrogation concerned not just the manner
of questioning, but its locale.  Here I return to Goldsmith, to consider
his draft opinion on Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.214
This memo passes ethical muster because it openly acknowledges con-
trary authority on almost all relevant points.  That acknowledgement,
however, is not complete, ignoring the same imperative for a purpo-
sive reading of international obligations that Yoo slights in his memo.
Moreover, the memo’s inconsistencies in method suggest a strong re-
sult orientation.  Consequently, having credited Goldsmith for sub-
stantial character, courage, and judgment in repudiating the Yoo
torture memos, we cannot completely absolve Goldsmith himself of
responsibility for the torture archipelago that the Bush Administra-
tion has created in the wake of September 11.
In the memo, Goldsmith states that Article 49 does not bar the
deportation of undocumented aliens from occupied Iraq, or their
“brief” detention elsewhere for purposes of interrogation.215  These
conclusions, however, do not square with the text or context of Article
49.  Article 49 by its terms bars an occupying power from deporting or
transferring any “protected person[ ]” from a country under occupa-
tion.216  Viewed from the perspective of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (“ICRC”), which merits deference as the organiza-
tion charged with responsibility for monitoring compliance with the
Geneva Conventions, Article 49 is an absolute prohibition designed to
213. See Brian Albrecht, Uncovering Nazi Secrets; Vet Can Now Talk of PO Box 1142, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 11, 2008, at B1 (discussing secret American program for debriefing
Nazi notables such as rocket scientist Wernher von Braun).
214. See Draft Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Asst. Att’y Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Mar. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Goldsmith Draft Memo],
in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 168, at 367. R
215. Id. at 380.
216. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
(IV)].
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bar “disappearances” wrought by an occupied power.217  The provi-
sion, which prohibits deportations or transfers for any purpose, has an
institutional, prophylactic purpose of the kind that lawfare critics ha-
bitually marginalize: it ensures that in the fluid period of an occupa-
tion, an occupying power will not be able to serve expedience by
removing persons from the territory.  Moreover, Article 49 works in
tandem with other provisions of international treaty and customary
law which bar cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and torture.
If an occupying power can transfer residents of one state to another, it
also can hide them from view, and then engage in abusive interroga-
tion techniques with impunity.  In ignoring this concern, Goldsmith
fails to give Article 49 the purposive reading that customary interna-
tional law requires.218
In addition to disregarding the prophylactic purpose of the provi-
sion and declining to defer to the ICRC, Goldsmith disregards the
plain meaning of the text.  Article 49 bars the “deportation[ ]” or
“transfer[ ]” of persons by an occupying power from occupied terri-
tory.219  In American law, deportation has a specific meaning that cov-
ers exactly what Goldsmith approves—the removal of aliens who have
violated immigration laws.220  Goldsmith argues that deportation has a
different meaning in Article 49, claiming Article 49 deals with the
transportation of lawful residents of an occupied territory to concen-
tration camps outside the territory, as the Nazis did during World War
II.221  He then argues that “transfer” has the same meaning as “depor-
tation,”222 even though it seems more logical and consistent with the
provision’s purpose that the drafters would have added the term
217. See ICRC, International Humanitarian Law—Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600056?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 17,
2008) (providing commentary to Article 49).
218. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (providing rules of treaty interpretation); see also
LUBAN, supra note 7, at 184–88 (critiquing Goldsmith’s Article 49 draft opinion).  Gold- R
smith did act diligently in urging United States authorities in Iraq to carefully document
the illegal status of transferees.  Goldsmith Draft Memo, supra note 214, at 374 n.9.  Gold- R
smith fails to recognize, however, that when an occupying power has influence over the
occupied country’s government, changes to the immigration status of disfavored groups
may result.  Indeed, during the Nazi occupation, compliant governments in France, Hun-
gary, and Croatia stripped Jews of their citizenship, making them illegal aliens.  David
Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of War and
Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 323–25 (2007) (discussing historical background of Arti-
cle 49).  An occupier’s careful documentation of this status should not mitigate the viola-
tion of international law.
219. Geneva Convention (IV), supra note 216, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318. R
220. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2006) (providing classes of deportable aliens).
221. Goldsmith Draft Memo, supra note 214, at 369–70. R
222. Id. at 371.
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“transfer” to close any gaps created by their referring to “deportation.”
Because the proposed practice deals with illegal aliens, not those who
are lawful, he argues that Article 49 is not an obstacle.223
The interpretive strategy of reading “deportation” and “transfer”
as redundant is inconsistent with a hermeneutic tack Goldsmith takes
later in the memo.  In seeking to avoid the plain meaning of Article
49’s text, he argues that this reading would render redundant Article
51, which bars forced labor, and Article 76, which bars deportation of
those accused of offenses and who must be detained in the occupied
country.224  The ICRC contends, however, that these provisions
merely reemphasize and reiterate the central obligation contained in
Article 49.225  This view is clearly more consistent with the purposes of
each provision.  In any case, if Goldsmith embraces redundancy when
the result supports the government’s preferred option, as in the con-
struction of “deportation” and “transfer,” a commitment to lawyerly
craft should require the same tolerance when the results point in the
other direction.
Through much of the memo, Goldsmith proceeds without con-
sidering the institutional mission creep that enables abuses.  If trans-
parency is not present, abuse is far more likely.  Because detentions
outside an occupied territory will probably be secret, abuses will oc-
cur.  Since Goldsmith does not “know” that abuses will occur,226 he is
on safe ethical ground.227  Lawyers, however, should do more, includ-
ing offering advice where needed on the institutional consequences of
their client’s actions.228  Goldsmith appears to reject this stance.229
Goldsmith’s position here echoes his view of Yoo’s memo—he be-
lieved there that procedural safeguards were in place to minimize
223. Id. at 380.
224. Id. at 378.
225. See id. at 379 n.13 (noting the ICRC’s position).
226. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 172–73 (asserting lack of knowledge about whether R
advice was sought in connection with a “broader rendition program”).
227. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008) (“A lawyer shall not counsel
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal . . . .”).
228. See id. R. 2.1 (encouraging the lawyer to offer advice on nonlegal consequences);
see generally Peter Margulies, “Who Are You to Tell Me That?”: Attorney-Client Deliberation Re-
garding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990) [hereinafter
Margulies, “Who Are You to Tell Me That?”] (arguing that public interest lawyers and others
have an obligation to discuss nonlegal issues with clients).
229. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 147–48 (“OLC’s ultimate responsibility is to provide R
information about legality, regardless of what morality may indicate, and even if harm may
result.”).  Other passages in the book suggest that Goldsmith is a prudentialist at heart,
concerned with institutional reputation. See id. at 158 (discussing his decision to withdraw
the Yoo memo).  Goldsmith has yet to succeed in reconciling the parsimonious and
prudentialist elements of his perspective.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 47 25-NOV-08 13:14
2008] TRUE BELIEVERS AT LAW 47
abuse and criticized Yoo for unnecessarily sweeping language.  Here,
too, Goldsmith assumes that no abuse will occur, which is why he en-
dorses brief detentions.  Moreover, the emphasis on brief detentions
takes on a more ominous tone if one considers the Levin memo, with
its durational qualification for torture.  Sometimes, despite Levin and
Goldsmith’s view, even a brief detention is problematic.  To serve the
abiding interests of the United States, a national security lawyer
should pay more attention to these institutional concerns.
B. Issue Entrepreneurs at the OLC and the Consequences of Ignoring
Consequences
Issue entrepreneurs who give short shrift to institutional conse-
quences incur long-term costs for the institutions they serve.  These
long-term costs are often not evident immediately, when the issue en-
trepreneur earns plaudits for forging a new discourse and trashing old
icons.  In absorbing the praise, the issue entrepreneur also legitimates
expedient actions, including the coercive interrogation at issue in
each memo discussed above.230  This legitimation, however, comes
with severe costs for the reputational interests of the entity receiving
the advice.  In addition, issues like coercive interrogation generate an
institutional overhang that dominates future discourse and crowds out
other priorities.  Moreover, the volatile transitions wrought by issue
entrepreneurs, in the coercive interrogation context and in private
sector debacles such as Enron, can inspire satellite misconduct such as
perjury or obstruction.  This misconduct undermines the integrity of
institutions.
As with many issue entrepreneurs, the legitimation function of
the lawfare critics was crucial.  The legitimation function served in-
strumental ends—as Goldsmith concedes, officials could use the
memos to engage in abuses with impunity.231  This instrumental ac-
count, however, short-changes the lawfare critics’ importance.  Even
before September 11, the lawfare critics provided an intellectual and
normative imprimatur for efforts to expand executive power at the
230. Here, again, Goldsmith’s withdrawal of Yoo’s memo and his insistence that Iraqi
captives were protected under the Geneva Conventions complicate the picture.  One could
plausibly argue that Goldsmith’s championing of the lawfare paradigm actually positioned
him well to take these courageous steps.  Goldsmith got the OLC job, as he concedes,
because people like David Addington believed that he would play the same role as John
Yoo. Id. at 30.  If Addington and others had understood from the start that Goldsmith’s
commitment to legal craft would temper his advice, the OLC position may have gone to
someone with fewer scruples.
231. Id. at 150.
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expense of congressional authority and international law.232  The
lawfare critics’ prominence in elite journals in the late 1990s
dovetailed perfectly with the mission of restoring executive power es-
poused by Vice President Cheney and Cheney’s counsel, David Add-
ington.  This prominence gave the movement for executive power
new cachet, and sharpened its story of a return to the origins of the
Republic.  Taken together, expedience and a compelling origin story
produced a tipping point.233
The OLC lawyers of the Bush Administration had something else
in common with other issue entrepreneurs.  As noted above, a stylized
iconoclasm or disturbing of boundaries often helps issue entrepre-
neurs get noticed.  Yoo and Goldsmith demonstrated this technique.
Yoo’s failure to cite Youngstown and his use of a statute with marginal
relevance to coercive interrogation, along with his sweeping claims for
presidential power, have been described as bad lawyering, or as stud-
ied ignorance.  They also had a more expressive function, however,
demonstrating his contempt for the traditions that customary interna-
tional law and the Youngstown framework embody.  Goldsmith, who
never relinquished a commitment to lawyerly craft, reacted with rue-
fulness and regret to this spectacle.  Indeed, Yoo’s excesses triggered
Goldsmith’s attempt to have it both ways.  As a reaction to Yoo, Gold-
smith sought to preserve the lawfare critique while also rejecting the
Bush Administration’s imprudent unilateralism.  In his Article 49
draft, however, Goldsmith engages in a more unobtrusive brand of
idol-smashing.  In approving the removal of undocumented aliens
232. Goldsmith did not share Yoo’s executive unilateralism in all respects. While he be-
lieved the President had authority to detain and try enemy combatants without express
congressional authority, he also believed that more robust procedural safeguards were nec-
essary. See id. at 28–29.  His wholesale critique of international law, however, muted this
difference. Id. at 28 (discussing Addington’s detailed knowledge of Goldsmith’s views on
international law).
233. A number of lawyers within the government dissented from this view. See CHARLIE
SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 147, 196–99 (2007) (discussing criticism of Addington’s and Yoo’s policies
by William H. Taft IV, Legal Advisor for the State Department, and other Justice Depart-
ment lawyers, including Deputy Attorney General Jim Comey); Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo,
Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1819–21 (2007) (discussing dissent by military lawyers).
Goldsmith’s book on the Bush Administration, despite what this Article contends is its
mixed message, has clearly helped focus attention on the poor track record of the Admin-
istration. See Preserving the Rule of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5–37 (2007) (testimony of Jack Goldsmith on back-
ground of torture memos and dispute about the Administration’s Terrorist Surveillance
Program); cf. 153 CONG. REC. S15011–12 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2007) (remarks of Sen.
Whitehouse) (castigating the unduly expansive interpretation of presidential power given
in classified OLC opinions).
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from Iraq, Goldsmith declines to cite or distinguish the Vienna Con-
vention’s dictum that treaties like the Geneva Conventions should be
interpreted according to their purpose.234  This conspicuous failure is
not inadvertent.  Rather, it is rooted in Goldsmith’s lawfare narrative,
which dismisses the benefits that other scholars have claimed accom-
pany the Vienna Convention’s rules on interpretation.  Goldsmith’s
Article 49 memo was a manifestation of this disdain.235
The tipping point engineered in part by the lawfare critics had
significant consequences.236  Commentators on American foreign pol-
icy contend that the United States’ greatest strength lies in its “soft
power”—its ability to leverage cultural, social, and political vitality to
persuade other countries without the use of force.237  The efficacy of
soft power depends on perceptions that the United States acts
fairly,238 as measured by observance of human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian norms.  American defection from international
law norms discredits those who promote such norms as an answer to
extremists.  It also gives a valuable rhetorical tool to despotic regimes
that wish to resist constructive change.239  Popular indignation at this
intransigence can result in a violent reaction that puts extremists in
power, as the case of Iran demonstrates.240  In this fashion, the volatil-
234. In fairness, Goldsmith does not ignore purpose; rather, he argues that one should
interpret the purpose of Article 49 narrowly, to encompass only permanent removal of
lawful residents of the occupied territory. See Goldsmith Draft Memo, supra note 214, at R
371.  The Vienna Convention’s guidance here suggests, however, that broad interpreta-
tions are favored. See Vienna Convention, supra note 218.  Goldsmith does not acknowl- R
edge this guidance.
235. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 97–98 (arguing that Vienna Convention R
adds nothing to initial processes of treaty formation and ratification in reducing dangers of
prisoner dilemma games in foreign affairs).
236. The discussion in this paragraph borrows in large part from an earlier piece. See
Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at 657–58. R
237. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY
SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 35 (2002) (arguing that a preemptive approach by the
United States will result in the loss of “important opportunities for cooperation in the
solution of global problems such as terrorism”).
238. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1487
(2003) (arguing that perceptions that the United States adheres to double standards weak-
ens its soft power).
239. Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at 658. R
240. See STEPHEN KINZER, OVERTHROW: AMERICA’S CENTURY OF REGIME CHANGE FROM HA-
WAII TO IRAQ 196 (2006) (noting that efforts by the United States to dislodge democrati-
cally elected regimes in Iran and elsewhere exacerbated anti-American sentiments).
Antiterror measures passed by Congress can also have unintended policy consequences,
even when they pass constitutional muster.  For example, consider terrorist financing re-
strictions such as the federal material support statute, which bars the provision of material
support to terrorist activity or terrorist organizations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A & B (2000 &
Supp. V 2007).  Without due care in enforcement, the material support statute can unduly
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ity bred by the decline of American soft power damages American in-
terests and legitimacy abroad.
Issue entrepreneurship during times of crisis can also impair the
deliberation necessary for sound political judgment at home.  Here
again, institutional pathologies distort rationality.  Politics is path-de-
pendent—one event serves as a catalyst for reactions, even when those
reactions would not be optimal from a long-term perspective.241  In
setting a path to follow, the executive has the advantage of dispatch.
Once the executive sets the agenda, she can lock the country into
place.  For example, if the Charming Betsy canon has descriptive as well
as normative force, Congress may not wish to cavalierly pass legislation
opposed to international law.242  Once the President acts, however,
chill charitable giving by Muslims seeking to fulfill obligations of their faith.  It can also
further polarize the political environment overseas by forcing groups to replace contribu-
tions by moderates with funding from extreme elements in countries such as Saudi Arabia
where antiterrorism efforts are sometimes spotty in implementation. See Nina J. Crimm,
Muslim-Americans’ Charitable Giving Dilemma: What About a Centralized Terror-Free Donor Ad-
vised Fund?, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing obligation rooted
in Islam of zakat or sacrifice to assist the less fortunate and risk of alienation if antiterror
laws frustrate fulfillment of this duty; suggesting an organizational structure that would
facilitate giving while meeting antiterror goals through transparency and monitoring);
Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its Implica-
tions for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1341, 1351–53 (2004) (discussing policy consequences of antiterror legislation); Peter
Margulies, Laws of Unintended Consequences: Terrorist Financing Restrictions and Transitions to
Democracy, 20 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 65, 75–84 (2007) [hereinafter Margulies, Laws of Unin-
tended Consequences] (same); see also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 76 (2003) (arguing that the
material support statute is unconstitutional); Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Antici-
patory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 486–92
(2007) (arguing that some conspiracy prosecutions under material support laws are surro-
gates for preventive detention because defendants’ acts are remote in time, scope, or cer-
tainty of implementation from actual violence). But see Humanitarian Law Project v.
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134–37 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding material support statute as
serving significant governmental objective and imposing merely incidental burden on free
speech; rejecting vagueness challenge to statutory prohibition of provision of “personnel,”
while finding prohibitions on provision of “training” and “expert advice or assistance” void
for vagueness).
241. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 603–04 (2001) (defining path-depen-
dence).  Goldsmith and Posner recognize the influence of such processes, but maintain
the virtues of their parsimonious model. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9, at 7–9 R
(discussing critiques to rational choice theory).
242. Cf. Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Com-
mander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61, 73–76 (2007) (arguing that the
President should be more constrained by treaties and customary international law than by
statutes because such forms of international law embody long-term practice of states—as in
customary international law–and unique collaboration between Congress and the Presi-
dent—as in the case of treaties). But see Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 97, at R
1963 (noting that the Senate is “the sole legislative participant in the treaty power”).
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impetus for enacting such a regime increases because of concern
about otherwise exposing state officials or private actors cooperating
with them to legal liability.  Path-dependence produces a hasty con-
gressional rubber stamp, such as the Military Commissions Act, which
also raises substantial constitutional issues.243  Eventually, as in foreign
affairs, a massive counter-reaction may ensue, such as the Non-Deten-
tion Act,244 passed in the wake of the Cold War, which sought to deny
243. See supra notes 123–129 and accompanying text.  For an interesting argument that
civilian courts also have problems in handling terrorism cases, see A. John Radsan, The
Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1417, 1417–19 (2005)
(arguing that problems with prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui stemmed from lack of fit
between security concerns and the criminal justice system, and that the Department of
Defense should have detained Moussaoui).
Constitutional issues also emerged in related areas, particularly in the Administra-
tion’s Terrorist Surveillance Program (“TSP”).  The TSP involved access to millions of elec-
tronic communications, many of them made by persons in the United States.  Although we
know relatively little about the TSP, the program’s extensive warrantless surveillance
seemed to violate the procedures set out by Congress in the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (“FISA”). See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting electronic surveil-
lance without statutory authorization); cf. Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the
Adversary System: Article III Courts, FISA, CIPA and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y
& ETHICS J. 203 (2006) (discussing challenges for defense counsel imposed by FISA).  Ad-
ministration justifications of the TSP were made using the same inherent authority argu-
ment John Yoo made in his memo: arguing that the President’s Article II status as
Commander in Chief gave him this power and that, in any event, Congress had implicitly
authorized surveillance under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) of
September 18, 2001. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Asst. Att’y Gen., to The Honor-
able Pat Roberts, Chairman, Sen. Select Comm. on Intelligence, et al. (Dec. 22, 2005),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj122205.pdf; cf. John Yoo, The Ter-
rorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 565, 566 (2007) (argu-
ing for the constitutionality of TSP).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), cast sub-
stantial doubt on the government’s assertions regarding the TSP.  In Hamdan, the Court
held that the AUMF did not authorize the unilateral establishment of military commissions
by President Bush, when those commissions violated the international law of war that Con-
gress had incorporated by reference into the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Id. at
593–94.  By analogy, the AUMF also did not authorize the comprehensive surveillance pro-
gram occurring within the United States embodied in the TSP.  To his great credit, Gold-
smith opposed the very broad TSP initially implemented by the President, but it is unclear
whether he opposed the revised program, which was adopted after objections by Gold-
smith, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Deputy Attorney General James Comey. See Gold-
smith, supra note 1, at 182; see also John Cary Sims, What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal, R
33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 105–06 (2006) (arguing that the TSP is unconstitutional);
David Alan Jordan, Decrypting the Fourth Amendment: Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the En-
hanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice Over Internet Protocol, 47 B.C. L. REV.
505, 544 (2006) (arguing that TSP violated evolving Fourth Amendment standards). But
see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a “Reasonable Ex-
pectation of Privacy?,” 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 504–05 (2001) (arguing that individuals using
encryption may have subjective expectation of privacy, but such an expectation is not nor-
matively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
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the President any authority to detain an individual, regardless of the
exigency of the situation.245  Here, as in the international realm, vola-
tility does not serve abiding values.246
Because of path-dependence, unduly risky actions taken by offi-
cials at one point can hamstring future decisionmakers.  Attorney
General Michael B. Mukasey, someone who by all accounts is a decent
and honest public servant, has appeared evasive and equivocal be-
cause of his refusal to answer questions about whether waterboarding
constitutes torture.  He has compounded this impression with recent
remarks that the facts and circumstances might determine whether
waterboarding fits the bill.247  Subsequent observations that it would
245. Id. But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (authorizing detention of
alleged terrorist under AUMF); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Author-
ization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2106 (2005) (arguing that AUMF
trumps Non-Detention Act); Margulies, Judging Terror, supra note 114, at 421–25 (arguing
that AUMF provides sufficient authority for interstitial, narrowly tailored detention); Carl
Tobias, The Process Due Indefinitely Detained Citizens, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1695–98 (2007)
(discussing Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld); Stephen I. Vladeck,
Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 157, 190–92 (2004) (expressing
doubt about executive authority to detain individuals without express congressional
approval).
246. Before a counter-reaction develops, the nature of political markets will often en-
courage hasty appeals to the use of force.  A political candidate who fails to endorse the use
of force and the maximum discretion in its use looks “soft.”  That is one reason that official
lists of terrorist states or organizations rarely shrink—politicians who make or oversee such
lists find advantage in expanding the terrorist groups targeted, while no one wants to call
for removing a group from the watch list. See  Margulies, Laws of Unintended Consequences,
supra note 240, at 81 (discussing political liability of appearing soft on terrorism).  Just as R
politicians rarely say that sentences for criminals are too high, or that fewer aliens should
be deported for engaging in illegal conduct, the capacity and discretion to use force tends
to expand in the political marketplace.  The same dynamic encourages harsher criminal
laws. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANS-
FORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 29 (2007) (“[T]he ability
of the state to take drastic action against convicted wrongdoers provides an unparalleled
constitutional avenue of action.”); see also Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institu-
tional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2237–51 (2003) (discussing factors that broaden
the scope of criminal liability under federal statutes); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 533–39 (2001) (noting convergence of inter-
ests between legislators and prosecutors that broadens scope of criminal law); cf. Richman
& Stuntz, supra note 25, at 618–24 (discussing dynamics of federal criminal prosecution of R
terrorists).
247. See Richard B. Schmitt, Is It Torture? He’s Still Not Ready to Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2008, at A10 (stating that, during a Senate Committee hearing, Muskasey declined to pro-
vide a definitive opinion on whether waterboarding constituted torture); cf. Dan Eggen,
Justice Official Defends Rough CIA Interrogations; Severe, Lasting Pain is Torture, He Says, WASH.
POST, Feb. 17, 2008, at A3 (reporting on testimony of Steven Bradbury, acting chief of
OLC, that waterboarding as practiced by Bush Administration did not constitute torture).
Mukasey has permitted an ethics inquiry into OLC memos on interrogation, conducted by
the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility. See Scott Shane, Waterboard-
ing Focus of Inquiry by Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2008, at A1.
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be inappropriate for the Justice Department to prosecute officials for
violations of the torture statute when those officials relied on OLC
advice have fleshed out the portrait of a good man stuck with the re-
sults of past excesses for which he was not responsible.  Congressional
frustration at Mukasey’s equivocations has made it difficult to gather
political momentum for needed changes in staffing and policy at the
Justice Department, as the Department seeks to recover from the dis-
astrous reign of former Attorney General Gonzales.248
A final externality generated by issue entrepreneurship on coer-
cion and international law concerns the integrity of government offi-
cials.  As the response to Abu Ghraib revealed, norms like the
international and domestic rules against torture can be diluted, but
not extinguished.  Eventually, departures will become a matter for
shame, regret, or anxiety about legal exposure.  These factors drive
the occurrence of satellite misconduct revolving around the interroga-
tion regime, including obstruction of justice and perjury.  The de-
struction of the CIA tapes of interrogation sessions illustrates this
risk.249  Satellite misconduct further undermines the integrity of the
officials implementing the policy, particularly of the lawyers involved.
In this way, issue entrepreneurs dealing with inherently dangerous or
intrusive programs create negative externalities in legal ethics that
persist even if the government seeks to resume observance of interna-
tional norms.
IV. APPROACHES TO REGULATING ISSUE ENTREPRENEURS ON
NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS
If issue entrepreneurship is a problem, the next question is what
to do about it.  There are a number of options, including criminal law,
tort law, structural remedies, and informal norms.  The criminal and
tort law options are both novel for lawyers giving advice, yet perhaps
more apt in this setting than in others that lack the potential for such
high negative externalities.  The Bivens action filed recently against
John Yoo250 may herald greater use of these avenues.  The informal
norms approach has also gained traction.  For each approach, one
248. The Administration’s insistence that the Senate confirm Steven Bradbury as perma-
nent head of the OLC, despite Bradbury’s role in drafting legal opinions that condoned
abusive interrogations, has also contributed to this problem of institutional overhang. See
Peter Baker, Bush Urges Vote on Nominees; Senate Democrats Aim to Stall Till ’09, WASH. POST,
Feb. 8, 2008, at A17.
249. See Scott Shane, Prosecutor to Review Official Handling of C.I.A. Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2008, at A23 (discussing the destruction of interrogation tapes).
250. See Complaint at 3, Padilla v. Yoo, No. 08-0035 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008) (bringing
civil rights action against Yoo in his individual capacity).
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should question whether the option in question enhances delibera-
tion about the difficult issues facing lawyers giving national security
advice.  Evaluation should keep in mind that remedies will apply not
only to the current Administration, but to those in the future.
A. Criminalizing National Security Advice
Criminalizing legal advice of any kind seems like a stretch, at first
glance.  Legal rules protect the attorney-client relationship, most obvi-
ously through an evidentiary privilege designed to promote communi-
cation.  The threat of criminal prosecution may erect a barrier
between lawyer and client, making communication more difficult.
That being said, one can construct an argument for criminal prosecu-
tion when the lawyer gives certain kinds of advice.
The centerpiece of this argument would be the classification of
legal authorization as a crime of complicity, such as aiding and abet-
ting.251  Terrorist prosecutions include cases where culpability has at-
tached because of the dissemination of an authorization for
violence.252  A factfinder should determine that the authorizing party
knowingly assisted unlawful acts, and that her actions contributed sig-
nificantly to the acts’ occurrence.  This authorization theory would
support liability for a cleric who endorsed specific acts of violence as
being consistent with religious teachings with the knowledge that
members of the group would act on this endorsement.253
251. Cf. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 212–29
(2000) (discussing case law and advancing theory of complicity based on participation and
“authorship” of shared enterprise).  For example, a lawyer giving advice that enabled the
torture of a suspect, including a suspect at a so-called CIA “black site” abroad, could be
charged with aiding and abetting a war crime or a violation of the torture statute.  The
Supreme Court has recently limited civil liability for aiding and abetting under the securi-
ties laws and expressed some concern about negative externalities that could be triggered
by such a cause of action. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 128 S. Ct. 761,
771–72 (2008).
252. See United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 296–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (reviewing
indictment of an attorney for aiding a translator pass messages to an imprisoned foreign
terrorist organization leader); cf. Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of
Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 448–52 (2007) (arguing that accomplices should
be judged by their direct contribution to harm alleged and that distinction between princi-
pal and accomplice is incoherent and should be eliminated).
253. See, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 116–18 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding
cleric’s conviction of conspiracy and solicitation of attack against the United States); cf.
Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity, supra note 62, at 197–200 (discussing how cler- R
ics and others may be liable for “signaling” their followers to engage in terrorist activity).
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The lawyer who advises that inherently violent acts254 such as co-
ercive interrogation are permissible is not in theory different from the
offending cleric.  One might argue that the lawyer’s advice is often
hypothetical.  The client asks, “If we did X, would that be legal?”  The
lawyer merely responds in kind.  On this view, the lawyer cannot have
knowledge of any specific acts that the client will commit after receipt
of the lawyer’s advice.
In the OLC context, however, this argument is unpersuasive.  The
government is a repeat player.  It has significant opportunities to im-
plement the lawyer’s advice, whether or not it does so in a given case.
Certainly, the distance between authorization and action is no greater
than it would be for a cleric who declares that his associates can make
Europe a free-fire zone.255  In both cases, the individual that asked for
the authorization knows that the question is not an idle one.
The next argument is that the prospect of criminal prosecution
will induce unwelcome risk aversion in the government lawyer.  Some-
times, the lawyer has to make tough calls, in which authorizing a vio-
lent act, such as a targeted killing, may protect United States persons
against greater danger.256  To deal with this issue, courts could require
a jury to find that a defendant’s advice was clearly in violation of set-
tled law.  The legal system asks juries to make this kind of decision all
the time in the tort setting; in principle, the criminal context is no
different.257
Despite the colorable case for criminal prosecution, this option
fails because of its adverse consequences not only for the quality of
legal judgment offered in the future by the President’s advisers, but
254. See Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711–13 (1943) (noting that
seller’s active encouragement of sales of inherently dangerous goods, coupled with knowl-
edge of illegal activities, would support conspiracy charge).
255. I do not claim here that the United States government and a terrorist group are
morally equivalent.  Terrorists target civilians engaged in ordinary activities, including
shopping, working, and taking public transportation.  There is no credible evidence that
United States officials do this, even though civilians may become collateral damage in the
use of force.
256. See William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The
U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 679–81 (2003) (discussing rationales in inter-
national and domestic law justifying targeted killing in carefully tailored circumstances).
257. Christopher Kutz argues that risk aversion is an appropriate stance when the law-
yer’s advice sets the stage for “gross violence,” whether that violence is from private individ-
uals or from the state.  Christopher Kutz, The Lawyers Know Sin: Complicity in Torture, in THE
TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA, supra note 7, at 241, 245.  Kutz further argues that lawyers R
should have a safe harbor when they fully air the arguments against their stated position.
Id. at 246. But see JORDAN J. PAUST, BEYOND THE LAW: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S UNLAW-
FUL RESPONSES IN THE “WAR” ON TERROR 23–24 (2007) (arguing for criminal penalties);
Markovic, supra note 168 (same). R
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also for the quality of the politics practiced by both parties.  If Twain
was right about the man with the hammer, we should be wary about
the effects of giving partisan politicians the tool of criminal prosecu-
tion.  The Independent Counsel statute, for example, too often substi-
tuted criminal investigations for the more challenging and important
task of political debate on the issues.258  As Robert Jackson noted de-
cades ago, targeting a particular individual for investigation always
risks unfairness because no one is perfect, and a prosecutor looking
for wrongdoing will often find it.259  If one could prosecute a John
Yoo, one could also imagine a prosecution of a lawyer who acted as
Robert Jackson did in the destroyer deal with Britain during World
War II.260  Each prosecution will increase the resentment of the other
side, leading to a downward spiral of mutual recriminations.  In addi-
tion, the threat of prosecution may make administrations more secre-
tive, thus further impairing the quality of political discourse.261
The independent counsel investigation of Ted Olson reflects this
concern.  While Olson’s eagerness to assert executive privilege regard-
ing an independent agency—the EPA—was unduly doctrinaire, con-
gressional Democrats’ successful pressure for a criminal investigation
was an excessive response.  The entire matter would have been better
handled through political avenues, including ongoing congressional
oversight of both the EPA and the Justice Department.
Investigations of this kind have a nasty way of not just bringing
law into politics to an inappropriate degree, but also bringing politics
into law.  The risk is particularly great because the conduct charged,
as in Olson’s case, will often involve satellite crimes like perjury and
obstruction.  While pretextual prosecutions are sometimes necessary
to protect the integrity of the system, they give prosecutors a huge
258. See Lund, supra note 5, at 66 (discussing the shortcomings of the Independent R
Counsel law).
259. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 19–20
(1940) (highlighting the potential of a prosecutor to abuse power by inappropriately focus-
ing on certain individuals or groups).
260. See 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 484, 486–88 (1940); cf. JACKSON, supra note 75, at 93–103 R
(discussing background of destroyer deal, which eventually led to Lend-Lease legislation).
I believe that Jackson acted properly because the process he and President Roosevelt en-
gaged in was far more transparent than the process leading to issuance of the torture
memos. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text; cf. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at R
192–205 (discussing destroyer deal); Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at R
666–69 (same).  In a volatile and polarized political climate, however, playing “gotcha” is
often the activity of the moment, sweeping up dubious and worthy public servants alike.
261. This chilling effect is one reason that I propose a presumptive safe harbor from
criminal prosecution for administrations that promptly make legal opinions public. See
infra notes 373–380 and accompanying text. R
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amount of discretion which can easily be abused.262  Leaks to burnish
the prosecutor’s reputation or embarrass the defense may become
common.263  These externalities suggest that criminal prosecution is
often a cure worse than the disease.
B. Tort Liability and OLC
Damages actions, like the one recently filed by Jose Padilla
against John Yoo,264 have the same virtues and problems as criminal
liability.  Damages actions can be based on group wrongdoing to ad-
dress the plausible deniability that governmental organizations devise
to shield themselves.  Tort suits can also bring out valuable informa-
tion about tipping points in organizational wrongdoing, much as legal
scrutiny of the Enron debacle brought to light data about corporate
misconduct.265
A tort suit regarding legal authorization for torture would be
styled as a Bivens action, seeking to hold officials accountable for viola-
tions of constitutional rights.266  In Padilla’s case, if Yoo’s legal recom-
mendation was a significant cause267 of the plaintiff’s detention for
262. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 25, at 590–91 (discussing the balance of power a R
prosecutor has in pretextual cases); cf. Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prose-
cution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 899–901
(2000) (arguing for greater control of prosecutorial discretion in cases involving parents
allegedly using interstate travel to avoid paying child support).
263. See John Q. Barrett, The Leak and the Craft: A Hard Line Proposal to Stop Unaccountable
Disclosures of Law Enforcement Information, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 632–33 (1999) (discuss-
ing the power of an investigative leak to affect personal lives, work, and general happiness).
264. See Complaint, Padilla v. Yoo, No. 08-0035 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008).
265. See Regan, supra note 67, at 1141–42 (discussing how an examination of Enron’s R
transactions during bankruptcy proceedings brought to light the fraudulent activity); Wil-
liam H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Miscon-
duct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 12–15 (2005) (arguing that the culture of “ambivalently
bureaucratic business[es]” may help explain the Enron scandal).
266. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389–92 (1971) (addressing
claim that federal narcotics  agents’ activities violated the Fourth Amendment); Arar v.
Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 266–67 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that plaintiff’s claims of
“torture and coercive interrogation” fall under a Bivens analysis), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d
Cir. 2008); cf. id. at 261–62 (discussing aiding and abetting liability under Torture Victim
Protection Act). See generally James Barron, U.S. Appeals Court to Rehear Case of Deported Ca-
nadian, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2008, at B4 (reporting that Second Circuit will rehear Arar
case en banc).
267. On the question of causation in aiding and abetting liability, see Boim v. Holy Land
Found. for Relief & Dev., 511 F.3d 707, 740–42 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff must
demonstrate causation-in-fact to prevail on claim that alleged fundraisers for Hamas aided
and abetted terrorist attack, while further explaining that collective wrongdoing often has
many causes and that defendants’ conduct need not be principal cause of harm to support
liability), reh’g granted and vacated No. 05-1815, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12925 (7th Cir. June
16, 2008).
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almost two years under conditions of extreme sensory deprivation and
human isolation,268 Yoo is arguably liable in the same fashion as other
officials in on the decision, such as Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.  The
inherently dangerous nature of the activity—coercive interrogation—
that Yoo endorsed buttresses this theory of tort liability.
Moreover, suits like Padilla’s aid the cause of transparency in gov-
ernment.  Few administrations have been as secretive as the Bush Ad-
ministration.  A source of particular frustration has been the secrecy
surrounding legal analysis of the Administration’s initiatives, includ-
ing heightened interrogation techniques, National Security Agency
surveillance, and so on.  Even in camera inspection of some of the legal
opinions withheld from view would be a victory.  Moreover, there is
always the possibility that publicity around the lawsuit would prompt
further public disclosure, authorized or not, as occurred with the tor-
ture memos in the wake of Abu Ghraib.  While secrets should not be
revealed lightly, the Administration’s determination to make the law
itself secret is an effort perilous to democracy.
One can also argue that the many threshold questions in Padilla’s
suit are not necessarily obstacles to liability.  Attorney-client privilege
may well have been waived, at least as to already public documents like
the Yoo memo.  The state secrets doctrine269 may not apply either,
given the public disclosure of Padilla’s detention and the conditions
of his confinement, although the exact information that led to Pa-
dilla’s arrest may be covered if it came from interrogation of other Al
Qaeda detainees.  The “special factors counseling hesitation” under
Bivens may include embarrassment to a foreign power, but may not
include embarrassment to the United States government, which is po-
tentially embarrassed in any Bivens action.270  Qualified immunity may
not apply, particularly because some of Yoo’s analysis, such as his anal-
ogy to the statute providing emergency medical coverage for undocu-
mented aliens, would be laughable if the stakes were not so high.  The
268. Padilla alleges that Yoo publicly admitted that he made this recommendation. See
Complaint at 19, Padilla v. Yoo, No. 08-0035 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008).
269. See Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1250–53 (2007) (discussing general role of state secrets doctrine
in post September 11 cases).
270. See Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281–82 (holding that embarrassment to Canada, which
had allegedly cooperated in Arar’s rendition to Syria, constitutes a special factor under
Bivens analysis).  Special factors could include the same risk of disclosure of sensitive intelli-
gence information discussed in the text with respect to the state secrets doctrine.
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plaintiffs face obstacles here that are significant, but perhaps not
insurmountable.271
However, just as in the criminal context, there are reasons to be
wary of tort litigation.  Damages actions like Padilla’s will not necessa-
rily make national security lawyers more conscientious overall; instead,
they may merely personalize a systemic problem.  Targeting John Yoo
may be emotionally satisfying, but it is hardly a panacea for the peren-
nial dilemmas facing national security lawyers.  Moreover, training fire
on one law professor brings to mind Robert Jackson’s warning about
the dangers of investigating those who are currently unpopular.  The
better course might be to use political pressure to persuade the Ad-
ministration to release the remaining legal opinions, and to engage
Yoo on the merits.
C. Prudence, Best Practices, and Preaching to the Choir: Informal
Norms
Another response to Yoo has come from veterans of the Clinton
era OLC, who have suggested informal norms to regulate the issue
entrepreneurship of the lawfare critics, while recognizing that the
President also has a sphere of lawful authority.  The informal norms
approach has yielded a valuable document comprised of suggested
guidelines for the OLC that will mitigate issue entrepreneurship in
the future,272 for example by urging open dissemination of OLC opin-
ions whenever possible.  The informal norms approach, however, has
three problems that limit its utility.  First, its guidelines are aspira-
tional, looking toward the long-term health of the OLC.  Long-term
concerns tend to recede in emergencies, when they are most needed.
Second, because the informal norms proponents hail almost exclu-
sively from Democratic administrations, they lack the inclusiveness to
formulate comprehensive norms or effectively impose reputational
sanctions.  Third, as a matter of substance, the informal norms ap-
proach does not give the President sufficient flexibility.
271. Regarding the qualified immunity issue, Yoo will assert that courts considered Pa-
dilla’s habeas petitions for a number of years without reaching a definitive conclusion.  In
addition, Yoo would be able to cite the complicated venue questions in the case, arguably
having the effect of prolonging Padilla’s confinement.  Padilla’s own lawyers decided to
maintain their lawsuit in the Second Circuit, where Padilla was initially detained as a mate-
rial witness, instead of filing in the Fourth Circuit, where Padilla was held for the bulk of
the detention period.  The Supreme Court eventually held that habeas jurisdiction over
Padilla was available only in the Fourth Circuit. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451
(2004).  Holding Yoo responsible for the tactical decision made by Padilla’s attorneys
seems unfair.
272. See Johnsen, supra note 5, at 1603–10 (highlighting ten helpful OLC guidelines). R
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The first problem with the guidelines is their aspirational con-
tent.  They are a valuable first step, but an emergency often places
long-term concerns on the back-burner.  Attorneys are people, too,
and invoking long-term concerns can seem like party-pooping.  No
one wants to be a party-pooper.  Long-term concerns like those involv-
ing individual rights can also seem irrelevant in an emergency, when
the government is bracing for the next attack.  Finally, even mention-
ing long-term concerns in such a climate can prejudice the lawyer’s
ability to get a job.  Government employers looking to hire an issue
entrepreneur with a disdain for “lawfare” do not really want to hear
about how the entrepreneur will temper her ideological pursuits with
a concern for the country’s reputation.  If the government official was
interested in this concern, he would not be interviewing this particu-
lar candidate.  Similarly, the candidate gets signals from the govern-
ment about what kind of candidate will get the nod.  Goldsmith
candidly acknowledges that this tacit sidelining of reputation and
rights concerns occurred in his interview process.273  It would seem
likely to recur.  In this sense, the informal norms approach has the
inverse problem of the tort and criminal strategies—they over-enforce
norms, while the informal norms approach leads to under-
enforcement.
The second problem with the informal norms approach is the
underinclusiveness of its stakeholders.  In recent decades, issue entre-
preneurship has largely been a factor in Republican administrations.
This, to be sure, was not always true.  One could point to aggressive
legal interpretations during Democratic administrations—for exam-
ple, opinions supporting the escalation in Vietnam.274  One could also
point to aggressive legal interpretations during the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration—Jackson’s opinion on the destroyer deal might fit the bill, for
example, although Jackson was never an advocate for unfettered exec-
utive power or disregard of international law.  Legal opinions support-
ing Roosevelt’s court-packing proposal might also qualify.  Much
earlier, during Jefferson’s Administration, Attorney General Levi Lin-
coln was an issue entrepreneur, albeit one who wished to curtail the
power of the federal government.
Nevertheless, if one considers recent history, the history of entre-
preneurship encompasses figures like Rehnquist, Olson,  Charles
Fried,275 and Goldsmith, who mixed entrepreneurship on some issues
273. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 29–30 (describing his interview process). R
274. See Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-
Nam, 54 DEP’T ST. BULL. 474 (1966), reprinted in DYCUS ET AL., supra note 78, at 209. R
275. See generally FRIED, supra note 86. R
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with more balanced analysis on others,276 along with lawyers who took
a starker line, like Douglas Kmiec277 and Yoo.  There are some legiti-
mate reasons for the way that issue entrepreneurship has occurred
and thrived disproportionately in Republican administrations.
Republicans tend to see the permanent government of the bureau-
cracy as a Democratic preserve, bearing the partisan stamp of its New
Deal beginnings.278  Republicans practice issue entrepreneurship to
combat the perceived institutional advantage of Democrats in the per-
manent government.279  This distrust of the permanent government,
however, means that Republicans will not feel bound by informal un-
derstandings that do not include them and will not share the stake
that Democrats have in enforcing those understandings.280  That
276. Rehnquist’s rejection of the view that the President is empowered to impound law-
fully appropriated funds is a cardinal illustration here, along with Goldsmith’s withdrawal
of the Yoo memo and his opinion that Iraqi captives were entitled to Geneva rights.
277. See DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT 179–88 (1992) (asserting expansive view of the President’s power over foreign
affairs in the context of the Iran-Contra episode); cf. FRIED, supra note 86, at 168 (discuss- R
ing dispute between Fried, on the one hand, and John Bolton and Kmiec, on the other,
regarding the utility of argument for strict separation of powers).  Despite Kmiec’s long
record of championing executive branch authority, he apparently has found the aggressive
posture of the Bush Administration too much to stomach. See SAVAGE, supra note 233, at R
243–44 (noting, in regard to presidential signing statements that amount to a sub silentio
veto of legislation, Kmiec’s comment that “[t]he President is not well served by the lawyers
who have been advising him”).  Kmiec has also contended recently that Barack Obama is a
worthy heir of the Reagan mantle. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Reaganites for Obama? Sorry, Mc-
Cain. Barack Obama is a Natural for the Catholic Vote, SLATE, Feb. 13, 2008, http://
www.slate.com/id/2184378/.
278. See FRIED, supra note 86, at 15 (discussing the Reagan Revolution’s opposition to R
the New Deal’s entrenchment of bureaucracy).
279. Cf. id. at 154–55 (discussing intractability of permanent government); SAVAGE,
supra note 233, at 281–86 (discussing efforts in first and second Bush Administrations to R
control bureaucracy).
280. Republicans may also be disturbed by an unattractive side of the informal norms
approach (although not the one practiced by the principals of the “OLC in exile” group):
the shunning that Yoo has encountered in some portions of the legal academy. See Robert
Collier, Furor Over UC Prof’s Brief on War; He Advised Bush on Prisoners’ Rights, S.F. CHRON.,
June 7, 2004, at A1 (reporting on petition drive asking Yoo to resign his faculty position).
Criticism of Yoo is undoubtedly appropriate; however, shunning can come to resemble the
personal targeting that occurred with some risk earlier in our history.  Condemnation of
Yoo for one episode, no matter how significant, should not end his career, or tar those who
rightly believe that Yoo has worthwhile insights to offer on a number of international and
constitutional law topics, including the history of the treaty power. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism
and the Constitution, supra note 97, at 1960–61 (marshalling historical evidence to demon- R
strate that the Framers and state ratifying conventions did not believe that all treaties were
inherently self-executing, and more controversially, to argue that all treaties require imple-
menting legislation). But see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2126–37
(1999) (disputing Yoo’s second, more controversial thesis).  Surely the proof is in the pud-
ding—if the work is useful, it should be applauded; if it is not, it should be vigorously
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means that the risk of issue entrepreneurship will remain high in Re-
publican administrations.
The final problem with the informal norms approach is its failure
to give the President sufficient flexibility.  The guidelines indicate that
the OLC should provide the President with the “best” view of the ap-
plicable law.281  If this means merely that the OLC should clearly and
honestly set forth the relevant authority found in the Constitution,
judicial decisions, and statutes, it is hard to disagree.  However, the
guidelines may mean something stronger—that the most accurate
reading of a particular source of authority, for example, a statute, is
necessarily the “best” reading.  In the statutory context, therefore, the
best reading would be the one most consistent with legislative intent
(assuming no serious constitutional questions).  While this is often
true, one can think of situations where it is not—FDR’s destroyer deal,
for one.  There are situations where the President should act accord-
ing to a view of the law that is not the most accurate, because of press-
ing interests or values.282  The OLC should be free to give the
President advice to this effect, as long as the advice is public, takes
account of contrary authority, and meets other criteria I set out later
in this Article.283  Limiting OLC to a narrow definition of the “best”
reading ignores the situations where a different action by the Presi-
dent serves the national interest.284
D. Structural Remedies: A New Foundation, or Rearranging the Deck
Chairs?
In light of the inadequacies of the criminal, tort, and informal
norms approaches, some commentators have proposed structural
fixes to problems with OLC and with executive branch decisionmak-
criticized.  The identity of the author may at the margins color perceptions, particularly if
Yoo opines on matters where his views may seem like an apologia.  The author’s identity,
however, should not substitute for evaluation of the work on its merits, and should not
harm scholars who collaborate with Yoo and who have not engaged in the problematic
conduct that Yoo has displayed.
281. See Johnsen, supra note 5, at 1605 (stating that the OLC should guide the President R
with the best understanding of all legal implications).
282. For one account of different approaches to the problem of presidential power in
emergencies, see CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 275–76 (2d ed. 2006) (citing Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of
Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1386–88 (1989)) (distinguishing between absolutist, relativist,
and liberal constitutionalist approaches).
283. See infra Part VI.
284. The guidelines might be susceptible to an alternative reading in which the “best”
interpretation reflects the President’s considered judgment in exigent circumstances.  The
guidelines, however, do not squarely address what factors might guide the President’s legal
advisors in such a situation.
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ing.285  For example, Neal Katyal has proposed that many of the advi-
sory functions of the OLC be turned over to an adjudicative entity
structured as an independent agency.286  Nina Pillard has argued that
OLC lawyers should engage more with others in the executive branch
and has recommended a larger role for the Justice Department’s In-
spector General.287  These structural approaches have significant
promise but also raise more questions than they answer.
The most serious problem is that the adjudicator proposal does
not have sufficient flexibility to deal with the wide range of pressing
problems that confront a President, particularly in the realm of for-
eign affairs and national security.  An adjudicative model contem-
plates time to submit briefs, affidavits, and exhibits from each side.
However, in an emergency situation such as the Cuban Missile Crisis
or even the French overture that resulted in the Louisiana Purchase,
time may be short, and the window for action may close.  To a signifi-
cant degree, then, an adjudicative approach builds in risk-aversion in
a way that may not be most productive for American interests.
The adjudicative model may also be too rigid from a substantive
perspective.  It will tend to apply judicial precedent because that is the
most natural source of authority for an adjudicative body.  Judicial
precedent, however, may not suit the myriad of situations where pro-
cedural or other obstacles leave the executive as the sole deci-
sionmaker.288  In addition, the adjudicator’s definition of the “best”
interpretation will typically devolve to the question of accuracy,
whether or not that reading matches national interests.  Moreover, be-
cause executive authority often lacks a practical check because of the
presence of a political question that defeats judicial review,289 it seems
odd to empower an adjudicative entity to decide matters raising such
285. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2336–41 (2006) (discussing how the OLC’s struc-
ture and goals may affect its advice to the President); cf. Pillard, supra note 5, at 748–58 R
(discussing  structural reforms in OLC, including a greater role for the Justice Department
Office of the Inspector General); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 897–909 (2007) (criticizing Katyal’s proposals as unduly rigid or
utopian, but proposing prudential strategies, such as bipartisanship in appointments, that
might have comparable effects).  Goldsmith has endorsed the prudential structural mea-
sures, such as bipartisanship in wartime appointments, suggested by Posner and Vermeule.
See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 203–05 (approving of Roosevelt’s bipartisan R
appointments).
286. See Katyl, supra note 285, at 2337. R
287. See Pillard, supra note 5, at 754–58. R
288. See McGinnis, supra note 5, at 382–89 (discussing court-centered view); Pillard, R
supra note 5, at 683–84 (same). R
289. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214–17 (1962) (discussing a number of realms
where political questions predominate, including the duration of hostilities); cf. id. at 217
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 64 25-NOV-08 13:14
64 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:1
concerns.  By the same token, if the entity declines “jurisdiction” on
this basis, the executive is left with no guidance whatsoever.
One should also be concerned about the legitimacy of such a tri-
bunal and the quality of the input it receives.  Courts in America are
legitimate in part because they are adversarial.  Inquisitorial proceed-
ings are rare, at least in courts, with exceptions limited to certain
kinds of contempt citations.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has held
that standing to sue requires concretely adversarial relationships be-
tween the parties, not just because of Article III, but also because con-
creteness sharpens the issues.290  In the structural reform model’s
adjudicative entity, it is not clear who will oppose the position taken by
the President, or what institutional interest will impel that fortunate
entity to argue zealously in opposition.  Admittedly, the State Depart-
ment might be a capable and eager adversary on some international
law issues.  However, this may not always be the case.291  Without a
sure source of adversarial inputs, the tribunal is left gazing at its own
navel, which is not always an edifying view.
The President can also seek to exit the adjudicative option by
seeking advice elsewhere, such as the White House Counsel.  This exit
strategy would make legal advice even more political and less indepen-
dent.292  While Katyal suggests that courts could encourage use of the
adjudicator by withholding deference to decisions that were made
through a different route,293 courts may not elect to take this tack.
Moreover, the various doctrines permitting deference are so manipu-
lable that the signals to the President will inevitably be mixed.
In sum, the structural approach is also no panacea.  There is
much to be learned, however, from a “clean sheet of paper” exercise
(noting that a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards” may signal the
presence of a political question).
290. Id. at 204.
291. In addition, bringing in the State Department raises another problem inherent in
the scheme: like the game of whack-a-mole, the adjudicator proposal may merely shift po-
litical influence to another part of the process.  The President will have an incentive to
select both a Director of Adjudication and a Secretary of State who march in lock-step with
the President, because that will be the only way to preserve maximum flexibility for the
executive.
292. The unique prestige of the OLC may make exit less likely. See MARYANNE BORRELLI
ET AL., THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT, REP. NO. 29, THE WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL’S OFFICE
12 (2000), available at http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/files/counsel/Counsel-
OD.PDF (quoting C. Boyden Gray, White House Counsel under President George H. W.
Bush, as observing that, “[w]e [the White House] were free to ignore their advice but you
knew . . . you did so at your peril because if you got into trouble you wouldn’t have them
there backing you up, you wouldn’t have the institution backing you up”).
293. See Katyal, supra note 285, at 2340 (explaining that courts can encourage “internal R
checks” by implicitly promising judicial deference).
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involving the architecture of legal decisionmaking in the executive
branch.  In particular, measures to encourage reporting to Congress,
disclosures to the public, and involvement by other entities, such as
Inspectors General, are worth investigating further.
E. The Ethical National Security Lawyer: An Oxymoron?
Some have suggested that state disciplinary authorities investigate
John Yoo for violations of the ethical rules governing attorney con-
duct.294  As noted, Yoo may have violated Rule 1.1, which requires that
the lawyer give competent advice,295 and Rule 1.2, which bars the law-
yer from counseling the client to commit a crime or fraud, or assisting
the client in doing so.296  One could also argue that regardless of
Yoo’s conduct, further attention to the distinctive problems of na-
tional security lawyers is appropriate in the drafting of ethical stan-
dards.  The first option is unattractive, for reasons I explain here,
while the second has promise as part of a pragmatic approach, as I
explain in the next section.
The disciplinary options are not unprecedented.  While state dis-
ciplinary authorities would surely be reluctant to head into this thicket
in the broad run of cases, they have done so.297  In the District of
Columbia and New York bars, there are pools of expertise to evaluate
these issues.
Nevertheless, the same “gotcha” externalities bedevil the ethics
option for Yoo.  Targeting Yoo allows many critics of the Administra-
tion to feel good, but does little to address the systemic problems that
Yoo represents.  In addition, the ethics rules do not provide a clear
avenue for sanctioning Yoo.  In particular, the word “knows,” which
qualifies the lawyer’s duty to avoid counseling a client to engage in
illegal behavior, forms a significant obstacle.298  The word is in the
294. See Michael E. Tigar, What Lawyers, What Edge?, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 536–37
(2007).  The Justice Department could also reprimand an OLC attorney who has violated
ethics rules or department policy, or file a grievance against the attorney with a state bar.
See Shane, supra note 247 (describing Justice Department investigation of OLC opinions). R
295. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008).
296. Id. R. 1.2(d); see Clark, supra note 17, at 465–69; Harris, supra note 17, at 420. R
297. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
390–94 (2005) (discussing case of Abraham Sofaer, former law professor, federal judge,
and State Department legal advisor, who was disciplined for representing the Libyan gov-
ernment in connection with Libya’s role in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 years after
Sofaer had participated in U.S. government decisions to use force against Libya based on
Libya’s role in previous terrorist attacks).
298. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008).
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rules to set up high barriers in precisely this situation.299  Expecting
bar disciplinary counsel, who typically focus on theft from clients and
more mundane concerns, to interpret the term more broadly is
unrealistic.
These issues do not apply to revisions of the ethics rules that
might codify some of the best practices that commentators from the
“OLC in exile” have identified, as part of a repertoire of reforms.  I
will turn to this task in the final section of the Article.
V. A MODEL OF DIALOGIC EQUIPOISE
To respond to these concerns, we need a deliberative model that
rejects the issue entrepreneur role, sidesteps the downsides of the reg-
ulatory frameworks set out above, and exemplifies both a commitment
to abiding values and the capacity to respond to exigent situations.
On difficult national security questions, the OLC lawyer cannot be
merely a “neutral expositor” of the law, advising the President to
mechanically comply with the most accurate reading of legislative in-
tent.300  Yet, by the same token, the lawyer giving national security ad-
vice cannot content herself with a situational approach, taking
direction on an ad hoc basis from each occupant of the executive of-
fice.  Instead, the lawyer should take an institutional approach,301 cen-
tering on upholding what I call dialogic equipoise between the
branches.
In an earlier article, I argued that lawyers needed to maintain a
balance or equipoise between entrepreneurial activity—attracting cli-
ents through advocacy of particular positions or fashioning of distinc-
tive litigation styles—and gatekeeping—preserving the integrity of the
299. For a bracing, if not cynical, account of the language in legal ethics codes, see
Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 641–52
(1981) (arguing that professional self-regulation usually serves the profession’s interests,
rather than interests of the public).
300. See Moss, supra note 5, at 1323–24 (explaining that the OLC has used “constitu- R
tional practice” to support the President’s military use where Congress has not explicitly
given guidance).  In areas where Congress has constitutional authority, however, statutory
text that is clear should compel compliance, absent substantial questions about constitu-
tionality.  For an example of such serious questions, ultimately vindicated by the Supreme
Court, see Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1355–56
(1953) (setting out President Roosevelt’s view, contrary to Jackson’s own, that the portion
of Lend-Lease Act allowing Congress to suspend aid to Britain by means of a concurrent
resolution was invalid); Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Stat-
utes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 35 (1994) (noting Supreme Court decision in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)), reprinted in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 577–80 (1999).
301. For another take on this institutional conception, see McGinnis, supra note 5. R
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legal system, even when the result may harm a client.302  The first attri-
bute is compelled by the need for client autonomy and by the lawyer’s
freedom under the First Amendment to forge a professional identity;
the second is inherent in the lawyer’s democratic role of intermediary
between public and private interests.303
The model of dialogic equipoise rests not only on a conception of
the lawyer’s role but also on a pragmatic conception of the separation
of powers in national security matters, which also entails checks and
balances.304  The overlapping powers given to the political branches,
such as the authority to declare war and provide for the armed forces
given to Congress under Article I of the Constitution, and the author-
ity given to the President as Commander in Chief, are perhaps the
most prominent example.  Ideally, interpretations of this architecture
in both the courts and the political branches305 not only should pro-
vide “latitude of interpretation for changing times”306 but also seek to
prevent the power of any one branch from dominating the others.
A. Transparency, Tailoring, and Dialogic Equipoise
This model rests on two elements: transparency and tailoring.
Transparency calls for dialog between the branches, within the execu-
tive branch, and with the public, to develop a sense of stake and opti-
mize the quality of decisions.  Tailoring, like the equitable tailoring
that courts do to take into account the interests of parties and the
302. See Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence, supra note 4, at 952–54.  I argued that this bal- R
ance had two key elements: (1) avoiding prior knowledge of a client’s wrongdoing, which
would tend to make the advocate or adviser into an accomplice, and (2) preserving the
ability to give the client bad news. Id.  I also argued that this approach was relevant to the
advice context, and that John Yoo, who had reason to know that the government would act
on his opinion by using coercive tactics in interrogations also failed to accurately account
for contrary precedent or accurately characterize authority that allegedly supported his
view, had failed this test on both counts. Id. at 977–78.
303. Id. at 943–44.  Kronman’s model of the lawyer as source of wisdom and prudence
captures this dimension. See KRONMAN, supra note 13, at 128–34 (describing a good lawyer R
as one who is both sympathetic and detached in the lawyer-client relationship).
304. The Framers expressly sought this “distributed and blended” approach to power, as
opposed to a model where each branch had powers hermetically sealed from those of the
others. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
305. See Morrison, supra note 18, at 1240–44 (discussing executive branch interpreta- R
tion); Pillard, supra note 5, at 676–84 (same); cf. Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, R
Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1599–1615 (2005) (book review) (dis-
cussing problems with theories that prioritize interpretation by legislative and executive
branches over court-centered view).
306. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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public interest,307 requires that the lawyer seek to accommodate both
the rationale and content of proposed executive action within the
constitutional scheme of overlapping authority among the branches.
The role conception that drives the dialogic equipoise model
stems not only from the logic of the separation of powers but also
from the lawyer’s function in representing collective entities and the
historical function of the Attorney General.  Under the Model Rules,
lawyers representing collective entities such as corporations must act
in the best interests of the organization.308  On significant occasions,
such as when a person, like a CEO, that the lawyer would ordinarily
look to for direction on the organization’s behalf acts against the en-
tity’s interests, the lawyer has an obligation to uphold those interests.
This institutional obligation reduces the agency costs that flow from
the self-dealing or myopia of particular managers, and promotes con-
tinuity within the organization.309  The sense of institutional obliga-
tion within the dialogic equipoise model also echoes the background
understanding that existed at the founding of the function of the At-
torney General, derived from English law.310  A minimum of objectiv-
ity was part and parcel of this understanding.311  Edmund Randolph,
the first Attorney General of the United States, set the tone with opin-
ions on the establishment of the Bank of the United States that were
measured, taking into account the most cogent arguments for and
against the proposal.312
Because the model seeks to reduce the agency costs of executive
overreaching, it also preserves the long-term perspective that emer-
gencies can sometimes obscure.  Transparency can help prevent the
loss of executive power and credibility that can follow in the wake of
executive overreaching.  Transparency also preserves the legitimacy
and international reputation of the United States by displaying the
executive’s confidence that it can rally others to its cause and respond
307. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944) (explaining that the public inter-
est should inform a court’s grant of injunctive relief).
308. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2008).
309. See Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence, supra note 4, at 957–58 (citing Enron as an R
example).
310. See Moss, supra note 5, at 1310 n.27 (citing English commentator who noted that R
tradition and the unwritten understanding of England’s ancient “constitution” established
the basic requirement that the Attorney General “must not allow political considerations to
affect his actions in those matters in which he has to act in an impartial and even quasi-
judicial way”).
311. See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The
Attorney General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 118–20 (1994) (discuss-
ing an early Attorney General’s ability to provide honest and independent analysis).
312. Id.
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to their concerns.  This is what the drafters of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence had in mind when they claimed “a decent Respect [for] the
Opinions of Mankind.”313  Maintaining reputation allows the United
States to exercise “soft power”314 that will often be more effective than
brute force.315  In this fashion, a dialogic equipoise model enhances
long-term stability and aids in refining current policies.
Moreover, transparency does not necessarily frustrate timely ac-
tion, including the use of force when that is necessary.  In the Cuban
Missile Crisis, for example, the Administration engaged in a wide and
vigorous internal debate and subsequently consulted with foreign
capitals and international organizations.316  The destroyer deal be-
tween the United States and Britain featured a robust internal debate.
Most recently, dialog with Congress and the United Nations preceded
the decision by the United States to intervene militarily in Afghanistan
after September 11.  Government attorneys should urge dialog and
advise the President of the adverse consequences attending a lack of
transparency.
Just as dialog yields results that preserve American leverage, tai-
loring an executive response will have similar benefits.  Courts use tai-
loring to ensure that extraordinary remedies such as injunctions serve
the public interest and respect the rights of the parties.317  Under es-
tablished principles of equity, a court will take care that an injunction
uses the minimum amount of coercion—and, by correlation, the min-
imum amount of judicial capital—necessary to ensure compliance
with the law.  Similarly, when lawyers advise the President that a
planned action is permissible, they should ensure that both the claim
of executive authority and the action authorized intrude to the mini-
mum extent on the interests of other branches, the rights of individu-
als, and the core principles of international law.  In the Cuban Missile
Crisis, for example, the Kennedy Administration rejected an all-out
attack on Cuba and opted instead for a limited blockade in large part
313. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
314. See NYE, supra note 237, at 35 (emphasizing the necessity of cultivating friendship R
and cooperation with foreign countries, particularly European nations).
315. See Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at 657–58. R
316. Id. at 671.
317. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CAL.
L. REV. 1387, 1387, 1389 (2007) (discussing how injunctions play an important role in
public programs); cf. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1039–40 (2004) (discussing role of reme-
dies in fostering innovation and flexibility in government institutions).  For a classic analy-
sis, see generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976).
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because of concerns about the international reputation of the United
States.318
The equipoise contemplated here is fluid, not static, in keeping
with events.  Just as balancing on a bicycle or a high beam typically
requires movement, the President’s authority resists a rigid interpreta-
tion.319  To permit the “scope and elasticity”320 necessary in a chang-
ing world, a legal advisor can approve bounded, interstitial actions
like the blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis that clash with the
most accurate reading of a statute or of international law.321  As long
as those actions have been the subject of robust dialog, interstitial
movements of this kind enhance democracy.  Like attempts in court
to challenge the weight of precedent, such interstitial moves can high-
light possible discontinuities between current understandings and
pressing realities, and further the evolution of the law.322
318. See KENNEDY, supra note 148, at 9 (recounting Attorney General’s argument that an R
all-out attack on Cuba would be “Pearl Harbor in reverse”); cf. ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 25–40 (1974) (discussing in-
ternational law issues).
319. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
320. Id.
321. The blockade ordered by President Kennedy in response to the Soviets’ placement
of offensive nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba was probably not a reaction to an “immi-
nent” threat of force, and therefore would not be considered self-defense under interna-
tional law. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (establishing the inherent right of individual self-
defense upon an armed attack); cf. Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at R
669–72 (discussing legal basis for the blockade).  Nevertheless, at least one prominent is-
sue entrepreneur who usually urged a limited role for executive power in foreign affairs
supported the blockade, citing the tailoring that typified Kennedy’s approach. See Louis
Henkin, Comment in CHAYES, supra note 318, at 149, 152–53 (discussing how international R
law limited U.S. options during the Cuban Missile Crisis).  In the future, issues of informa-
tion security will test the flexibility and integrity of the legal framework governing the use
of force. See Mark R. Shulman, Note, Discrimination in the Laws of Information Warfare, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 939, 961–66 (1999) (questioning the need to discriminate be-
tween military and civilian targets in information warfare); cf. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer
Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 913–30 (1999) (discussing circumstances where force might
be appropriate response to computer attack, particularly when attack can be reasonably
viewed as a component of a strategy resulting in an armed assault).
322. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008) (stating that a lawyer may
“counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope,
meaning or application of the law”).  Other branches besides the executive have on occa-
sion made use of measures that pose tensions with the separation of powers but are justifia-
ble on an interstitial basis.  In approving the independent counsel statute, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who was a functionalist in his view of the separation of powers, asserted that
Congress had the power to place the appointment of certain executive officers in the
courts of law. Rehnquist also noted that the role of the independent counsel was limited in
jurisdiction and tenure.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988).  As the Court recog-
nized in Olson, courts have long had the power to appoint attorneys to prosecute criminal
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B. Equipoise in Action: Lincoln and Habeas Corpus
For a still-controversial example of dialogic equipoise, consider
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas in April 1861.323  At that time, Mary-
landers sympathetic to the Confederacy attacked Union troops,324 im-
peded the movements of state militias coming to the aid of
Washington, D.C.,325 and burned railroad bridges from Baltimore to
the North.326  Maryland officials, who were either unwilling or unable
to control the ensuing mob violence, demanded that Lincoln promise
that no Union forces would travel through the state.327
If Congress had been in session, it might have taken action to
prevent the encirclement of the capital and restore order in Mary-
land.  However, Congress had adjourned.328  Nevertheless, statutes
permitted the President to call out the militia to preserve the author-
ity of the federal courts.329  These statutes arguably contemplated the
declaration of martial law.  Under martial law, the government en-
joyed the same power it possessed after the suspension of habeas
corpus.330  In light of all of these factors, Lincoln took the extraordi-
contempt charges. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787,
793–96 (1987).  Some of these devices, including the independent counsel statute, were
unwise.  It was best in the long run, however, to leave this realization to the political pro-
cess, rather than mandate it as a matter of constitutional law.
323. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
26–60 (1998) (discussing background to Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus); Sanford
Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 716–17
(2006) (discussing Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus).
324. JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE
PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 184–85 (2006).
325. See Paul Finkelman, Limiting Rights in Times of Crisis: Our Civil War Experience—A
History Lesson for a Post-9-11 America, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS 25, 35 (2003).
326. Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Arguments
Surrounding Ex Parte Merryman, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 11, 14–15 (2004).
327. SIMON, supra note 324, at 185. R
328. DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 117 (2003).
329. See Ex parte Field, 9 F. Cas. 1, 6–7 (C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4,761) (citing the Militia
Act of 1795); cf. FARBER, supra note 328, at 162 (discussing Field); Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, R
Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE L.J. 149, 175–77 (2004) (same).  Interestingly,
Chief Justice Taney had also, prior to the Civil War, articulated a robust view of the Presi-
dent’s power to call out the militia to quell insurrections. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1,
43 (1849) (asserting that judicial review of the President’s decision would be a “guarantee
of anarchy”).
330. Buchanan’s Attorney General, J.S. Black, displayed a risk aversion that failed the
test of dialogic equipoise.  Instead of recognizing that Union military force might be neces-
sary to uphold the authority of the federal courts in the event of a rebellion, Black coun-
seled that pervasive anti-federal feeling in any state would render presidential attempts to
restore federal authority futile and thus “wholly illegal.” See Power of the President in
Executing the Laws, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 523 (1860).  Buchanan’s instructions to Black
may have foreordained this result. See POWELL, supra note 300, at 168. R
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nary measure of suspending habeas corpus on the route between Phil-
adelphia and Washington, D.C.331  He stuck to his decision in the face
of an opinion by Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman332 that re-
quired the government to produce an individual arrested on suspi-
cion of helping to drill a Confederate unit.333  Lincoln also
demonstrated transparency, convening Congress for a special session
on July 4, 1861, sending a message explaining his actions and seeking
ratification of wartime measures.334
In his message, Lincoln offered a pragmatic reading of the Con-
stitution’s Take Care Clause,335 consistent with a dialogic equipoise
model.  Lincoln argued that the Take Care Clause’s injunction that
the President “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” did not
mandate mere ministerial implementation, but at least in times of cri-
sis required a quantum of judgment.336  Viewed as a rule of reason,
the Take Care Clause permitted interstitial departures to address exi-
gent circumstances.  Taney’s view in Merryman was more rigid.  Taney
based his holding that the President could not unilaterally suspend
habeas on the placement of the Suspension Clause337 in Article I,
which deals with the powers of Congress.338  Lincoln responded that
the textual placement of the Suspension Clause was not dispositive.
According to Lincoln, framing “laws” in the plural required attention
to “[t]he whole of the laws,” rather than pondering a single law in
isolation.339  Employing the metaphor of home and dwelling place
331. FARBER, supra note 328, at 16–17, 163; Frank J. Williams, Abraham Lincoln and Civil R
Liberties: Then and Now—The Southern Rebellion and September 11, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
463, 466 (2004).
332. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
333. NEELY, supra note 136, at 10; see FRANK J. WILLIAMS, JUDGING LINCOLN 63 (2002) R
(noting that Merryman was accused of recruiting a unit of soldiers for the Confederacy,
and then serving as a drillmaster for the unit).  Taney dismissed these charges as “vague
and unsupported accusations.” See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147.  Taney also dis-
counted the threat to federal authority in Maryland, asserting that “there had never been
the slightest resistance” to the lawful exercise of federal power in the state. Id. at 152.
334. See President’s Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861) [hereinafter
July 4 Message], in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 430 (Roy B. Basler ed.,
1953).
335. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
336. See July 4 Message, supra note 334, at 429–30 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). R
337. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
338. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148.
339. July 4 Message, supra note 334, at 430; see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE R
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 58–59 (First Mariner Books 2004) (discussing Lincoln’s exercise of
power); Barron & Lederman, supra note 2, at 998–1000 (arguing that Lincoln’s actions R
were essentially contingent and provisional, and did not rest on absolutist conception of
presidential power).  Against the weight of historical consensus, Neely views Lincoln’s mes-
sage to Congress as muddled and hesitant. See NEELY, supra note 136, at 11–13.  This quali- R
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that had served Lincoln so well in his “house divided” speech on the
effects of slavery,340 he argued that his duty lay in ensuring that consti-
tutional government did not “go to pieces” as it faced the existential
threat of insurrection and secession.341  On this view, the Take Care
Clause required an interstitial violation of one of the laws, including
the Suspension Clause, if the alternative was permitting “all the laws,
but one, to go unexecuted . . . .”342
In contrast to Lincoln’s interstitial approach, Attorney General
Edward Bates’s opinion upholding suspension—sent to Congress
shortly after Lincoln’s message—failed the test of dialogic equi-
poise.343  While Bates couched his argument in part in the legislative
authorization provided by the statutes of 1795 and 1807, he also made
fied tone, however, may simply suggest that Lincoln was wary of absolute pronouncements
and recognized the importance of tailoring.
340. See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
PROMISE OF AMERICA 46–48 (1995) (discussing Lincoln’s speech at the Republican conven-
tion on June 16, 1858).
341. July 4 Message, supra note 334, at 430. R
342. Id.  The Supreme Court arguably ratified Lincoln’s interstitial approach.  In Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the Court struck down the use of military commis-
sions to try non-belligerents in areas where the federal courts were functioning.  The Court
acknowledged, however, that “in a great crisis” such as the Civil War, the government
needed the flexibility to detain people who posed an imminent danger. Id. at 125 (observ-
ing that “exigency” would require suspension of writ when “immediate public investigation
according to law may not be possible; and . . . the peril to the country may be too imminent
to suffer such persons to go at large”).
343. See Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74
(1861).  One influential school of thought asserts that interstitial acts by the President are
“extra-legal,” even when they may be justifiable in exigent circumstances.  Proponents of
this view argue that keeping interstitial acts in this realm minimizes the risk that an excess
of power will distort the normal processes of law. See OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NI´ AOLA´IN,
LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 123–27 (2006) (ana-
lyzing Jefferson’s view); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always
Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1099–1109 (2003) (same); cf. Kim Lane Scheppele,
Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1001, 1003 (2004) (arguing that emergency measures create their own momentum).  Like
dialogic equipoise, the extra-legalist account emphasizes transparency and ratification by
Congress, the courts, or both. But see Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitution-
alism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 47–48 (Mark
Tushnet ed., 2005) (arguing that requirements of transparency and ratification impose
merely weak proceduralist duties on the executive).  The extra-legalist view, however, suf-
fers from an unduly narrow reading of what constitutes legality.  Over time, interstitial
departures such as the Louisiana Purchase, Lincoln’s habeas suspension, and Roosevelt’s
destroyer deal become part of a common law of executive practice.  Shaping that common
law to the whole fabric of American constitutionalism requires a nuanced understanding
of the factors underlying each departure. See Margulies, Beyond Absolutism, supra note 179, R
at 322–23 (critiquing extra-legalist model); cf. Morrison, supra note 18 (discussing legal R
interpretation in the executive branch); Pillard, supra note 5 (same).  Armed with this R
understanding, we can discern whether future departures are appropriately tailored or
ultra vires.  The extra-legalist account impedes this understanding.
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an absolutist case for presidential power that does not depend on the
temporary condition of a congressional recess.344  In addition, Bates
argued that the justification for suspension is a political question, not
susceptible to judicial resolution.345  Whether Bates’s lack of reserva-
tions stemmed from his ideological commitments,346 or—more cyni-
cally—his doing Lincoln’s bidding in a “good cop, bad cop” routine
for Congress’s benefit, Bates’s absolutism struck an ominous tone that
I will return to shortly.
Before exploring this point, however, I should note that other
measures taken by presidents in trying times fit the interstitial ele-
ments of dialogic equipoise.  Roosevelt’s destroyer deal with Britain
was discussed publicly before Attorney General Jackson issued his
opinion approving the transaction and was ratified by Congress early
in the next year when it enacted the Lend-Lease program into law.347
The destroyer deal was modest, dealing with over-age destroyers, and
did not work a wholesale transfer of American military might to the
British.348  John F. Kennedy’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis was
also tailored and included robust internal dialog within the Adminis-
tration, consultation with allies, and submission of the matter to the
Organization of American States.349
Each of these initiatives also led to other valuable developments
in the law.  The presidential power that Lincoln displayed in the sus-
pension of habeas corpus was a direct antecedent of the power he
wielded in the Emancipation Proclamation, which was subsequently
ratified by the Thirteenth Amendment350 and is now embodied in
344. 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 80–83 (1861).
345. Id. at 86; cf. Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333,
335–36 (2006) (arguing against view that suspension is political question).
346. See POWELL, supra note 300, at 179–80 (considering Bates’ views). R
347. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 2, at 1042–47. R
348. See JACKSON, supra note 75, at 93–103. R
349. See Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at 669–72.  In addition, R
shortly before the crisis began, Congress passed a resolution about Cuba aimed at enhanc-
ing the President’s leverage. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 339, at 174–75. But see id. (dis- R
cussing unwillingness of influential senators to give the President advance authorization to
commence hostilities).  If the President had consulted Congress during this Cold War epi-
sode, legislators may well have pressed for a more aggressive response.
350. See Sanford Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional? Do We/Should
We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1142; cf. id. at 1149 (discussing
argument that Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments ratified Lincoln’s actions,
whatever their constitutionality and justification at the time); see also Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, The Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in Chief Power, 40 GA. L. REV. 807,
814–23 (2006) (defending Emancipation Proclamation as legitimate exercise of presiden-
tial wartime authority).  Lincoln’s leveraging of both lawful and interstitial authority was
even more skillful and sustained in his measures directed against slavery, starting with his
July 4, 1861, recommendation that Congress pass a confiscation act that freed slaves em-
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strong international antislavery norms.351  Roosevelt’s destroyer deal
led to the Lend-Lease Act,352 which contributed materially to the de-
feat of Hitler and indirectly to establishment of the United Nations
after World War II.353  Kennedy’s tailored response to the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis led to the negotiation the next year of the nuclear test ban
treaty with the Soviet Union.354
ployed in aiding the Confederacy in areas captured by Union forces. See JAMES OAKES, THE
RADICAL AND THE REPUBLICAN: FREDERICK DOUGLASS, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, AND THE TRIUMPH
OF ANTISLAVERY POLITICS 143 (2007).
351. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. DOC A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (prohibiting slavery in all
forms).
352. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 2, at 1046–47. R
353. See ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1932–1945, at 7–9 (1979) (discussing evolution of Roosevelt’s views on world governance,
stemming from his experience as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson Administra-
tion); Bush, supra note 147, at 2365–67 (discussing Robert Jackson’s views on aggression R
and international law).
354. See President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at American University
(June 10, 1963), available at http://www.american.edu/media/speeches/Kennedy.htm
(calling on Khrushchev and the Soviet Union to work with the United States to reach a
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty).
For a contemporary example of dialogic equipoise, consider an opinion by another
Bush Administration OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Philbin.  In a 2003
opinion, Philbin opined that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had statutory
authority to detain an alien pending deportation for a period longer than the 90 days. See
Limitations on the Detention Authority of the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Op. Off. Legal Counsel (Feb. 20, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/INSDetention.htm
(discussing Section 241(a)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000)).  To justify a reasonable delay, Philbin first advanced a purposive
reading of the statute: careful checking would promote foreign policy and national security
goals closely related to immigration regulation. Id.  The statute expressly gave the govern-
ment the authority to reject removal to a specific country if removal would be “prejudicial
to the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(C)(iv) (2000).  This authority would be in-
consistent with a requirement that the government release the alien within the United
States.  Second, the Supreme Court had indicated that deference to the executive may be
appropriate in removal cases involving terrorist activity to avoid gaps in the “Nation’s ar-
mor.”  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695–96 (2001).  The publication of Philbin’s opin-
ion was the final step in the interstitial process.  Once the opinion was published, Congress
was free to examine the issue.  Congress’s failure to act would signal legislative acquies-
cence in the practice, bringing it within Box 2 of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown analysis,
where the President’s decisions are entitled to some deference. See Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  For a discussion on
acquiescence theory, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69, 678–88 (1981);
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11; H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s Authority Over Foreign
Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 538–39 (1999).
Philbin’s painstaking analysis here and elsewhere came at a price.  After Bush’s re-
election, Solicitor General Paul Clement wanted to hire Philbin as his principal deputy.
David Addington, Vice President Cheney’s counsel, expressed opposition.  Newly ap-
pointed Attorney General Alberto Gonzales acquiesced to Addington. See GOLDSMITH,
supra note 1, at 171; SAVAGE, supra note 233, at 198. R
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Nevertheless, the sage advisor must realize that interstitial moves
may linger in an unhealthy fashion, outliving their utility and en-
gendering lasting harm.  The lawyer providing national security advice
should carefully underline that an interstitial move that affects indi-
vidual rights, such as Lincoln’s suspension of habeas, should lapse at
the earliest possible opportunity.  In the case of suspension, this
should have happened in July of 1861, when Congress was in session,
able to vote for suspension itself (as it ultimately did in 1863),355 and
when the threat of secession and insurrection in Maryland had eased.
Lincoln’s failure to do this counts as a retreat from the dialogic equi-
poise model, resulting in the detention with minimal due process of
some 13,000 citizens.356  Few of the detainees posed a threat and
many were detained because they expressed doubt about the Union
cause in public, or because a neighbor or erstwhile friend reported
some private conversation to settle a score.357  Indeed, congressional
ratification of the suspension did not end the constitutional difficul-
ties faced by the government.  Consistent with the institutional over-
hang phenomenon mentioned earlier, Congress sacrificed liberty for
perceived security, enacting the regime of military commissions that
the Court struck down in Ex parte Milligan.358  Lawyers considering in-
terstitial departures should recognize the asymmetry between the ease
of initiating an intrusive regime in a time of crisis and the difficulty of
ending that regime once its rationale has evaporated.
C. Can Equipoise Encompass Torture?
The allowance for interstitial action under this model preserves
presidential flexibility.  Does it make the lawyer too pliable?  For ex-
ample, it might be possible to argue that torture of one suspect be-
lieved to have valuable information would be merely interstitial.  The
short answer here is that torture is covered by a categorical bar under
international law.  The CAT prohibits it, with no exceptions.359  In ad-
dition, under customary international law, torture is a violation of jus
cogens from which states cannot derogate.360  Although Congress
could violate this prohibition, courts would require the clearest possi-
355. See NEELY, supra note 136, at 68. R
356. Id. at 23.
357. See id. at 57–60 (recounting the circumstances surrounding various detentions).
358. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
359. Convention against Torture, supra note 172, art. 2. R
360. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702(d) (1987).
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ble statement of legislative intent.  Acquiescence would not be
sufficient.
In addition, as I have noted, under an appropriate reading of the
Charming Betsy canon, courts would construe the Torture Act as consis-
tent with jus cogens.  Because Congress passed the torture statute, and
more recent legislation such as the McCain Amendment,361 pursuant
to its textually granted authority under the Constitution to “define
and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,”362 this would
leave the would-be torturer where we found him, in Youngstown’s Box
3, where the President’s power is at its “lowest ebb.”363
The Supreme Court has never said that the President has the au-
thority to violate international law; indeed, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the
Court found that the President lacked authority to unilaterally estab-
lish tribunals that violated Congress’s incorporation of the law of
war.364  Some might suggest that a lawyer advised the President to do
what was necessary and later count on legislation from Congress to
retroactively grant impunity to the perpetrators.  This was arguably
what happened with the passage of the Military Commissions Act of
2006.  Under a dialogic equipoise model, however, the President’s dis-
closure would have been inadequate because it was both involuntary
and delayed for over two years after coercive interrogations began.365
Torture should also not be viewed as interstitial because it is both
immeasurable and irreversible.  Individuals’ tolerance for pain varies,
so the infliction of pain is not susceptible to precise measurement.  In
this sense, torture is distinct from detention, which we can measure in
terms of the time involved.  Very brief periods of restraint are permis-
sible in ordinary law enforcement,366 while the Supreme Court has
frowned on indefinite detention without due process.367  Although
361. See S. Amend. 1977, 109th Cong., 151 CONG. REC. S10908 (2005) (enacted)
(prohibiting inhumane and degrading treatment of prisoners in United States government
custody); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1403, 119 Stat. 347
(2005).
362. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
363. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
364. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559–60 (2006).
365. Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at 662 n.88; see also Christopher R
Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 268 (2007) (comparing
Bush Administration’s view of extra-statutory presidential authority to approach taken by
presidents Jefferson and Lincoln).
366. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (identifying circumstances in which police
officers may detain and search individuals).
367. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517–21 (2004) (explaining that the United
States may detain enemy combatants “for the duration of the relevant conflict” and that
“indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized”).
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Daniel Levin’s OLC memo seeks to define torture in durational
terms,368 this definition does not reckon with torture’s lasting psycho-
logical consequences.  Because of these psychological ramifications,
torture is irreversible.  While the trauma of brief detention may fade
upon release, we have no such assurance about the psychological frag-
mentation that torture engenders.369  Torture’s stains on national rep-
utation are similarly difficult to eradicate.  In light of these concerns, a
dialogic equipoise model would reject any ex ante authorization of
interrogation based on physical harm.370
VI. ENFORCING DIALOGIC EQUIPOISE: A COMPREHENSIVE REGIME
If we grant that an institutional model of government lawyering
stressing dialogic equipoise is superior, we are left with the question of
how to enforce it.  The bad news here is that no single approach will
do the trick—as we have seen, each method, including criminal and
tort liability, informal norms, structural reform, and professional disci-
pline, has problems.  If we use these methods in combination, how-
ever, we may arrive at an effective and fair compliance regime.371  This
pragmatic approach would rely on tort and criminal law to lend teeth
to the informal norm school’s urging of transparency.  It would turn
to prospective changes in ethics law, devoted to the special issues fac-
ing national security lawyers, to encourage best practices, including
citing and distinguishing contrary authority in the provision of advice
and relying on the argument for presidential action that is least intru-
368. See Levin Memo, supra note 200, at 372–74 (discussing “prolonged mental harm” R
under the Convention against Torture).
369. See Louis Michael Seidman, Torture’s Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 881, 904–09 (2005)
(stating that “[e]ven when the victim[ ] . . . survives, torture is a kind of death precisely
because it reduces the victim to his body”).
370. This prohibition would include threats of physical harm to the captive or to third
parties. See Margulies & Corbin, supra note 123.  Justice Scalia evidently disagrees. See R
Scalia Says He Sees a Role For Physical Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A17.  For a
more thoughtful defense of coercive interrogation in isolated circumstances entailing the
prevention of catastrophic harm, see generally PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM,
PROTECTING LIBERTY IN AN AGE OF TERROR (2005).  Even if the lawyer should not authorize
infliction of physical pain for purposes of interrogation, this does not mean that Fifth
Amendment standards appropriate for domestic law enforcement must govern all aspects
of the interrogation of terrorists.  For example, full Miranda warnings may be impractical
or unwise, depending on the place and purpose of interrogation. See United States v. Bin
Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 187–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that United States agents
interrogating foreign national abroad did not have to inform subject that he would be
provided with an attorney upon his request when circumstances made such a guarantee
impracticable).
371. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 847–53
(1992) (offering an optimal compliance strategy).
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sive on the separation of powers.372  Finally, to address the problem of
satellite misconduct, this pragmatic regime suggests a structural re-
form that posits greater involvement for Inspectors General, in con-
junction with the OLC.  I discuss these possible provisions in turn.
A. Disclosure as Safe Harbor
If criminal and tort liability seem harsh, one solution might be to
make disclosure a presumptive safe harbor through legislation or
court rulings.  Disclosure will promote both deliberation and account-
ability.  Ideally, it will also spur efforts at consensus.
Disclosure as a safe harbor is already a common theme in admin-
istrative, corporate, and tort law.  Deference in administrative law fol-
lows from a deliberative process that is transparent and open to input
from interested parties.373  Corporations that timely disclose possible
market-moving events shift responsibility to investors.374  Professionals
372. These changes in the law governing lawyers could be the result of specialized stan-
dards, such as the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards, or changes to the Model Rules them-
selves. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587–91
(discussing areas in which Model Rules could provide additional guidance for prosecu-
tors). But see Nancy J. Moore, Intra-Professional Warfare Between Prosecutors and Defense Attor-
neys: A Plea for an End to the Current Hostilities, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 515, 518–20 (1992)
(cautioning that ethics regulation can unduly chill prosecutors or even prompt exit from
domain of professional regulation).
373. This disclosure and dialog is a crucial underpinning for the deference that the
Court often accords to administrative decisions. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 853–59, 863–65 (1984) (describing an agency’s lengthy dialog with
various stakeholders through notice and comment procedures prior to issuing regula-
tions); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005, 1011 (2008) (discussing Food and
Drug Administration reporting requirements imposed on pharmaceutical companies as
backdrop for holding that federal law preempts state tort law in suits on medical devices);
cf. Peter L. Strauss, Within Marbury: The Importance of Judicial Limits on the Executive’s Power
To Say What the Law Is, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 59, 62 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/
images/pdfs/63_a.pdf (discussing the importance of public dialog and participation as a
rationale for deference in administrative law); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to
War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2669–70 (2005) (arguing that deference to presidential inter-
pretations can be problematic when deference conflicts with civil liberties).  The rationale
for deference has sparked particularly heated discussion in the realm of presidential au-
thority over foreign affairs. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86
VA. L. REV. 649, 673–75 (2000) (discussing virtues of appropriately cabined doctrine of
deference in foreign affairs); Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power
and Executive Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1765–71 (2007) (discussing varia-
tion among schools of thought on deference doctrine). Compare Eric A. Posner & Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1204–07 (2007) (arguing
for deference to executive), with Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1257–75 (2007) (arguing against blanket deference to
executive).
374. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE 205–06 (2006) (discussing relationship between Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion regulations and advice by corporate lawyers that promotes timely disclosure by
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who obtain informed consent from those they serve also have a safe
harbor.375
National security advice should operate along the same lines.
Once disclosure of a legal opinion is made, the onus of responsibility
shifts to other stakeholders to register their views.  In a public setting,
the Brandeisian remedies of “sunlight”376 and “more speech”377 can
flourish.  The media, the public, and voices in the blogosphere378 can
examine the analysis.379  In addition, the prospect of public scrutiny
will be a valuable ex ante incentive for more candor and comprehen-
sive analysis in OLC opinions.  Absent disclosure, both criminal and
tort liability should be in play.380
B. Consideration of Institutional Consequences
Legal advisers should also consider the institutional conse-
quences of particular decisions.  As I have discussed, decisions have
spillover effects.  The rules of legal ethics encourage lawyers to offer
publicly traded companies); cf. Perino, supra note 55, at 919–21 (discussing enforcement R
of federal securities laws by lawyers for aggrieved investors).
375. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2008) (permitting informed con-
sent to cure conflicts of interest in certain situations where lawyer reasonably believes that
she could effectively represent client’s interests); cf. Troy E. Elder, Poor Clients, Informed
Consent, and the Ethics of Rejection, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 1002–11 (2007) (discussing
complexity of informed consent for clients living in poverty); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking
Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 920–40 (1994) (discussing difficulties of implementing
informed consent doctrine).
376. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.  Sun-
light is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . . ”).
377. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
378. These voices include David Luban, Brian Tamanaha, Scott Horton, Sanford Levin-
son, and Marty Lederman on Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/; Lawrence So-
lum on the Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com; and commentators on The
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com, Legal Ethics Forum, http://www.legalethicsfo-
rum.com, and Opinio Juris, http://opiniojuris.org.
379. For a discussion of the overstated dichotomy between transparency and security in
an analogous setting, see generally Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Inten-
sive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 465 (2007).
380. Government lawyers may be required to offer advice in complex and exigent cir-
cumstances where disclosure is not feasible.  One example is advice on whether a proposed
military action is consistent with international law mandates on proportionality and dis-
crimination between military and civilian targets. See Shulman, supra note 321, at 961–66. R
Another concerns advice about a targeted killing of a terrorist engaged in the planning or
execution of attacks against American civilians or military personnel. See Banks & Raven-
Hansen, supra note 256, at 682–87.  In these situations, qualified immunity and related R
doctrines will shield the lawyer from legal exposure. See Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Ser-
vants: The Courts, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SUP. CT. REV.
281 (discussing immunity issues).
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advice that goes beyond doctrine, to assess such non-legal ramifica-
tions.381  Because lawyers often represent repeat players, they are well
situated to grasp how a legal regime will affect institutions.  Prudent
legal advice should point out not only the benefits if a proposed ac-
tion is successful, but the consequences of failure.  If the risk of failure
is high, this advice may be thoroughly unwelcome to the client.  Dia-
logic equipoise works, however, only when lawyers have the gumption
to give clients bad news about both legal and non-legal risks.  A rule
requiring, not merely permitting, such advice in the national security
area would counteract issue entrepreneurship.
The post-September 11 legal memos on law and terrorism would
fail this test.  Both Yoo’s memo on permissible interrogation tech-
niques and Goldsmith’s Article 49 memo failed to identify or analyze
the possibility that interrogation techniques identified as legal would
expand into clearly illegal conduct.  They also utterly failed to ac-
knowledge the risk that their opinions would not adequately shield
personnel who have engaged in coercive interrogation.  In this event,
as we have seen with the recent revelations about destruction of CIA
tapes, the likelihood of satellite misconduct rises exponentially.  Here,
too, the competent lawyer should note the hazard on the horizon.
C. There’s No News Like Bad News: Citing and Distinguishing
Contrary Authority
James Comey, who resigned as Deputy Attorney General because
he, like Goldsmith, grew nervous about the Bush Administration’s
stubbornly unilateralist ways, has advised lawyers that saying “No” is a
vital asset for the government lawyer.382 One way of saying “No” is to
give clients a full accounting of the authority arrayed against them.
The informal norms school has pressed this task as a best practice for
381. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2008) (“In representing a client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.  In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situa-
tion.”); Katyal, supra note 61, at 120 (discussing Model Rule 2.1 and arguing that law R
schools should encourage discussion about attorneys’ moral obligations to clients); cf. Mar-
gulies, “Who Are You to Tell Me That?,” supra note 228, at 214 & n.3, 221–44 (discussing R
lawyer’s role in offering advice on institutional and social consequences); Radack, supra
note 5, at 42–45 (suggesting special rule that would encourage government lawyers to offer R
advice on morality).
382. See Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, FBI Chief Disputes Gonzales on Spying; Mueller Describes
Internal Debate, WASH. POST, July 27, 2007, at A1 (noting opposition of both Comey and FBI
Director Robert Mueller to the original version of Terrorist Surveillance Program); see also
Margulies, Lawyers’ Independence, supra note 4, at 952–54 (“Giving the client bad news is the R
other cornerstone of equipoise.”).
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OLC lawyers.  Lawyers are already required to cite and distinguish
contrary authority when they appear in court.383  Lawyers providing
advice should have the same responsibility.  This obligation may make
some lawyers into wet blankets.  Sometimes, however, wet blankets are
less dangerous than true believers.
D. Modesty Loves Comity: Least Drastic Accounts of Presidential Power
Another grave flaw of the Yoo memos, here identified by Gold-
smith, is their sweeping view of presidential power.  Dialogic equi-
poise, with its emphasis on tailoring, would require the national
security lawyer to offer the most modest account of presidential power
sufficient to justify the objective, and to authorize only interstitial de-
partures from Jackson’s Youngstown framework.  Under this view, the
President’s power—outside of clear textual grants of authority such as
the pardon power—would only rarely be sufficient in the face of con-
gressional opposition.  When congressional authorization clearly ex-
cluded an action, such as the boarding of ships leaving French ports
in Little v. Barreme384 or the limits on warrantless surveillance under
FISA,385 the lawyer would generally recommend complying with the
scope of the authorization, and taking care to avoid exceeding it.386
A default that disfavors sweeping assertions of executive power
will facilitate comity between the branches and avoid needless adverse
consequences.  Just as Brandeis urged courts to choose the most mod-
est ground of decision available,387 lawyers for the executive should
avoid the epic assertions of executive power proclaimed by Yoo.  In-
stead, lawyers for the President should emulate the Court’s methodol-
ogy under Youngstown, first focusing on ways in which Congress could
have expressly or impliedly authorized presidential action, or acqui-
esced in such action.  Taking the least drastic alternative view will also
have beneficial ex ante effects, encouraging lawyers to pay attention to
lawyerly craft, synthesizing Supreme Court decisions and other appli-
383. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2008) (“A lawyer shall not
knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by
opposing counsel . . . . ”).
384. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
385. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000).
386. Exceptions would include situations where decisive action was required to repel a
military threat, as in The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), although even here the
competent lawyer would take care to mention signs of acquiescence or consent in
Congress.
387. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 83 25-NOV-08 13:14
2008] TRUE BELIEVERS AT LAW 83
cable law, instead of ignoring the legal landscape.388  For example, in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,389 the government would have been better served
by a more modest argument that conceded the need for procedural
safeguards, instead of provoking an inter-branch conflict that the
Court resolved by declining to give the President a “blank check.”390
E. Harmonization with Emerging Norms
The preference for modest claims of presidential authority can in
rare instances clash with the need for legal change.  Faced with exi-
gent circumstances and a legal regime outpaced by emerging humani-
tarian norms, the President may act.  Transparency and tailoring,
however, should inform such humanitarian interventions.
Both legal ethics and international law acknowledge the need for
mechanisms that encourage legal transitions.391  Rule 1.2 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct permits lawyers to challenge ex-
isting law through litigation and through legal advice to groups engag-
ing in civil disobedience.392  The core case under Rule 1.2 concerns
advocacy of legal positions that are contrary to precedent.  One can
argue, however, that the allowance of advice regarding civil disobedi-
388. One important caveat here is that the lawyer should exercise restraint in recom-
mending a broad interpretation of a statute on the ground that a narrow construction will
unduly limit the President’s constitutional prerogatives.  Constitutional avoidance strate-
gies of this kind create a real risk of self-dealing by the executive, which has an obvious
incentive to maximize its own powers.  This imperial deployment of avoidance is one of the
problems with Yoo’s memo. See supra Part III.A.1; cf. Kinkopf, supra note 23, at 1180–81 R
(discussing how executive branch lawyers sometimes play with “[l]oaded [d]ice” in their
interpretation of statutes). See generally Morrison, supra note 18 (discussing constitutional R
avoidance in the executive branch); Christopher H. Schroeder, Loaded Dice and Other
Problems: A Further Reflection on the Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1325, 1327–30
(2006) (arguing that more concrete involvement by Congress can minimize executive self-
dealing).  The better solution here is to condition recourse to constitutional avoidance on
other criteria, including consideration of adverse authority and institutional consequences.
In areas like detention and trial of alleged terrorists, where the courts have imposed limits
on the President’s ability to act unilaterally, legal advice should recognize those limits.
Concern about harm to the United States’ reputation caused by revelations about interro-
gation abuses should counsel further caution.
389. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
390. See id. at 536.  Interestingly, perhaps dictated by “situation sense” and the relational
history or course of conduct on detainee litigation between the government and the Court,
Solicitor General Clement took a far more modest and tempered view in Boumediene of
what Congress intended, arguing that the Court could find ample procedural safeguards in
the MCA and the Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”) and that would make the MCA an
adequate substitute for habeas, instead of throwing all his eggs in the basket that the de-
tainees simply were not entitled to habeas relief. See Greenhouse, supra note 129. R
391. This passage is drawn from Margulies, When to Push the Envelope, supra note 77, at R
665–66.
392. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008).
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ence contemplates self-help in pressing situations.  International law
also allows change.  Fundamental norms, such as the prohibitions on
torture and slavery, become jus cogens through an accretionary process
that reflects actions and assertions by states and the analysis of experts.
Although detecting emerging norms is not always easy, courts are
competent to perform this role.393  The executive has a similar func-
tion in interstitial situations.  Executive action, however, should be
open, submitted for the approval of the legislature, courts, and the
public.
The first humanitarian intervention was not really an “interven-
tion” at all because it concerned a domestic matter: the emancipation
of persons living in slavery in the United States.  Though often justi-
fied under the President’s war powers, Lincoln’s Emancipation Procla-
mation394 was of course inconsistent on its face with Chief Justice
Taney’s infamous Dred Scott395 opinion.  The Emancipation Proclama-
tion was also broader than the war power alone may have permitted
because it freed enslaved persons throughout the Confederacy, in-
cluding those far from the battle lines who played no role in support-
ing the war effort.396  To close the gap, Lincoln argued that
emancipation was “an act of justice” consistent with the “considerate
judgment of mankind.”397  In making this argument, Lincoln invoked
the regard for internationally recognized norms that drove the Decla-
ration of Independence.398  Lincoln’s argument also tacitly acknowl-
edged the trajectory of international human rights law, in which
emancipation had acquired extraordinary momentum.399  Moreover,
the Emancipation Proclamation was public and interstitial, as the
product of a concerted policy that Lincoln had pursued and his per-
393. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–15 (2004) (discussing process of
adjudication under Alien Tort Statute, which allows plaintiffs to seek relief in United States
courts for violations of the “law of nations”).
394. President Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), in 6 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
395. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
396. See Levinson, supra note 350, at 1143–45. R
397. Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 394, at 30; cf. Levinson, supra note R
350, at 1142 (noting Lincoln’s invocation of war powers as “legal justification” for liberat- R
ing slaves).
398. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (seeking justification in
“opinions of mankind”).
399. See Jenny S. Martinez, Antislavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights
Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550, 557–95 (2008) (discussing evolution of international law regarding
slavery).  The suppression of the slave trade, which Lincoln had vigorously supported, pre-
saged emancipation. Id. at 627–28; cf. OAKES, supra note 350, at 157–59 (describing Lin- R
coln’s efforts to end the slave trade).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 85 25-NOV-08 13:14
2008] TRUE BELIEVERS AT LAW 85
ception that the end of the Civil War would in any case spell an end to
the peculiar institution.400
Today, presidents could justify commitments of troops abroad for
humanitarian purposes focusing on the elimination of genocide.401
For example, intervention in Rwanda to stop the genocide there
would have been justified, even absent congressional authorization.
The tailoring principle, however, would forbid intervention for other
purposes, such as a preference for regime change.  In addition, legal
advisors should nurture the transparency gained by collaboration with
international institutions such as the United Nations or the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization.402
F. The Case for Structure: Rule 3.4, the OIG, and the OLC
We also need structural reform to deal with the problem of satel-
lite misconduct.  One option would be to put in place a procedure for
executive branch lawyers who become aware that personnel in their
agency possess potentially incriminating materials and are considering
destroying those items.  Here, Rule 3.4 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct would generally give the lawyer a safe harbor if the
lawyer advised against destruction of the material.403  Another provi-
sion, Rule 1.13, would permit a lawyer to climb the ladder of the entity
leadership structure to alert senior officials of the problem404 and
400. Id. at 154 (describing Lincoln’s promotion of the Confiscation Act and his interpre-
tation, not mentioned in the statutory text, that slaves confiscated by Union forces would
henceforth be free persons); cf. id. at 154–55 (noting Lincoln’s assessment that “the people
would not permit” the return of confiscated slaves to their masters and his view that the
consequences of secession would deal slavery a “mortal wound”).
401. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A.
Res. 260 (III), at 174, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 179th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 9,
1948).  The first Bush Administration offered a legal justification for the intervention in
Somalia centering on the importance of humanitarian aid; the passage of United Nations
Security Council  Resolution 794, S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992), au-
thorizing the use of force to protect relief personnel; and the authority of the President to
protect Americans abroad. See Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia,
16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 8, 9–12 (1992).
402. A competent legal advisor should also recommend timely notice to Congress of
humanitarian intervention, equivalent to the notice required under the War Powers Reso-
lution. See 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (2000) (outlining reporting requirements).  Intervention,
whatever the rationale, unaccompanied by such notice has often failed to take into account
the consequences of unilateral presidential action. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 78, at R
266–68 (discussing aborted 1980 mission to rescue American hostages in Iran).
403. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2008) (“A lawyer shall not . . .
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential eviden-
tiary value.  A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act . . . .”).
404. Id. R. 1.13 (stating in part that “[u]nless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not
necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter
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might permit disclosure not forbidden by substantive law405 if the se-
nior official declined to act appropriately.
As the recent CIA tape destruction episode demonstrates, how-
ever, the current ethical and governmental checks on overreaching of
this kind, including document destruction, are inadequate.  Accord-
ing to published reports, initial meetings on the tapes included Gon-
zales, Addington, and John Bellinger, then-counsel to the National
Security Council.406  Bellinger cautioned the CIA to preserve the
tapes, but Gonzales and Addington may have been more equivocal;
indeed, some reports suggest that top White House lawyers argued
vigorously for the tapes’ destruction.407  Climbing the ladder is useless
in this situation.  The President does not want to know about the
problem because knowing would undermine the stance of plausible
deniability that the Administration wishes to cultivate.  Merely provid-
ing advice also serves to offer bureaucratic cover, while doing little or
nothing to preserve the tapes.
To address this problem, the attorney in a subordinate agency
such as the CIA should be required, under federal law and in the eth-
ics code, to disclose the possibility of material evidence destruction to
the Inspector General of the agency.408  Because of the independence
of the Inspectors General, this disclosure will promote transparency
and ensure the existence of a record.  The Inspector General can then
at her discretion seek an opinion about the destruction from the
OLC.  This process will enforce integrity and deliberation and deter
the manufacture of plausible deniability.
to higher authority in the organization, including . . . to the highest authority that can act
on behalf of the organization”).
405. Substantive law limitations might include contractual limits on disclosure to which
the individual agreed upon joining the government.
406. See Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, Tapes by C.I.A. Lived and Died to Save Image, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at A1.
407. See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Bush Lawyers Discussed Fate of C.I.A. Tapes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at A1.
408. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006) (stating the Office of
Inspector General’s purpose is to “prevent and detect fraud and abuse” in governmental
programs); cf. Pillard, supra note 5, at 754–58 (urging heightened role for Department of R
Justice Inspector General in collaborating with OLC).  Expanded authority for the Justice
Department’s Inspector General may require amending the Inspector General Act. See 5
U.S.C. app. § 8E(b)(2), (3) (2006) (requiring the Inspector General to refer matters re-
garding the professional conduct of Justice Department lawyers to the Justice Depart-
ment’s Office of Professional Responsibility).
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VII. CONCLUSION
These measures are necessary because the advantages of parsi-
mony manifest themselves immediately, while parsimony’s costs are
often latent.  Issue entrepreneurs bask in the plaudits that accompany
an aesthetically satisfying theory, and invite the brickbats of those who
would never agree in the first place.  The lawfare critics traveled this
path with their critique of international law and their wariness about
judicial intervention.  For the lawfare critics, constraint was unneces-
sary and ordinary prudence would aid policymakers in preserving
good will.  As the lawfare critics moved toward a tipping point in their
dismantling of the framework of constraint, they paid insufficient at-
tention to the weak reed that prudence would become when stripped
of these protections.  The resulting loss of reputation for the United
States represents the real wages of issue entrepreneurship.
As is often true, identifying a problem is easier than fashioning a
remedy.  Criminal and tort law solutions risk personalizing the prob-
lem.  The informal norms approach advances a valuable repertoire of
best practices, but lacks stakeholders among the national security con-
servatives who have been most prone to issue entrepreneurship in the
recent past.  Structural reforms raise issues about legitimacy, and risk
a perversely heightened political influence.
To address the costs of issue entrepreneurship for legal advice on
national security matters, lawyers should turn to a model of dialogic
equipoise.  This model resists parsimonious formulas, instead recog-
nizing that the challenge of governing in changing times requires two
values: transparency and tailoring.  Dialogic equipoise allows the Pres-
ident flexibility in taking action, even when that action contravenes
the most accurate reading of sources of authority.  Action, however,
must be both interstitial—with a clear exit strategy—and publicly
disclosed.
To implement the dialogic equipoise model, this Article recom-
mends a blended approach.  A safe harbor for publicly disclosed legal
opinions will encourage disclosure, promote sound legal analysis, and
refine the corpus of executive lawmaking.  Legal ethics norms requir-
ing consideration of institutional consequences and assertion of the
least drastic rationale for executive power will encourage prudence,
while giving the executive needed flexibility.  Finally, giving Inspectors
General and the OLC a formal role in ruling on issues of document
destruction will curb the satellite misconduct that often enters in the
wake of failed issue entrepreneurship.
Adoption of a model of dialogic equipoise will not be easy.  Al-
though much successful national security advice, such as the response
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\MLR101.txt unknown Seq: 88 25-NOV-08 13:14
88 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:1
to the Cuban Missile Crisis, matches the model, it faces cogent criti-
ques on the Left and Right.  Those on the Left may argue that the
model gives the executive too much power, and licenses continuing
disregard for the rule of law among the President’s legal advisors.
Those on the Right may argue that the model gives the permanent
bureaucracy a veto, placing obstacles in the way of mandates for
change.  Each of these critiques identifies plausible risks.  Indeed, any
pre-commitment mechanism generates the risk that some party will be
obliged to bear costs it otherwise could have avoided, or forego gains
it could otherwise have achieved because that party has assumed obli-
gations in common with other stakeholders.  Constitutionalism is an
ongoing experiment in dialog and reciprocity, with these risks of pre-
commitment front and center.  National security lawyers play a vital
role in this venture, reconciling risks with abiding values.  A model of
dialogic equipoise can reinforce deliberation when exigencies ob-
scure the teachings of prudence.
